The development of Swazi cotton cultivation, 1904-85. by Sikhondze, B. A. B.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWAZI COTTON CULTIVATION
1904-85.
Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in African 
History.
Bonginkosi Azariah Bhutana Sikhondze 





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672610
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
THESIS TOPIC




CHAPTER 1 THE ORIGINS OF COTTON CULTIVATION 1904-16 
pp. 1 - 23
CHAPTER 2 THE FRUSTRATION OF SWAZI COTTON CULTIVATION 
1916-31 pp. 24-56
CHAPTER 3 THE WORLD SLUMP AND SW AZI COTTON 
CULTIVATION 1931-39 pp. 57- 85
CHAPTER 4 COTTON BECOMING KING: THE ADVANCE OF COTTON 
PRODUCTION AND OF SWAZI COTTON PRODUCERS 1939-60 pp. 
86-133.
CHAPTER 5 INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN CATTLE and COTTON 
1955-80 pp. 134-167.
CHAPTER 6 COTTON CULTIVATING ENTREPRENEURS and SOCIAL 
DIFFERENTIATION 1955-85. pp. 168-210.
CHAPTER 7 THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE UNIONS IN COTTON 
CULTIVATION 1954-85. pp. 211-237.
CONCLUSION pp. 238-246.
RESEARCH SOURCES pp. 247-269.
ABSTRACT
Settler farm ers in Swaziland failed in their attem pt to 
confine cotton production to their estates partly  because of 
capital limitations. During the First World War some Swazi had 
fought hard to legitimise cotton production by them, and this 
became m anifest in the 1920s and 1930s when early Swazi 
cotton growing entrepreneurs em erged, particu larly  notable 
being the role of Swazi pastors of religion. But since the cotton 
price was low, Swazi advances were limited until the late 1950s 
when some growers made relatively great strides in cotton 
cultivation  especially  in the south eastern area. External 
brokers p rov ided  cred it fo r prosperous grow ers w hile 
n eg lec ting  o ther groups, and the ir p roduce  rem ained  
insignificant. Other cultivators among the progressive farmers 
already owned cattle which were invested in cotton production.
Swazi exploitation of credit provided by brokers, the 
Colonial State, and Swazi Adm inistration in the late 1960s, 
fac ilita ted  social d iffe ren tia tio n  am ong co tton  grow ers. 
Properous growers began to purchase title deed land by the 
late 1960s, and more in the mid-1970s. At that juncture cotton 
production expanded due to its high price which attracted more 
growers from less suited parts of the territory. With prosperity 
in cotton, traditional cattle were cross-bred to sell for more 
money to finance cotton. Rich entrepreneurs added other 
businesses to cotton growing. Cotton expansion led to the 
formation of a cooperative in south east Swaziland to facilitate 
trade. To link the area to the rest of the territory, due to 
m ultiplied econom ic activities there, the in frastructure was 
improved, and economic progress was promoted. Schools, clinics 
and shops were provided by the cotton growing community.
PREFACE
This study traces the developm ent of Sw azi cotton 
cultivation from 1904 to 1985. Having begun as a settler 
monopoly business, Swazi growers who had been shut out 
fought successfully for participation in the business and the 
battle was won in the 1950s, when cotton cultivation expanded 
remarkably in Swazi Areas.
Cotton cultivation in Swaziland had been prom oted mainly 
by companies which were based in South Africa. As a result, 
research had to be conducted both in South A frica and 
Swaziland Archives and libraries. To accomplish this project 
and to undertake fieldwork in Swaziland financial assistance 
was received from  the International D evelopm ent Research 
Centre in Nairobi. I am very grateful to the organisation 
because due to the heavy reliance of this study upon oral 
evidence, many visits were made to the area studied for 
frequent interviews. The Social Science Research Unit of the 
University of Swaziland also deserve a sim ilar gratitude for 
their financia l assistance towards the com pletion  of the 
research. Among those who financed the study are the British 
Council without whose sponsorship I could not have been able 
to undertake my training in England and to return to Swaziland 
for intensive research, and to them I am very grateful.
The Swaziland National Archives (referred to in the notes as 
Sna), under the directorship of Julius S. Dlamini were extremely 
helpful in allowing me access even to files which were still 
closed according to laws which govern their perservation and 
use. The staff of the Royal Commonwealth Society Library in 
London were also helpful in letting me read their records on 
Swaziland and on the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation. The 
K illie Campbell Africana Library in Durban and the Union 
Building in Pretoria, South Africa, were also cooperative though 
their records did not answer those questions which were 
central to the themes of the study.
During my field work there were many people who made an 
invaluab le  input tow ards the com pletion of the study. 
U nfortunately  there is not enough space to thank them 
individually, but to do so in general terms. Among them are my 
brothers Captain Bongani and Dumisani both of whom assisted 
me in so many ways. It was at the typing stage that Maryjayne 
of the History Office, SOAS, also proved an indispensable force 
and to her I am grateful for the assistance she afforded me. I 
would also like to express my thanks to Catherine Lawrence of 
the Geography Department, SOAS, for the assistance she gave 
me while I was drawing up maps for the thesis.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Professor 
Richard Gray whose guidance and interest in the study from its 




THE ORIGINS OF COTTON CULTIVATION,
1904-16
Already by the end of the 19th century some businessmen 
and politicians had begun to consider the incorporation of the 
empire to the m etropolis in order to solve the problems that 
were threatening to wreck the British economy. It was at the 
end of the 19th century that the prices of industrial products 
began to decline and so did the profits, and these were brought 
about by the keen competition for the limited European market, 
made worse by some rapid industrialisation in Germany and the 
U nited  S tates o f A m erica. These problem s w ere even 
exacerbated by 'the reduction of the free trade world by tariff 
b a rr ie rs '.^  Since these events were a threat to the stability of 
the British economy, it became im perative to develop the 
colonies so that some economic cooperation between them and 
the m etropolis could be established. The type of development 
alluded to here was one whereby the colonies would provide 
m arkets for B ritish surplus goods which could not compete 
effectively in the European markets; it was also thought that 
co lonies could  provide the raw  m aterials w hich B ritish  
industries needed so desperately to survive the com petition.2 
Such economic cooperation, it was hoped, would reduce the 
amount of dependence each of the colonies exerted upon the 
British economy while at the same time it jerked  up their 
econom y.
Politicians such as Joseph Chamberlain, who was Colonial 
Secretary from 1895 to 1903, had supported the development of 
commodities such as cotton in the empire as a solution to the 
declining supplies from the United States of America. It was also 
during his term of office that the B ritish Cotton Growing 
Association was formed in Lancashire in 1902 specifically to 
promote cotton cultivation in the empire. The B.C.G.A., with some 
British entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce all cooperated 
to urge colonial governments and the Colonial Office to make the 
venture a success.3 During Chamberlain's term of office, great
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strides were made in colonial developm ent but the main 
handicap was the lack of capital. For instance, between '1875 
and 1915 parliam ent authorised a total expenditure of only 
about £1 ,400,000 ' for co lonial developm ent.4 Initially the 
B.C.G.A. had earmarked West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa 
and South A frica (Zululand and the Eastern Transvaal) as 
potential cotton producing regions on the African continent.5
It was hoped that by 1900 the infrastructure of this sort 
could have long been realised in these regions, especially in 
W est Africa due to the region's long history of trade with the 
outside world, but it was obvious that even so the other regions 
would still require huge sums of money for the development of 
the infrastructure before it became usable for trading purposes. 
The failure of the B.C.G.A. to raise adequate funds to improve the 
infrastructure to facilitate both trade and communication was 
adequate explanation for the meagre production of the crop 
until after the First World War, when production began to rise.6 
It would, however, be dangerous to give the impression that the 
rise  in output was due only to the im provem ent of the 
infrastructure compared to the market price of the commodity 
along with other relevant factors of production. However, 
infrastructural improvements did occur particularly in regions 
with a high potential for production: these were among areas 
settled by European producers and in those areas cotton 
experim ents w ere carried  out. There was, how ever, no 
deliberate attempt by the colonial regime to provide roads to 
African areas, and the history of cotton production in Uganda 
where the A frican contribution was the dom inant factor to 
Uganda's leading supply of cotton to the market, is a case in 
point. Here, transport facilities were only im proved in the 
1920's. Africans who benefited from the transport facilities 
provided before the 1920's were those who accidentally found 
their homes lying along roads leading from European settler 
farms to the market.^
In Swaziland, the history of cotton cultivation began in 
1904, when Allister M itchell Miller, owner of large pieces of
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land and the Swaziland Corporation, Ltd., started to experiment 
with some varieties given to him by the B.C.G.A.8 Miller was a 
Scottish settler who had arrived in Swaziland in 1S88 from
S c o t la n d .9 The time of his arrival in Swaziland followed the 
'discovery' of the goldfields in the W itwatersrand which had 
injected some great histeria into those European settlers who 
had come to southern Africa for investment purposes, not just 
for settlement. With that purpose in mind, Miller wasted no time 
since soon after his arrival he made his presence felt in the 
territory. For instance, he was appointed secretary of the White 
Committee in Swaziland, 'and one of the five representatives of 
king M bandzeni on the comm ittee' in which he served as
secretary. He also secured for himself a very important position
of private secretary to the king. It stands to reason that Miller 
was greedy for power, because after this key position, he went 
on to accumulate more power by weaving his way up to the 
position of Resident Advisor to the king. To attain this latter 
achievem ent M iller was assisted by one of the pow erful
concessionaires in Swaziland, John Thoburn. Thoburn did this by 
supplanting Sir Theophilus Shepstone in the position of Resident 
Advisor to the king in favour of Miller, because Shepstone had 
cancelled Thoburn's concession. But M iller's appointm ent as 
Advisor to the king lasted for only a short while, since soon after 
the death of the king in October 1889 he was removed on 
account of corruption and Shepstone was re-instated. The 
dismissal of M iller had been occasioned by the death of king 
M bandzeni in October 1889 who was later succeeded by the 
m ost vigilant Queen Regent. It was the Queen Regent who 
realised the speed by which M iller apportioned out large land 
concessions to his friends. For instance, his friend Thoburn is 
said to have obtained 'two rem arkable concessions' which 
provided him TOO year leasehold to all land and mineral areas 
which had not been granted by the king at the time of grant*.H
The behaviour of Miller and Thoburn could be understood 
clearly when placed in the context of the southern African 
events of the time. Three years before M iller was appointed into 
the position of Advisor to the king, goldfields were opened up in
4
the T ransvaal for m ining, and profits prom ised a bright 
economic future in the region. Those who either did not afford 
adequate capital to compete with the big magnates or arrived 
late on the spot were turned to other regions which promised to 
be a second W itw atersrand. To this end some im perialists 
expanded as far as Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in search of a second 
gold m i n e .  12 These elements also spilled over to Swaziland, and 
the most avid of these are represented by Miller and Thoburn. 
Immediate mining was not carried out nor was there any search 
of evidence to ascertain if mineral wealth was actually available, 
rather the most urgent thing was the accumulation of as much 
land as possible in those areas which promised to be the second 
T ransvaal.
In an attempt to safeguard and perhaps to multiply the 
capital already invested, M iller and Thoburn were quick to 
dispose of some of their concessions to a small London Syndicate 
in 1889 for £2000, which was later absorbed in June 1891 by a 
company in London known as the Um bandine Concessions 
Syndicate with a share capital of £50,000, in which both 
im perialists are believed to have received '100 £1 shares 
e a c h ' ,  13 But due to the labour shortage in the region, the 
company could not exploit the mineral and other resources, 
instead it concentrated on the accumulation of more land. The 
labour shortage was caused by the attractions the South African 
cash commanded there. It would, however, be proper to talk of 
com petition for labour power between the local (Swaziland) 
investors and those in South Africa, whereby the former could 
not compete effectively to stop the migration. It was therefore 
capital shortage rather than lack of em ployable numbers of 
Swazi men that made the capitalists in Swaziland suffer acutely 
from labour shortages. Even skilled labour, especially  from 
abroad, could not be attracted to Swaziland away from the 
booming South Africa. In 1898, after its holdings had expanded 
the syndicate was merged into a public company, the Swaziland 
Corporation, Ltd., whose first local manager was Allister Mitchell 
M iller. 14
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In Swaziland, in 1903 when the colonial state was preparing 
to mount the land partition programme of alienated land, it also 
imposed a heavy tax on the Swazi with a view towards releasing 
labour power to go and serve on capitalist institutions. Each 
male from the age of 18 years was expected to pay £2 and there 
were other charges, especially in cases of polygamists where a
tax of 35 each additional wife was pa id .15 The
institutions which absorbed the labour were mining industries 
and the modern agricultural sector. But, as argued by J.S. Crush, 
at that juncture mining reeled under some economic depression 
so that it was risky to invest in it then. The only business which
offered better investm ent opportunities and was least affected
by the depression was agricultural farming. The interests of the 
corporation were then swayed to the latter in which it tried 
plantation agriculture. This venture was made strong and viable 
by the South A frican consum er market whose demand for 
forestry products, sub-tropical produce and stock products all of 
which were suited to the territory, was gradually expanding. 16 
Also charged with the responsibility to multiply the investments 
of the corporation, the directors had also assessed the possibility 
of a cotton industry in Swaziland, and the territory promised a 
bright future in this direction. Since the corporation did not have 
adequate capital for such an investm ent the directors had to 
look beyond its param eters, this time to the m etropoles, and 
specifically  to Am erican planters who had the capital and 
expertise in cotton production. It was hoped that the question of 
labour would be obviated by the employm ent of the local 
womenfolk and the importation of labourers from  Portuguese
T o n g a la n d .l?
Already by 1903, the am ount of land owned by the 
corporation had grown so vast that it was thought to be in the 
region of 379,700 acres. But not all this amount of land could be 
profitably put under cotton cultivation because some of it was 
unsuited to the production of the crop due mainly to the huge 
rocks and high hills which were found in some parts of the 
territory. About 20,000 acres of Dupont's Estate and 170,000 
acres of Peebles in Manzini were ^ g H ^ c o t t o n  cultivation,
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while the rest was turned into grazing grounds. Yet another area 
which offered better investm ent opportunities was livestock 
such as cattle  w hose m arket was still rem unerative  in 
Johannesburg, South A f r i c a . 1 8
Another capitalist company which got involved with cotton 
cultivation was the Swaziland Mushroom Land Settlement. This 
company was form ed in 1907 by Lord Lovat as the Land 
Settlement Association of South Africa, with the objective of 
purchasing land for the settlem ent of British farm ers in the 
territory. In 1908 the name of the company changed to become 
the Mushroom Valley Agricultural Training Association. Finance 
for the company was provided by Lovat's colleagues and friends 
all of whom became shareholders with fixed rates of interest, 
while surplus profits were devoted to the expansion of the 
investm ents of the syndicate. With the subscribed capital the 
Swaziland branch of the company was formed and it undertook 
to cultivate cotton in the midlands of the t e r r i t o r y .  19 a  third 
com pany to take in te rest in cotton cu ltivation  was the 
Henderson Consolidated Company, Ltd., whose manager by 1906 
was A.R. Torrens.20
This then is the background information which will help 
follow the events which hinge upon the cultivation of cotton in 
Swaziland from 1904.21 At this juncture, the B.C.G.A. did not yet 
have an agent of its own, at least in South Africa and Swaziland, 
so it was forced to rely upon merchant organizations to spread 
cotton cultivation in those areas of the region which were suited 
for the crop. In Swaziland this responsibility was delegated to 
the Swaziland Corporation, whose base was London. M iller, as 
local manager shouldered the responsibility. M iller had begun 
with the experiments at the Mawelawela plains which are found 
to the w est of the Luyengo Campus of the U niversity  of 
Swaziland. Being a settler himself Miller was bound to identify 
more with the interests of the European settler population to the 
total oblivion of those of the indigenous people. This attitude 
became even more glaring when the cultivation of cotton was 
begun by some settlers through his encouragement. Other cotton
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experiments were carried out by Frank Buckham at Croydon 
near the Mbuluzi River (see sketch map) in the Mliba area in 
1 9 0 4 -0 5 .2 2  Cotton seeds were distributed to other interested 
European farmers as early as 1905, a year after M iller himself 
had started with cotton cultivation for experimental purposes. 
No African was approached and encouraged to use the seeds for 
experim ental purposes.
The sources available do not unfortunately suggest the 
reason why the local population was left outside of the cotton 
venture. Perhaps, the B .C .G .A . did not m ention  Swazi 
involvement at so early a stage of cotton production because it 
did not occur to them that leaving the Swazi out of the list of 
intended recipients for the seeds would create problems in the 
long run. It is however, also possible that the B.C.G.A. had made 
the omission deliberately on the grounds that the Swazi growers, 
whose agricultural farming methods were still backward, could 
be involved in due course. Because of the backward farming 
technology it was perhaps hoped that the Swazi could acquire 
the technology through their apprenticeship on the farms of 
their European counterparts and only after that development 
w ould they be confident to undertake cotton cu ltivation . 
However, this settler attitude was contrary to the philosophy of 
the B.C .G .A . who aimed to encourage m ainly indigenous 
cultivators to grow the crop along with the settler population. In 
their long term plan the B.C.G.A. wanted the indigenous growers 
to play a predom inant ro le  particu larly  in U ganda and 
N i g e r i a . 23 Yet what seems to have been another cause for the 
exclusion of the local growers was the B.C.G.A.'s reliance upon 
the settlers and the colonial state to introduce cotton production 
in the territory. Consequently, when the colonial state, along 
with the collusion of the settlers, began to distribute cotton 
seeds for cu ltiva tion , their approach was predom inantly  
determined by their fear of what would happen to the labour 
market if both populations were encouraged to grow the crop, 
and the main worry, it seems, was that the labour market would 
shrink, in due course. Both the colonial state and the settlers
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were wary of the destabilisation of the labour market and as a 
result sought to protect it at all costs.
Miller’s first experiment at the Mawelawela plain did not 
do well in the 1904-05 season due in the main to the fact that 
the crop was destroyed by fire. W hat was left after the 
destruction, M iller was able to send to the Imperial Institute in 
London for evaluation in an attempt to assess the potential of 
the industry in the region. After his laboratory assessment of 
the quality of the crop, Professor Wyndham Dunstan indicated
that the potential was quite high and that in a good season much 
better results would be realised. This report, however, stated 
that the crop had been planted rather late hence its delayed
ripening. Late planting, which had led to late m aturity, had 
rendered the quality of the crop rather inferior to a crop that 
could have been planted early to mature at the right time. In 
essence the report implied that it was important to identify an 
earlier planting time to improve the quality of the c r o p . 24 The 
institute later sent the crop to the ginners for the evaluation of 
the commercial value of the lint. The latter ginned the crop on 
the Platt's MaCarthy gin, and after their assessment a report was 
released and gave more encouraging results than those of the
Scientific and Technical department of the Im perial Institute,
The following is an extract from the conclusions of the ginners:
In view of the statement already referred to 
which was made in the letter accompanying 
the samples, that the latter represented the 
worst class of cotton in the plantation, the 
results obtained are very encouraging and 
indicate that the best portions of the crop were 
probably of excellent quality. There, can, 
therefore be little doubt that the cultivation 
of these cottons would be very successful 
and further efforts are to be strongly a d v o c a t e d ,  ^  5
The types of cotton referred to in the report above were Sample 
1, Brazillian Cotton , Sample 2, Sea Island Cotton, Sample 3, 
Egyptian Number 1, and Sample 4, Egyptian Number 2, all of
9
which were planted in the 1904-05 season at the Mawelawela
p la n ta tio n .26
The Miller plantation of these varieties was made possible 
by the technical assistance which was provided by J. Burtt-Davy, 
government botanist from South Africa, stationed at Barberton. 
It was also through the same scientist that the results from the 
Imperial Institute were delivered to Miller. But the problem of 
relying on a scientist who was as distant as Burtt-Davy proved a 
delaying factor in the long run, and the problem s which 
frustrated cotton cultivation and expansion in the territory took 
rather too long to be solved. Those European settlers who 
depended upon M iller to solve their technical problems suffered 
inconvenience especially  because of travelling  d ifficu lties 
between their farms and M iller's where they were instructed 
either by M iller himself or by the scientist who only visited the 
territory occasionally. Apart from the transport problems, there 
were yet others which hindered cotton cultivation such as 
cattle-keeping which pre-dated the growing of cotton. Cattle- 
keeping was strong for the settlers and more because of the long 
history behind it. Due to its viable and well established market 
in Johannesburg and D urban, cattle-keeping appealed to 
European farmers and to the Swazi cultivators, and perhaps 
even more strongly to the latter.
Acting on the recommendations of the ginners, Miller 
transferred  cotton planting from  the M aw elaw ela to more 
suitable areas like his farm, Peebles, in Manzini. Later, Miller 
expanded to his other farm  in Siteki where the clim atic 
conditions were well suited to the production of cotton. The 
clim atic  conditions at M aw elaw ela were m ore tem perate 
compared to those of Manzini and Siteki which were warm and 
ideal for the production of co tton .27  Cotton produced in 
Swaziland was exported to England through the port of Durban, 
and the cost of this transport was borne by the producer. In its 
initial stages, the cotton production technology and all related 
factors of production, had not yet been m astered by the 
company to boast of a good quality crop to fetch an attractive
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price in London. In order to bring down the costs of transport 
the company had to invite as many producers as possible so that 
the transportation costs could be shared equitably between the 
various grow ers.28
The earliest positive respondent was none other than the 
Henderson Consolidated Corporation, who duly began to toy with 
the idea of cotton production in the Balekane area in the year 
1906-07, two years after Miller had been on the business. The 
choice of the area by the Henderson group had been governed 
by the fact that cotton had been found to be growing wild there 
and that its quality was considered good and impressive. This 
realisation served as a guiding factor and the Henderson group 
were duly attracted by it to begin investing in cotton there. 
However, due to the shortage of labour power which they 
encountered the extent of cotton cultivation was handicapped 
and more so in the following season. Initially, the Henderson 
Corporation had started off with an area of 5 acres with a view 
to expand in future, but since the events did not favour these 
plans the results were different. Not only was the company 
unable to expand in future but it was forced in the following 
season to cut down on the amount of land it had cultivated 
previously by one acre. However, the output was not too bad 
when one considers that the corporation was still only 
experimenting with the crop for the first time. In their first year 
the Henderson realised an 539 lbs seed cotton output per acre 
with good quality results since the staple was estimated to be 
one and one-eighth to one and one-quarter, and that was 
considered close to the world-wide accepted American Upland, 
which was the best selling staple at that time, used then as a 
yardstick to measure the quality. The transport expenses were 
estimated at 6 pence per 100 lb of seed cotton from Swaziland 
via K om atiport to Durban from  where it was shipped to 
L o n d o n . 29 inspite of the long waiting before the money could 
be paid from  London, the producers persisted  w ith the 
cultivation of cotton. Production costs on the other hand were 
placed at two and three-quarter pence per lb while the market
11
price in England varied according to the variety as indicated in 
the analysis table below:
Cook's Long Staple 16 3/4 " " ” 15 1 / 2 ..............
Cook’s Long Staple2 16 ................. "..................15 1 / 4 ........
This price range indicates that the market price of cotton
was encouraging, but the m ost unfortunate developm ent in 
Swaziland was the outbreak of pests which spoiled the crop. It 
was in the same year, 1906-07, that the bollworm, the bug and 
the cotton stainer, made their appearance felt on the crop and 
caused considerable concern to the p r o d u c e r s . 30 The implication 
of this development was that the production costs were forced 
to rise, while it was reported that the local market price did not 
necessarily  respond in the same way. The im pact of this 
developm ent became m anifest in 1907-08 as shown in the
price decline. As a result of the infestation, the quality declined 
and consequently the price in England was directly affected 
while one’s knowledge of the local price remains unknown due 
to the absence of relevant statistics. Only the Fruitt’s big boll and 
the Russell’s big boll put up some resilience to the pest attack
hence their price was only depressed very slightly.31 Since the
spread of pests that were harmful to cotton was a result of some 
poor farming technology, all it meant was that the cultivators
had employed primitive technology to produce cotton. However,
primitive technology went hand in hand with the carelessness of 
the growers which was reflected in their failure to destroy the 
cotton trees immediately after harvesting. But pests alone could 
not have lowered the quality of the crop so drastically without 
the long distance involved in the transportation of the crop 
having made a major contribution en route to London. This line 
of reasoning could also be strengthened by the fact that the 
mode of packing was very backward then com pared to the 
modern one. Seen differently, the problem of insect attack on
Variety 
Bohemian 
Fruitt's Big Boll 
Russell's Big Boll
Price (1906-07) Price (1907-08




the crop need not be viewed in isolation, rather it needs to be 
used along with other factors whose influence went a long way 
towards handicapping the effort to establish cotton production 
in Swaziland. These will be returned to below.
In spite of the adverse experience growers met in cotton 
production, the Henderson Corporation, whose problems appear 
to have been more harrowing relative to those of other growers, 
was not deterred. Instead it went ahead to experim ent with 
other varieties in the next season, 1908-09, and also grew these 
on different soils from the previous varieties, at a different 
altitude and the area on which the experiments were carried out 
received more rainfall than those areas where the company had 
carried out the work before. In addition to this work the 
company also w anted to identify  the variety  whose yield 
capacity surpassed the others so that in future it invested in the 
prom otion of that particular strain. These were the results: 
Bohemian was 447 lbs per acre, Abassi was 94 lbs per acre, 
Fruitt's big boll was 517 lbs per acre, Cook's long staple was 579 
lbs per acre, Russell's big boll was 435 lbs per a c r e , 32 and the 
yields were encouraging to the company if this were to be 
improved on in future. These results gave the impression to the 
company that cotton cultivation would be a paying venture in 
the long run. However, what was clear to the company was that 
insect attack would rem ain their concern so long as their 
interest in cotton in the area continued. At this time the boll 
worm, cotton stainer, leaf aphis and triangular leaf disease, had 
become a constant concern of every investor in cotton. The 
1908-09 season had given the H enderson C orporation  a 
harrowing experience, because cotton pests had m ultiplied very 
rapidly throughout the country. Ironically, the crop did not 
sustain a heavy attack as it had done in the previous season 
most probably because the variety which had been planted in 
that season was still resistant to pest attack.
The third company to invest in cotton production in the area 
was the Mushroom Land Settlement, which began the cultivation 
of cotton in the midlands of the territory in 1907.33 This
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company did not receive adequate coverage in the sources that 
were consulted  perhaps because its con tribu tion  was not
remarkable since it cultivated cotton in a region that was less
suitable for the crop like the Swaziland Corporation had done in 
the initial stages of the industry. But the midlands, which stood 
in the middle of the territory, had parts which possessed a 
suitable climate to the cultivation of the crop. W hat seems a
plausible explanation for the choice of a less suitable region to 
cultivate cotton by the latter companies is that they had already 
invested their tim e and energy in pastoral farm ing whose 
profits at the time exceeded those which accrued from cotton 
production by a wide margin. Both companies were engaged in 
land sales whose profits, along with those of cattle-keeping, 
rendered  investm en t in co tton  p roduction  a secondary 
undertaking: the market for cotton was remote and its returns
took a long time to reach t h e m . 3 4
Yet another problem at that moment was the question of 
labour. Labour shortages threatened to nip the project in the 
bud. In 1903, for example, the tax payable to government by 
adult males had been revised and raised with the intention of 
releasing the labour power to these concerns and others whose 
business undertakings had been halted by the labour shortages. 
In order to a ttrac t the labour in adequate num bers the 
com panies investing in agricultural farming needed to offer 
competitive wages not with companies based in South Africa but 
even with alternative local sources of income likely to divert the 
labour away from settler farms. The alternative local sources of 
income assumed the sale of cattle. Sometimes, a range of crops 
other than cotton which found a viable market locally, were 
produced and these were sweet potatoes and others though it is 
important to state that the extent of the market for these crops 
was very limited at the time. Some of the Swazi growers were 
resident on private farms, an incident of history because when 
land alienation took place some of the Swazi already resident in 
those areas which had been designated for alienation chose to 
remain there while the conditions were still amicable. The fact 
that the colonial state allowed some of the Swazi to remain on
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private farms, was to prove a serious mistake in the long run 
since the more Swazi were resident on private farms the more
labour power supply was enjoyed by those landlords who
practised the system at the expense of those who did not have 
any tenants on their farms. Most landlords did not allow their 
tenants to go and sell their labour power to other settlers, and to 
ensure strict control over this labour Swazi residents on private 
farms required some written permission to leave the farm not 
necessarily for purposes of going out to look for a job but 
generally to leave the farm for any business they needed to do
outside. However, the latter system of labour control was more
common in South Africa than in S w a z i l a n d . 3 5
The question of labour is quite intricate, at least in the 
period under review. For instance, the institution of a written 
permit for a tenant was primarily meant to provide security to 
those unscrupulous European settlers who treated their workers 
harshly, because if there was a free movement of workers from 
one settler to the next, the unscrupulous ones would face a 
labour crisis. It was commonplace for tenants, whenever they 
met, to share accounts of their individual experiences and social 
relations with their landlords, and subsequently decisions were 
made to transfer their tenancy from an unscrupulous landlord to 
a reasonable one.3 6 The colonial regime had been sympathetic 
to the plight of their kith and kin hence the introduction of the 
written perm it which restricted the labour to their employment 
on a perm anent basis. This labour dimension was common in 
colonial Swaziland, particularly in the period under r e v i e w . 37
In the case of companies who grew cotton the tenant 
system of labour was popular for the same reasons that have 
already been discussed above. The Swaziland Corporation kept 
large numbers of tenants on its farm Peebles and these tenants 
were em ployed in the production of cotton. In m ost cases, 
however, the dominant mode of production was the capitalist 
one. This latter mode of production appears to have been more 
ex p lo ita tiv e  e sp ec ia lly  because it co n cen tra ted  on the 
employment of women and children who were paid low wages
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in the region of 6d per day for picking up to 25 and sometimes 
upwards of 30 lbs seed cotton by 1907.38 On the other hand, 
tenants were encouraged to cultivate cotton on private land, and 
this cotton was in turn purchased by the landlords on whose 
farms the production had taken place at 2s to 4s per bag 
w eighing the equ iva len t of 50 kgs in today 's  m etric 
m e a s u r e m e n t s . 39 This phenomenon begins to feature in the 
history of cotton cultivation by Swazi growers in 1910 and 
becomes a common phenomenon later but under some strict 
control. W hile the Swazi producer was saved from  the 
transportation problems which involved taking the crop to the 
market, the fact that his produce was listed under the names of 
people who had not actually done the production distorted the 
history of cotton cultivation especially by not giving due credit 
to the actual producers of the commodity.
In the Balekane area the Henderson Corporation was joined 
a year later by some settlers in the production of cotton. S. 
Sandeman, for instance, began to grow cotton in 1 9 0 7 . 4 0  Since 
he kept some tenants on his farm he did not experience the 
labour shortage problem  which had been encountered by the 
above company. In addition to tenants, Sandeman also employed 
the services of women and children. Sandeman is believed to 
have been one of the settlers who favoured the retention of 
tenants as a form of labour power by increasing the land upon 
which they settled and carried out their private agricultural 
farming at attractively low rates of rental. The objective of land 
increm ent was mainly to attract, for settlers of Sandeman's 
calibre, more tenants with a view to sustain the labour issue. In 
Mafutseni, which lies west of the Manzini town, settlers such as 
Herbert S. Perry and Captain Wallace of Dinedor, are also alleged 
to have engaged in cotton cultivation by means of engaging 
tenants on their farm s. In the m ajority of cases tenants 
depended on their families for labour to produce cotton, and 
only on very rare cases would they employ outside labour, 
especially when one considers the meagre level on which cotton 
was being grown at the time. Yet again it is difficult to assess 
this aspect and the level of cotton growing in the absence of
16
statistical backing in the recorded sources, but oral evidence 
asserts that the estimates were between one acre to one and a 
half acres. To a short sighted group of Swazi producers such an 
arrangem ent represented some bargain since it saved them 
from the problems of transport and others.41
Those settlers who resisted the use of tenants for cotton 
production did so either because they wanted to continue with 
the struggle to make cotton purely a European crop or due to the 
fact that they could not attract enough tenants to their farms. 
The latter category of disgruntled white farmers later advocated 
the elimination of tenancy on the grounds that it encouraged the 
spread of pests which would lead to the destruction of the
industry  in the territo ry  in due course. H ow ever, these 
allegations were not accepted by every settler and those who 
benefited from the tenant system dismissed the explanation as 
being a lam e excuse for racism . Yet another p lausible 
explanation is that some settlers feared com petition more than 
the destruction of the cotton industry in the long run. Hence, in 
order to pre-empt such a development, in 1909, some European 
settlers began to move very strongly for the formation of what 
came to be known as a European Farmers' Association which 
was duly formed in 1911.42 it was thought that the farm ers’ 
Association would attend to the farming problems of the settler 
community by providing marketing facilities, and other things 
which helped to solve some of the farming problems of the 
settler community. And two years after the Association was 
formed those members who held grudges against settlers who 
practised tenancy solicited the support of the Association to 
eliminate the practice. First, they argued that the system made 
the labour market lop-sided to the disadvantage of those who
did not favour it. Second, tenants who sometimes failed to get an 
adequate harvest to im press their landlords that they were 
indispensable, w ould steal from  their neighbouring settler
farmers to swell their small output. Thirdly, disgruntled farmers
also expressed their concern on the delicate nature of cotton 
cultivation and that if some of those who grew it, like the Swazi,
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did not know how to counteract the spread of pests, the industry 
would be nipped in the bud by such careless c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .4 3
In the same year sim ilar developm ents occurred in the 
Union of South Africa, and led to the enactment of the 1913 
Land Act, whose gist was mainly to reduce economic cooperation 
between Europeans and Africans for fear that some of the
Africans might, in the long run, emerge as rich entrepreneurs. In 
the same wise, European settlers in Swaziland might have feared 
that their 'superior culture' was in danger of being challenged 
by 'the noble savage', which meant that the beliefs and notions 
they had held and sometimes promulgated about the African, as 
being unenterprising and lazy were on the verge of being 
proven false. The impact of the Act was also adverse upon
African growers in South Africa as Colin Bundy has indicated in 
his study of 'peasants' t h e r e . 4 4 in fact? Swazi responses to the 
cultivation of cotton were no longer confined to private farms, 
but they were gradually spilling over to, and were becoming
m anifest even on, Sw azi N ation Land, then know n as 
r e  s e r v e  s .  4 5 European settler farmers were quick to notice such 
a development since it threatened to cut short African constant 
sale of cotton to them (settlers).
Not all of the Swazi growers could, however, be said to 
have been careless by selling dirty cotton to the market and 
even to their European counterparts. The fact that the Swazi 
cotton growers could be divided into two groups: namely those 
who were careful growers and sold mostly clean cotton and 
those whose cotton was discovered to be dirty was well known 
to the noisy European growers and it was precisely  this
know ledge that m ade them  anxious about Sw azi cotton 
production. This was caused by their concern over the state of 
the labour market. This development led to the realisation that 
European monopoly over cotton cultivation was already on the 
brink of collapse, hence the appeal to the A ssociation for 
protection against Swazi com petition. The solution to most 
settlers, it seemed, was to discourage the Swazi from growing 
the crop by accusing them of stealing cotton from the farms of
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their (European) neighbours, a strategy which led to Swazi
growers being paid very low sums for their cotton. Statistics are, 
however, wanting especially on the exact prices which were paid 
to the Swazi for their cotton; oral research does nonetheless 
allege that an equivalent of a 50 kg was purchased by 
Europeans at 4s or even less sometimes on the grounds that the 
crop was of inferior quality or sometimes that it had been 
s t o l e n . 4 6  But since all European cotton was baled by Swazi
workers, the allegations made that Swazi cotton was of inferior
quality was discovered to be false since it was baled along with 
European cotton without any prior clean up exercise being 
carried out on Swazi cotton. However, not all settlers were anti- 
Swazi grown cotton, for instance, European farmers like Perry of 
M afutseni, and Captain W allace, found south west of Luve,
treated Swazi growers well and reasonably good prices were 
paid for their c o t t o n . 4 7  But it is important to note that at that 
time the Swazi did not cultivate cotton on a large-scale, the
acreage, as indicated above, ranged between one-half acre to 
one and half acres per producer. The majority of these Swazi 
growers were sm all-scale cultivators which means that their 
contribution was very minimal. In that case they could not have 
m aterially threatened the hegemony of the settler farmers at 
least in the short r u n . 4 8
The problems of transport were minimal and could not have 
served as a strong deterrent to Swazi production of the crop 
because the majority of the Swazi who grew cotton were those 
whose homesteads lay close to the settler farmers' holdings who 
encouraged them to sell the crop directly to them. Secondly, the 
amount produced up to the outbreak of, and even for the 
duration of the First World War, was too small to warrant hiring 
a truck for its transportation. The form of transport widely used 
was porterage whereby only members of the family carried the 
burden, sometimes with the assistance of other members of the
extended  fam ily . But generally , fam ily labour, fo r the
transportation of the item, was sufficient and other forms of 
transport only became a necessity in the 1950's when the
volume in output began to e x p a n d . 4 9 The issue of Swazi cotton
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production began to worry settler producers in 1914 and in 
subsequent years. The year 1914 is crucial in the sense that it is 
when Swazi residents, on private farms, were forcibly moved to 
Swazi reserves. When this occurred, among those who migrated 
from private farms, were tenant farmers who had grown cotton 
on the farms of their landlords, on a 'share-crop system'. After 
these growers had moved to Swazi areas they did not give up 
the habit. As a result they became a force to reckon with 
especially by those settlers who were bent on throttling such an 
entrepreneurship. Among these growers were those who had 
since accumulated the technical skills, and equipm ent such as 
the plough, basic as it was, when they began to grow cotton on 
Swazi Nation Land, their farming attracted the attention of both 
factions of the European community: those who wanted to 
frustrate the endeavour and those who aimed to encourage the 
enterprise so that they could continue to benefit from buying 
the commodity at low prices, by taking adv^Ea^ge of the lack of 
transport on the part of the Swazi producer. The majority of 
these Swazi entrepreneurs did not have a high degree of 
awareness in commerce, and perhaps that explains why they 
did not resist their exploitation by these settlers. But there is 
more to it than meets the eye, for the payment of the tax was 
one notorious cause for Swazi exploitation since 1903 when the 
tax was revised and the tax made heavy for all Swazi males who 
were of paying age. Those who wished to rem ain with their 
families and did not migrate to South Africa in order to avoid a 
social dislocation similar to that which was experienced in South 
Africa, the cause of which was the mineral r e v o l u t i o n , 50 chose  
to earn the required money by other more noble means, chief 
among which was the sale of cattle and the production of cotton, 
still in its embryonic stage. In the process these Swazi growers 
lent themselves to settler exploitation.
In conclusion, what has transpired in the discussion is that, 
when cotton production was begun not only in Swaziland but 
throughout the empire, the B.C.G.A.'s main objective was to 
stabilise the constant flow of the commodity to the metropolis 
by encouraging both settlers and the indigenous group of
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growers to cultivate the crop. It was, however, the latter group 
that the B.C.G.A. sought to concentrate on for the production of 
cotton, due in the main to the cheap mode of production they 
utilised. But in Swaziland as a result of the indigenous people's 
rural economy being peripheral to the market economy, the only 
group who appeared ready for the project at least in the mean 
time were the settlers. The latter aimed to retain the enterprise 
as a purely European preserve, but the contradictions which 
soon punctuated their capitalist mode of production gave way to 
Swazi participation by 1909. Settlers themselves realised that to 
secure the labour services of the male members of the Swazi 
community they needed to encourage them instead to grow the 
crop and later sell it to the settlers.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FRUSTRATION OF SWAZI COTTON CULTIVATION,
1916-31.
Those Swazi who had worked on company plantations and 
European settler farms had, by 1916, accum ulated adequate 
know ledge on the production technology required  to grow 
co tto n . 1 Following the revision of the tax by the colonial state, 
some Swazi men who were of a tax paying age earned money by 
producing cotton, tobacco and maize, though the local market for 
the latter was poorer than that of the two cash crops.2 In 
addition to this group of Swazi growers were pastors, and some 
migrant workers who had been to the Natal Province of South 
Africa. Some of the pastors who responded to cotton production 
received some assistance from the Catholic Church though they 
were not members of the church, such as Ephraim M. Dlamini of 
Ngudzeni or Paul Thwala of Sandleni, but due to their desire to 
im itate their catholic friends and relatives, they sought their 
advice and even technical assistance.3 Archival sources mention 
that early Swazi respondents to cotton cultivation were educated. 
In fact, pastors of that time did not have a high education, merely 
one that enabled them to read their bibles, write and count 
Sunday o ffe r in g s .4 Yet other Swazi cotton producers were 
migrant workers who had visited the Natal Province in search of
employment. It was at Magudu, the northern part of Zululand,
that the BCG A experimented with cotton. Cotton in the area had 
been grown by C.J. Rhodes and his brother in the late 1860s.5
The response from European settlers was promising in the area,
and they are the ones who employed Swazi migrants there. The 
experience accumulated there in cotton production became useful 
when the need to grow it in Swaziland was created by the 
Swaziland Proclamation number 1 of 1916 which raised the level 
of tax to a maximum of £4 10s per year, especially for
polygam ists. 6
The challenge presented by these growers to companies 
and settlers was not easy to frustrate. In the past settlers had 
used Swazi tenants to grow cotton on their behalf, but after the
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war began, with the price of cotton improved, these tenants 
moved to Swazi areas where they grew cotton for a livelihood. 
Initially, settlers had colluded with the colonial state to frustrate 
Swazi cotton production, by withholding the seeds from Swazi 
growers, but this strategy failed later. The main explanation for 
its failure was that some of the settler farmers depended on 
Swazi production, and the latter had accepted very low prices for 
their cotton, and this led to both groups being eager to retain this 
cooperation . The term s of the cooperation  included  the 
distribution of cotton seeds to the growers and the improvement 
of the price for the crop from 1916. However, this arrangement 
affected those who retained the erstwhile arrangement while the 
new ones were given less lucrative terms. It had dawned to 
some European farmers that productive Swazi growers who 
were dedicated to cotton cultivation came from  those who 
worked on their own fields and not employees on European 
farms. The incentive to produce was made stronger by the 
returns realised. Those who were employed on the farms had 
shown lack of dedication. Their efforts were concentrated on 
maximising hours of se rv ice*to the amount of
hours worked. The result was that the services rendered were 
more quantitative than qualitative. This led to the poor quality 
of the crop relative to that which was produced on Swazi areas 
independently of settler direct control. In fact, the result was that 
all th ree  groups, when given adequate techn ica l advice, 
produced cotton of a reasonably high quality .7
This Swazi effort was reinfcj^ed in 1917, the same year the 
Empire Cotton Growing Committee was form ed and operated 
dem onstration lessons for both potential Swazi cultivators and 
those who had already begun to grow the crop .8 The committee 
had been form ed to investigate the problem s which hindered 
cotton growing in the empire. The committee secured the services 
of a South African scientist, H.W. Taylor, to investigate the 
suitability of the territory to a cotton industry. It was during the 
war that Taylor carried out his research by visiting virtually 
every part of the territory , and his report sounded some 
optim ism  in 1918.9 The report was transm itted to the Cotton 
Council, administrative body of the BCGA. The Cotton Council
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which engineered the formation of the committee resolved that 
cotton cultivation be promoted throughout suited parts of the 
empire to supply E n g l a n d .  10 Jt is not clear why Taylor's report 
m entioned H lathikhulu as being suited to cotton production, 
especially because of its low temperatures relative to regions 
such as Bremersdorp. However, a possible explanation is that 
Taylor might have been biased, first, by the encouraging settler 
and Swazi responses to cotton production in the area, and 
secondly, he might have been biased by the committee's choice of 
the area to set up a demonstration plot to teach the interested 
Swazi cultivators improved methods of cotton cultivation. In 
short, rather than carry out a scientific investigation, Taylor 
allowed himself to be influenced by the place where the crop had 
been grown to draw up his conclusion.
It would appear that both the committee and Swazi 
cultivators were motivated by the improvement of the price in
1916. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the lint price at the 
Liverpool market was 5 pence per lb and in 1916 it rose to 8 
pence of Liverpool price. H  But since it seems the local price was 
still low the m otivation among the Swazi rem ained low as 
indicated by the amount of land each grower cultivated. Recorded 
sources speak in general terms, and oral research corroborated 
the m eagreness of the acreage by soliciting som e estim ates, 
especially from growers themselves as well as observers. The 
majority of those who attempted to grow the crop confined the 
acreage to one-quarter and one-half of an acre per planting 
season. The infinitesmal amount of the land under cotton is best 
explained by the labour intensiveness of the commodity and by 
the grower's agricultural economy which involved growing many 
other crops, especially  food crops. 12 Yet another p lausib le  
explanation is that the demands for cash generated by cotton 
were not as m ultiple as in the 1950's. Before, during and 
immediately after the First W orld War money was required to 
meet tax obligations and other necessities such as the purchase of 
food and clothes. Expenditure on education was very minimal and 
even then there were few Swazis who sent their children to 
school for education, most of which was handled by church 
missions. But perhaps the most important factor was the price.
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During the war Swazi cotton growers thought that the crop sold at 
about 2 or 3 pence per lb and most of the growers did not even 
realise that the settlers cheated t h e m .  1 3
Swazi responses to the improved market price, and to the 
estab lishm ent of a dem onstration plot at H lathikhulu  were 
viewed by the disgruntled European settlers as detrim ental to
their monopoly over cotton cultivation. The committee, which had 
successfu lly  w ooed the cooperation of the departm ent of 
agriculture to do demonstration work and distribute cotton seeds 
free of charge, provoked the anger of racist settlers who lobbied 
the support of the administration to frustrate its progress. 14 The 
European settler insecurity was not so much a result of the
amount of cotton each Swazi grower produced as the future 
threat of that contribution to the monopoly settlers enjoyed, 
w hich involved the com petition the Swazi w ould present. 
Production in maize and sorghum suffered the same fate. To 
those who were opposed to cotton cultivation the influenza
epidemic of 1918 was seen as punishm ent to the nation for 
allowing the spread of crops which were not central to the rural 
economy. These were mainly cotton and tobacco. Cotton, in
particular, was held suspect due to the fact that unknown pests 
came to in fest the country not long after its introduction.
However, Swazi cotton cultivators thought differently from the 
reactionary  faction , and as such they continued  with its
production. It was precisely  this determ ination, m ore than
anything else, that made the Swazi growers push ahead in spite 
of the disapproval of chiefs and some settlers. That the influenza 
epidemic did not necessarily force Swazi growers out of cotton 
cultivation is supported by the fact that the acreage put under 
cotton in Swazi areas began to rise again in 1919-20. In the
previous season the national amount of land under cotton was 
100 acres while in the 1918-19 season the acreage had risen to 
an estimate of 500. This rise in the acreage and output in cotton 
was correspondent to the rise in the world market price to 25 
pence per lb of l in t .  16 However, since the market price referred 
to here was external, one can only suggest that the rise in acreage 
and output may have been caused by that of the lint price. It is 
important to note that statistics of this nature do not say much
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about individual grower contribution, particularly the Swazi one 
since they give a gross national picture. Oral evidence indicated 
that Swazi growers were affected adversely by the epidemic, 17 
and the acreage in Swazi areas went down as in 1917-18, with a 
correspondingly  depressed output which was w orsened by 
drought conditions. On a gross national level, however, the output 
was not correspondent with the amount of land cultivated with 
cotton compared to that of the previous year. W hile in the 
planting year ending May 1918, 100 acres were cultivated with 
an output of 1,911 lbs seed cotton, in the year ending in May 
1919, 500 acres were cultivated with the output placed at 2,737
lbs seed c o t t o n .  18
These statistics, however, do not elaborate on what was 
happening on SNL regarding the extent of land cultivated with 
cotton nor are the figures of output given. The colonial state did 
not believe that the Swazi grew cotton worth marketing at this 
junctu re . This a ttitude  is given w eight by the R esident
Commissioner's reaction to the plea of the European Farmers' 
Association to stop Swazi cultivation of cotton. D. Honey, then 
Resident Commissioner (1920), reacted by stating that the Swazi 
who grew cotton were educated and too few then to have caused 
that amount of s c a r e .  19 Considering that the number of Swazi 
growers was small and that they did it on a small scale and on a 
part-tim e basis they did not challenge the monopoly European 
farmers enjoyed. The bias of the colonial state distorted the
history of Swazi contribution to agricultural development. Had it 
not been for the threat European settler farmers felt from the
Sw azi challenge, the progress w hich was happening  in 
agricultural farming could have passed unnoticed.
European settler farmers had advanced both factual and 
unfounded justifications for wanting government to stop Swazi 
cotton production. The factual justifications were based on the
fact that if Swazi cotton growers increased and progress realised, 
the labour m arket would deteriorate further and reach crisis 
proportions. At the end of the First World War, Swaziland settler 
farm ers com peted both among them selves and w ith mining 
magnates in South Africa for limited Swazi labour. Migration to
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South Africa was tending upwards as a result of the revised tax. 
Men, for instance, paid upwards of £4 10s after the tax revision 
in 1916.20 The main attraction in South Africa was not so much 
the feeling of having been to industrialised South Africa as some 
writers have suggested, but the higher wages offered there 
com pared to those obtaining in Swaziland. A dult m ales are 
alleged to have been paid between 15 and 20 shillings in 
Swaziland, while in South Africa the wages were as high as 30 
shillings or more, plus rations by 1917.21 But migration also 
meant disapproval of government's imposition of the tax in order 
to push labour to the farms of European settlers w ithin the 
territo ry . The Sw azi who resisted  local farm  em ploym ent 
m igrated to South Africa specifically for short target periods 
aimed at earning the amount required to settle taxes and meet 
other financial obligations.22
Polygamists paid more tax because for each additional wife a 
tax of 35 shillings was charged, which is understood by Crush to 
have been 'a tax of the productive capacity of the h o m e s t e a d ' .23 
In fact, it was generally believed that an additional wife would 
swell the otherwise meagre labour force per hom estead thereby 
boosting its 'productive capacity'. If this developm ent was left 
uncurbed, the feeling entertained by the colonial state and the 
European settlers was that such homesteads would eventually 
become self-reliant something they viewed as detrimental to the 
settler and com pany econom ies which depended on African 
labour for survival, a point expatiated upon by C r u s h . 24 jt  is 
equally crucial to note that while self-reliance might have been 
the drive behind polygam y, the people involved  thought 
differently from materialists. While it is factual that polygamists 
enjoyed m ore labour than m onogam ists, the m aintenance 
expenses were also higher. In short, there was some balance 
betw een the m aintenance of a large fam ily and big labour 
turnover, the shortage of labour but fewer mouths to feed. Other 
accompanying results have been additional financial obligations 
of a various nature which pushed polygam ists into a labour 
market upon which the capitalist mode of production depended 
for its survival. Mveli Nyatsikati of Mtsambama in Hlathikhulu,
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was a victim of polygamy and he depended on wage labour. The 
main cause of this predicament was the tax and the high cost of 
l i v i n g . ^ 5 As he argued, maize prices were very high then, at 30 
shillings per bag of 200 lbs while the wages ranged between 15 
and 20  shillings per month, and that was the same duration for 
which a bag of maize lasted particularly for a family of 6 to 10
m em b ers .26
In 1918 and following years some chiefs began to worry 
over Swazi cotton production, for they considered that their 
effort should be directed towards the stabilisation of maize 
production in the territory. The concern of the chiefs over cotton 
production was exacerbated by Swazi cotton growers who came 
from private farms when mass evictions were implemented in 
1 9 1 4 .2 7  Chiefs felt that the influence of these growers could 
affect everybody in the area, and food production would continue 
to decline. Secondly, these newcomers introduced land enclosure 
to facilitate its development, the long-term purpose being to raise 
its surplus generating capacity. Land enclosure did not only 
assume the use of wire but it also involved the piling up of 
branches of trees to conceal what was grown inside. The purpose 
was to ward off animals that destroyed the crops. Land enclosure 
became a necessity when planting seasons started late thereby 
delaying even the picking season until late in July or early
August. By that time cattle would be let loose to forage for food
on harvested fields. Even when rains came early in the planting 
season, such as in August or September, cotton could not be 
planted until the second week of October as per the regulation. 
The main reason was that early planting helped pests to multiply 
much faster than when the crop was planted in the second week 
of October or later.2 8 The traditional practice was that common
land was not enclosed since that meant the denial of other 
members free access to the usufructuary rights to it, and chiefs 
kept an eye on these acts. Chiefs also ensured that everybody 
gave first priority to maize production to stabilise its supply. 
Maize had already become a staple foodcrop. Maize production
was widespread to warrant chiefly insistence on its production at 
the expense of cotton.
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In this manner chiefs had colluded with the capitalist 
system of production which encouraged the Swazi to sell their 
labour to European settlers rather than to produce cotton for a 
livelihood. It was at this time that the use of the plough was 
gradually expanding in Swaziland, especially in Shiselweni and 
B r e m e r s d o rp .29 Cotton and maize production required some 
different technology from the hoe which was used to produce 
traditional crops like sorghum. It became necessary for growers 
to use different technology to facilitate the breaking up of the soil 
to more than one and half inches deep to enable the tap roots to 
anchor into the soil and tap the food and other requisite minerals. 
To this end the ratio of ploughs to homesteads was thought to be 
one to ten. After W orld W ar One, the number had increased in 
Hlathikhulu, at least according to oral evidence, to one plough to a 
homestead. But even there most of the Swazi who owned the 
plough were those who cultivated maize, cotton and tobacco.30 
What seems to have facilitated the diffusion of these ploughs was 
the sym biotic com m ercial relationship which existed between 
some European farmers and Swazi cotton and tobacco producers. 
Europeans endeavoured to nurture the relationship  when the 
m arket conditions operated against them, as in 1920 to 1923 
when the production declined due to the slumped price. European 
farmers thought that Swazi producers did not feel the impact of 
the depressed price of cotton as they did themselves because the 
Swazi relied  on a p re-capitalist mode of production. Swazi 
growers who entered into this arrangem ent were those who 
wanted to exploit the relationship to acquire what they needed to 
promote their farming, like that of cotton with the use of the 
p lough .31
European settler struggle to frustrate Swazi production of 
cotton was thus weakened in part by the division inherent in the 
white farmer community itself. The less able financially often fell 
back on Swazi growers to sell their cotton to them (settlers) at 
very low prices. However, the Cotton Committee had noticed the 
problems of cotton marketing faced not only by Swazi growers 
but also by other poor white cotton producers and advocated the 
establishment of a local market. The ginnery was duly set up in 
Bremersdorp by the Swaziland Power Company in 1923. The
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latter area was chosen for its central position in the country and 
to the cotton producing area, and there were more cotton growers 
in it by 1923.32 Bremersdorp took the lead due to its congenial 
clim atic conditions. But the transport problem s continued to 
fru stra te  Swazi grow ers who found it cheaper and more 
convenient to sell to their neighbouring settler farmers because 
some of them owned transport. Another reason for the choice of 
Bremersdorp as a market was the concentration of large scale 
producers such as companies in it. The Swaziland Corporation, the 
H enderson  C orporation ; and o thers a ll grew  co tton  in 
Bremersdorp. There were fewer undertakers in Hlathikhulu. Yet 
another reason for the gin to be in Bremersdorp was the output 
per acre which was higher than that of Hlathikhulu. For instance, 
the output per acre in Bremersdorp was about 500 lbs seed 
cotton, while in Hlathikhulu the most they could get per acre was 
400 lbs or even less. This fact was noted in 1922, a year before 
the Power Company opened up the market. This observation was 
a result of the work of the ECGC formed on 12 September, 1921, 
as a research body of the BCGA.33 in Swaziland it shouldered the 
work which had been executed by the Cotton Committee.
The formation of the ECGC was also necessitated by the 
task of counteracting the spread of pests and of identifying a 
variety that was more resistant to pest attacks. Pest ravages 
were a common problem to cotton not only in Swaziland but even 
in B arberton and M agudu areas. How ever, the la tte r two 
supported a strong cotton industry, especially after a suitable 
variety had been identified. And this achievement was due to the 
quick response of the BCGA's Council at forming the ECGC, who 
provided solutions to the scientific problems that worried the 
crop. Since there were no advanced research  fac ilities  in 
Swaziland, laboratory research was carried out in Barberton, and 
the ECGC carried out research in Swaziland and sent whatever 
species that required laboratory examination to either Pretoria or 
B a r b e r t o n . 3 4  j n enquiry into the problem s of cotton
production, the ECGC consulted with large scale producers such as 
companies and settlers. The ECGC personnel attended to the 
problems of the latter group and not those which hindered Swazi 
production and the reasons may simply be that they were more
33
sym pathetic to the concern of the settlers about the labour 
market if the Swazi were allowed to grow cotton; it did the direct 
opposite of the Cotton Committee whose involvement with Swazi 
growers went back to 1917. The ECGC simply followed on the 
footsteps of those South African scientists such as W.H. Scherffius, 
who solved production problem s experienced by large scale 
cotton producers. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the ECGC 
on cotton production in Swaziland since the ECGC was formed at a 
time when the market price had been depressed, and this had its 
adverse impact reflected on the production. After the output 
began to rise in 1923, it was affected adversely yet again in 
1924-25 by the lateness of ra in s .3 5 p est outbreak  was 
successfully brought under control by the ECGC through the 
cooperation of the then cotton advisor, W.B. Wilson, who boasted 
of some experience in cotton problems. Wilson had been involved 
previously with cotton production problems in Ceylon and later 
Northern Z u l u l a n d . 3 6  i n  Ceylon his attention was mainly focussed 
upon cotton production by the indigenous people which explains 
his appointment into such a critical post at a time when a man of 
some outstanding expertise, not only in scientific problems but 
also in social problems, was required to resolve the racial issues 
which dominated cotton farming. Wilson's arrival in Swaziland, as 
a colonial state's appointee to work with the Cotton Committee, 
coincided with the struggle of the Swaziland European Farmers' 
Association to stop Swazi attempts at their nascent stage of cotton 
development. W hile it is not all too clear why W ilson was not 
willing to help the Swazi, his exposure to settler racist attitudes 
towards Africans in the Natal Province might suggest his reasons 
for more sympathy with settlers than with the Swazi.
In support of settler effort, Wilson reiterated their (settlers’) 
argument that if Swazi growers cultivated cotton, before they had 
improved their farming technology, and had been advised against 
'negligent farm ing', pests would spread rapidly and harm the 
industry. Wilson based his arguments on his experiences not only 
with the indigenous farm ers of Ceylon, but even with Zulus 
nearby, where he had served as cotton advisor before he took up 
his appointment in S w a z i l a n d . 37 As a result of this argument the 
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to indigenous cotton cultivators. However, the adm inistration 
had chosen to rem ain passive on the issue especially after 
Wilson joined the struggle on the side of the settlers. Initially, the 
Resident Com missioner had dism issed the allegation as being 
unfounded because he had assumed that Swazi cotton growers 
were those who could read and write. In that case the manual on 
cotton production distributed to all potential growers served as a 
deterrent to the spread of insects dangerous to the industry. 
C onsequently , very few Swazi grow ers cu ltiv a ted  cotton 
especially in M tsambama, where the secretary of the settler 
farmer association, Pierce Pringle, had come from. But en route to 
Goedgegun, in Nietgegund and Dwaleni, (see attached sketch 
map), some Swazi growers persisted with the enterprise amidst 
the com plaints that they encouraged the spread of cotton 
diseases and that they sto le cotton from  their European 
counterparts, especially at night. The pressure on Swazi growers 
to stop producing cotton even in the latter two areas was no less 
heavy. H ow ever, w hat m ade them  pers ist am idst all the 
allegations was that they did not depend on European farmers for 
the market any longer. Most of their cotton was sold to some 
South African buses which deposited it to itinerant merchants in 
Piet Retief from where it was taken to Cotona at Kempton P a r k .3 8
Relating his harrowing experience and that of colleagues in 
cotton cultivation, James Mamba of Dwaleni, said that they did 
not fail to carry cotton on their heads, and sometimes on the 
back of donkeys, to the main road where buses collected it. 
Persistence in cotton production was motivated both by cash and 
the desire to win the battle with settlers. The struggle was the 
resistance to sell labour to European and company plantations, 
where Swazi workers were exposed to hard work under strict 
conditions for very low wages of 10 to 15 shillings per month.3 9 
Even though their cotton output was small, at least it gave them 
some cash with which to meet their tax obligations and made 
some investments. Their cotton output per season per grower did 
not exceed one bag, and sold to South African buses who were 
thought to have paid them approximately £10 or even more.40 
Yet when sold to European settlers, one bag fetched a sum which 
did not exceed £6  depending on the quality of the crop.41
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M amba adm itted that the quality fluctuated v io lently  from
season to season depending on a number of factors such as rain 
which sometimes fell at harvest time. Reacting to the allegations 
that Swazi growers stole from their European counterparts to 
increase their small harvests, Mamba stated that that conduct did 
not represent theft. He recalled such cases and that he did not 
consider the act to be theft because growers were recovering an 
equivalent of what European settlers had defrauded from them
in previous seasons when they bought Swazi cotton. This theft 
occurred after Swazi gowers had realised that an equivalent of a 
bag was worth far more than £6  which they were paid by
se ttle rs .42 After they had calculated the number of times, and
amount of cotton sold to the settlers, they recovered the 
equivalent in convenient ways and times to avoid confrontation. 
These observations were corroborated by other oral sources from 
Ida Mkhonta and Madala Nhleko of Thunzini. At that time, they 
lived in Nietgegund. There are, however, some conflicts in these 
oral sources, in that while the reporters refuted the allegations of 
theft of European cotton, Ida M khonta revealed that it had
started as the recovery of Swazi cotton acquired through fraud 
by European farmers but the habit overcame its prosecutors. In 
th is way theft of E uropean  cotton becam e a com m on
phenom enon, but when the European settlers re ta lia ted  by 
shooting at the culprits, it was finally brought under control.43
To understand the struggle between European and Swazi 
cotton growers, especially the fraudulent acquisition of Swazi 
cotton by settlers, one needs to understand the objectives behind 
it all. It seems Europeans were bent on discouraging the Swazi 
from cotton production since that placed the labour market in a
very difficult situation, at least on a long term basis. The
argument that Swazi cotton growers were illiterate, and that 
their production would lead to the multiplication of pests was a 
feeble excuse since pests were common even on settler farms by 
as early as 1909, as shown in chapter one.44 At that time no 
Swazi cultivated cotton, and even in the latter 1910s, there were 
few Swazi cultivators who grew the crop compared to European 
settlers. Even the discovery of pests was on European farms since 
the departm ent of agriculture single-handedly  paid  special
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attention to the settler sector at the expense of Swazi areas. As 
the stories spread that cotton sold to the South African buses 
brought more profits, most of the Swazi growers who could 
transport their cotton to some local bus stops, did so. In the 
process European settlers were by-passed. The im pact of this 
development on European settlers was twofold: First, the labour 
market continued to be placed under some threat, second, those 
settlers who had salvaged the uncertainty of the labour market 
by purchasing cotton from Swazi cultivators at rock-bottom  
prices, could no longer enjoy the constant supplies from their 
erstw hile  c lien ts. This developm ent was not pecu lia r to 
H la th ik h u lu , because  even M afu tsen i and L w and le  in 
Bremersdorp began to experience the same development. Some 
of the producers in the latter areas had sold directly to their 
settler neighbours in spite of the market in M anzini. Swazi 
producers avoided selling to the market due to poor transport 
facilities between their areas and the ginnery. Even those who 
sold directly to the Power Company, especially from Lwandle, did 
so due to their nearness to the market. But even these were 
discouraged by the low prices paid by the company compared to 
that which obtained in South Africa.
By the 1920s, Swazi growers who sold directly to South 
Africa through the buses had increased. In Lwandle, for instance, 
out of eight cultivators, five sold to South A f r i c a . 4 5  At least the 
difference in cash per lb of seed cotton was said to be one perl^ 
in favour of the South African market. Swazi growers argued, 
especially  D avid M koko of M afutseni, that the one peny 
difference was significant when one considered that sometimes a 
marketable bag weighed 25 lbs or even more. When computing 
the total difference about 25 pence r e s u l t e d . 4 6  jn Goedgegun the 
number of Swazi growers who sold to buses was bigger. In 
N ietgegund alone there were nine g r o w e r s , 4  7 and they sold 
through the buses and obtained their seeds there. But the seeds 
were over and above what the government distributed to them 
free of charge through the department of agriculture as part of 
the package clinched between the cotton com m ittee and the 
colonial administration in 1917.48 However, some growers were 
not given the seeds in an effort to force them to sell labour to
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European farmers for wages. Sometimes the agricultural officers, 
who acted on the orders of influential settlers, exploited the 
ignorance of some Swazi growers about the free distribution of 
seeds. In those cases where growers demanded the seeds as per 
the package, officers gave excuses that seeds had already run out, 
though when the cultivators insisted they were finally  given. 
Those who in sisted  on the free d istribu tion  w ere from  
Nietgegund and D w a l e n i , 49 an(j a few from Mafutseni, as alleged 
by S c o t . 50 ft was easy for the settlers, once they secured the 
support of the departm ent of agriculture, to explo it Swazi 
grow ers.
The latter half of the 1920s saw Europeans adopting a 
different approach towards Swazi challenge of settler monopoly 
over cotton production. The age of settler brokerage was over, 
especially after the alternative market at Kempton Park offered 
better prices. The relationship of broker and Swazi grower, which 
had been offered by European settlers, had assumed the nature 
of the brokerage which Roger Southall and John Miles unravelled 
in their researches on cocoa production and sale in Ghana (Gold 
C o a s t) .51 The type of relationship they discovered was equally 
exploitative, except that the clien telistic  rela tionship  of the 
broker and producer was rather more com plicated than the 
S w aziland  one. In Sw aziland  the b roker-S w azi grow er 
relationship involved only two parties and as to what happened 
to the crop thereafter it was the broker's concern. Even when 
Clark appeared in M afutseni towards the close of the 1 9 2 0 ' s , 5 2  
the rela tionsh ip  rem ained direct, and even m ore attractive 
compared to that offered by the Power Company in Bremersdorp 
and some settlers. In Goedgegun, Language competed with settler 
producers in the r e g i o n . 53 Collusion and com petition between 
these two brokers were made d ifficu lt by the problem s of 
com m unication and transportation. As a resu lt each broker 
offered a price it considered remunerative to subvert that of its 
local competitors. If the Swazi had reached an organised level of 
trade they could have used these factors to their benefit, but 
their level of production and trade was still very low. Secondly, 
the crop was labour intensive. Production on a large scale could 
have caused problems of under-production of those crops which
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were supposed to be given first priority. As a tradition, the latter 
crops were given first preference and chiefs insisted that each 
hom estead afforded at least the minimum food requirem ents. 
Chiefs were even more vigilant on those growers who had 
already diversified their rural economy by adding cash crops to 
their farming schedule. In short, even though the approach of the 
colonial regim e and the ECGC in Swaziland had continuously
favoured the entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production, 
there were other powerful forces which created contradictions in 
the applicability of the system.
It would, however, be wrong to assume that this challenge 
to the c ap ita lis t m ode of p roduction  was com m onplace 
throughout the cotton producing areas. In B rem ersdorp, for 
instance, companies and settler farmers succeeded to establish
themselves and attracted adequate workers to their cotton farms. 
The Sw aziland Corporation, for instance, owned a farm in 
N gqu lw in i, w hose o p era tio n  depended  e n tire ly  on the 
corporation's success to cajole tenants to rem ain there but on
reasonable term s, especially after the en mass m ovem ent of 
Swazis to reserves was gazetted in 1 9 1 4 . 5 4  Some of the Swazi 
had preferred to remain on the farm as tenants, whereby they 
paid rent either in kind by agreeing on a specific number of 
workdays per year or in cash. These tenants were not free to go 
and work wherever they chose in order to pay rent to the
company. Instead they worked on the farm for cash. The money 
earned was used to pay rent, and this latter form of tenancy was 
encouraged by the company by expanding the amount of land on 
which tenants settled as an attraction to keep them there. In the 
long term, such an arrangement worked out in the interests of 
the company because labour was in dire demand. It was tenants 
such as these on Peebles north and south in the south east of 
M anzini (then Brem ersdorp), that there em erged a group of 
tenant cotton producers from  1 9 2 6 . 5  5  j n  the long run this 
arrangement enabled the company to beat its counterparts in the 
cut-throat com petition for the dim inishing num bers of Swazi 
labourers, and this development has also been touched upon by 
C r u s h . 5 6  Though these Swazi growers were tenants, their mode 
of production was partly capitalist and partly pre-capitalist and
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was carried out under the close supervision of the management 
on the farm. The seeds used, the planting time, and the whole 
technology involved in the production cycle were provided by 
the management. The labour was partly provided by members of 
the family of the tenant, at weeding and harvesting time.
Cotton is labour intensive in weeding because the fields 
need to stay clean until the harvest period is over to avoid soiling 
the lint. Harvesting also had to be completed by early July to 
protect the lint from the dust during the windy month hence the 
need to expand one's workforce to shorten the time that could 
have otherwise been spent on the cotton f i e l d s . 5 7 After the crop 
was harvested the profits were distributed according to the costs 
of the inputs expended on the production , tenants were 
contented with the deal though they were exploited. However, 
this view was not expressed and approved by all tenants on the 
farm. First, the money they earned could not be reinvested either 
in the purchase of part of the land they tilled, nor in the
equipment nor even cattle because it was too small. Second, as 
tenants, the regulations which governed their stay on the farm 
were very strict on the freedom of the type of crops each tenant 
grew, except for those which were desired by the company, such 
as maize and cotton. Third, the cotton they produced could only 
be sold direct to the company and not to any other buyer. By this
time there were at least three other alternative buyers in the
region. These were the Power Company in Bremersdorp, Clark in 
Mafutseni, and finally Cotona who operated through agents such 
as the South African buses which left Swaziland for Kempton 
Park in J o h a n n e s b u r g . 5 8 Denial of freedom to sell where the 
p roducer chose was rep resen ta tiv e  of som e degree of
exploitation. At least the conduct of closing down all possible 
avenues of marketing to the people did suggest exploitation.
It is, however, a fact that since 1922, as Table A indicates, 
cotton production showed some upward expansion on private 
farms. The old problems which pushed Swazi endeavours to the 
background w ere neg lected . The adverse im pact o f the 
in terven tion  of chiefs on cotton created m any production 
problem s. In a bid to avoid any form of harassm ent, Swazi
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growers responded by using hidden areas, which were difficult to 
visit by any form of transport other than on foot. In the case of 
Ngololweni, which lay south of Hlathikhulu, some cotton was 
grown in the deep valley of M ahonti and other valleys which 
were believed, by many in the area, to harbour evil spirits due to 
the thickness of the forests. Often strange noises, neither those of 
birds nor of any known animal, were common both at night and 
in broad d a y l i g h t . 5 9 it was here that some residents of the area 
went ahead to grow the crop. Due to the history behind the 
successful production of other crops in the valleys there was an 
indication that the valley provided an alternative venue for 
businesses that were anathema. It is factual that even today the 
valley makes travelling very treacherous, even on foot. However, 
the formidable nature of the valley has since waned as a result of 
the declining vegetation due to lack of adequate rainfalls and also 
due in part to human intervention which led to the felling down 
of trees and the cultivation of some crops there. After the 
cultivation had gone on repeatedly, without the area allowed to 
go fallow to recover its virginity, the thickness and fearful nature 
of the forest was reduced very drastically. But be that as it may, 
the problem s have been an obstruction to transport to the 
present day, except for the usage of porterage, a historical form 
of transport in that area.60
Transport between the valley and the settlements of the 
area posed a big problem. The transportation of inputs did not 
give the people a nightmare; the problem concerned the transfer 
of the harvest up h ill. N either could donkeys be used 
satisfactorily nor was the sledge a palliative to the transport 
problem. Porterage seemed the only solution, and in many ways 
it answered the problems which surrounded the transportation 
enigma. Sometimes porterage was supplemented with the use of 
donkeys, whereby two bags equivalent to 40 kgs or more each 
had their outlets rolled up together very tight and loaded on the 
back of donkeys. These donkeys were driven on some cleared 
pathway big enough for only one donkey to pass through at a 
time with the load on the back. These donkeys sometimes went 
out of control and ran into the forest with the load. Often times 
this resulted in the bags being torn and the contents scattered all
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over the escape pathway. Maize grains spread all over the place 
thereby causing some considerable loss. In the case of cotton, 
whenever a donkey behaved in this manner the lint was mixed 
up with dry leaves of trees or the soil, which resulted in the 
quality  being affected. How ever, other grow ers tied these 
donkeys with some rope and led by pulling the rope up the slope. 
Though there was no guarantee that these donkeys would not 
rebel, chances for a rebellion were reduced to a minimum than 
being completely eliminated. In other instances, donkeys rolled 
on the ground with the load, with adverse effects on the quality 
of the crop.61
On the other hand, porterage was popular and also more 
re liab le  than donkey transport. M em bers of each fam ily 
partic ipa ted  very effectively , som etim es along w ith invited 
members of the extended family, other relatives and friends. Not 
every member of the extended family was asked for assistance 
except for the responsib le  so that they did not create 
unnecessary problems which could cause the spoilation of the 
harvest. In other cases the transport which involved members of 
the extended family were treated like l i l i m a com m unal labour. 
The rewards were customarily in kind: that is, either the host 
slaughtered a beast and apportioned it among the participants or 
cooked and provided it as victuals along with some traditionally 
prepared mild and alcoholic drinks. But these transport problems 
were partially solved, in the 1930s by the royal appeal to the 
chiefs to support the cultivation of cotton, because from then 
onwards cotton cultivation became official and the construction of 
roads was no longer a secret. However, these roads needed some 
constant m aintenance because of heavy rains which fell and 
ruined them due to the sloping gradient.62
In the long run, the fertile soils of the valley offered some 
avenues to the diversification of the rural economy. For instance, 
they began to cultivate tobacco there, but other crops like 
sorghum and maize could not be grown due to rodent ravages. 
Initially, the cultivation was carried out with the hand-hoe and 
the trenches dug had to be deep. However, as the cotton area 
increased per grower, the plough became a necessity, and the
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problem  of digging out tree stum ps and roo ts becam e 
unavoidable. In order to reach the fields with the plough and 
equipment for inspanning the oxen, family labour was harnessed 
to take the equipment, plough and drive the oxen to the valley 
where the business took place. Driving the oxen unspanned was 
not a big problem but inspanning them outside the valley could 
have required clearing up some part of the forest for a pathway 
to allow the oxen to pass through. The growers did not want to do 
the latter since it could have attracted the attention of the chief 
who might have wanted to know what was happening in the 
valley. This venture was unavoidable due to the fertility of the 
soil made possible by the debris from the trees. Compost manure 
was used by the growers to restore the exhausted soils and the 
valley continued to support the families in that w a y . 63
Having come from a similar geopolitical region in Magudu, 
the dem onstrator, M adevu Khesw a, show ed some im m ense 
appreciation of the production problems of Swazi cotton growers. 
In a gesture of solidarity with the growers, he investigated the 
valid ity  of the chief's opposition to cotton cu ltivation  in 
Ngololweni. His findings were contrary to the allegations made by 
the growers: the Nduna, 'chief's adm inistrative assistan t,64 had
used the name of the chief to stop cotton cultivation, due to 
jealousy. Those who were aware that the chief was not after all 
opposed to the scheme had cultivated cotton inspite of the scare 
raised by others, and the history of E.P. Dludlu discussed below is 
a case in point. The growers of cotton at Mahonti assumed that 
since those who did not hide cotton cultivation were relatives of 
the chief, the latter had acted out of nepotism  to discourage 
cotton cu ltivation  by n o n -re la tiv es .65 i n 1929 Kheswa had 
advocated the transfer of the project to the open where the 
transport problems were not as daunting as those experienced in 
the valley. However, Kheswa returned to Zululand before the 
change had been com pleted in 1 9 2 9 .6 6  At first the Mahonti 
project was very limited in extent when one considers that each 
grower cultivated cotton between one and two acres with the 
output ranging between one and a half bags of 50 kg each of seed 
c o t to n .67 W hat seems to have been limiting factors were the 
difficulties involved in the transportation of the comm odity.
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However, its importance, in spite of its lim ited scale, was the 
success with which the growers by-passed labour m igration 
particularly to the distant settler farms and even to South Africa. 
Secondly, the taboo with which the valley had been held was 
brought to an end in due course in an attempt to respond to the 
incentive to trade.
Cotton cultivation penetrated almost every group of the 
population and not just capitalists like settlers and planters but 
even pastors: leaders of churches. The roots of cotton production 
by church leaders went back to post World War One, but did not
make any m aterial progress until the late 1920s.6 8 The reasons
for the lack of progress to the end of the 1920s are hard to 
establish , except perhaps to suggest that lack of m arketing 
facilities probably arrested progress. The pioneers were Samuel 
Simelane, who grew up in Sandleni and later moved to the south 
east of Hluthi, Thwala of Sandleni, Dludlu of Ngololweni, Dlamini 
of Ngudzeni, and Samuel Fakudze of M acetsheni, in Bulungu. 
Among these pastors existed some relationship, Dludlu was a 
brother-in-law of Dlamini, because the latter married a sister of 
the former. Fakudze was a cousin of Dlamini which made the 
three to be related to one another. Dlamini and Dludlu are the 
ones whose history of cotton cultivation produces more flashes 
than the others, though the others became forces to reckon with 
in the 1930s.69 Simelane is the only surviving member, whom 
the writer was able to interview from time to time since July 
19 8 0 .7 0  In the case of the other two, only relatives were 
approached and w illingly  provided the answers sought. In
addition to the rela tives, m embers of their churches were
interviewed, and both groups were very helpful in filling existent 
gaps in the study.71
Most people had the impression that pastors did not 
indulge in business since that would contradict their sermons on 
rendering to Caesar what was Caesar's and to God what was God's. 
However, Dludlu displayed virtues of a businessman in that the 
maize surplus he produced was sold for cash. He also sold some 
beans to his community. He also grew crops like cotton. The field 
on which he had grown cotton has now been given the name
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'k o tin i ', literally meaning that it once belonged to cotton. Dludlu 
was also reported to have been inspired by one m issionary 
Jackson who came to the country and settled at present-day 
Franson C hristian M ission Station, which becam e the local 
headquarters of all the branches of the mission in the country. 
The missionary was the head of the station from the early 1910s. 
But because the whole idea of cotton production was very hazy, 
Dludlu had not expanded its production until the 1920s when its 
production had expanded greatly, and output at national level 
reached hundreds of thousands of lbs, as shown in Table A.
Second, the price of the crop had improved considerably over the 
pre-w ar price level. His justification  for the project was to
provide employment to Swazi young men, particularly those who 
already had fam ilies and whose m igration to industrial South
Africa could have caused social d islocations.72 The effects of 
migration on the families had not at all been constructive. In 
essence, the pastor's objective was not necessarily to start a 
business that would continuously depend on the employment of 
the local population, rather he aimed to use his field for 
dem onstration lessons for the students to use the knowledge 
acquired to grow cotton for a livelihood. The cotton project was 
allegedly not popular with the chief of the area but since it was 
supported by the Cotton Committee, his challenge was seen as 
defiance to the committee project.73
At first the response from the local men was very poor 
until 1932, when the king intervened and challenged chiefs and 
their subjects to incorporate cotton in their rural econom ies.74 
But since the market was not very profitable, Dludlu encouraged 
his clients to cultivate it along with crops like beans and step up 
maize production because the market for these crops was already 
availab le  even in local trad ing  stores. He p ilo ted  the
entrepreneurship by teaching his students the diversification of 
the rural economy, which involved, not only crop production, but 
even animal husbandry. Before the World Slump of 1929-31, he 
is reported to have owned about 100 heads of cattle, which he 
sold from time to time. His area was not settled by European 
farmers due mainly to its remoteness from business centres and 
main roads. M otor transport posed a big problem  due to the
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impassable rivers and hills which surrounded the a r e a . 7 5  Similar 
observations were made by J. B. Webster in his study of African 
Churches in W est Africa where Yoruba church leaders took to the 
production of cash crops in order to raise funds for the
development of their a r e a s . 76 For the Ngololweni community the 
only means of transport used was porterage and donkey 
transport. The texture of the soils did not encourage the two 
features of farm ing: pastoral and agricu ltu ral. L arge-scale
pastoral farm ing lay north west of Ngololweni, approxim ately 
thirty kilom etres from the Mission Station. But since pastoral 
farming had offered only a limited number of job opportunities 
most of the able-bodied men travelled long distances, sometimes 
as far to the north as Hlathikhulu, which was more than 50 
kilom etres and they rem ained there for a month before they 
could visit their fam ilies. Thwala and Simelane had done the 
same at Sandleni but with disappointing results com pared to 
D l u d l u . 77 However, they succeeded to improve the financial
position of their families while their impact on the communities 
in which they lived remained very minimal.
At Ngudzeni, Dlamini, who carried out his farming rather 
as an individual to improve, first and forem ost his fam ily's
economy and then that of the community, did very well much 
against the chagrin of the local chief. It is, however, debatable if 
his progress in farming was to the benefit of his family per se, 
especially when one considers that as a pastor he had to respond 
to the needs of his family and those of the community in which 
he lived and ministered to, particularly members of his church. 
Having begun to grow cotton by 1926, in response to his brother- 
in-law 's incentive and that of the Roman priest who was his
neighbour in M aloma it took him two years to realise any 
progress. From his apologetic acreage at the beginning in 1926, 
Dlamini was able to expand from 3 acres in 1926 to 6 acres in 
1928. That expansion was also reflected in the amount of the 
labour force which rose from 5 in 1926 to 15 in 1928 and this 
labour worked along with fam ily m e m b e r s . 78 M ost of these 
workers did not want to be paid in cash for their services but 
with maize, because their fields had not produced enough to 
provide for their fam ilies. D lam ini’s expansion  in cotton
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production was slow due to the marketing problem s and the 
impact it had on capturing the labour in the community from 
migrating was very weak. The marketing of the crop could only 
be done either at Nsoko, which was about 40 kilometres south of 
the area, or at Mbulungwane, 43 kilometres north west. Donkeys 
were used to transport the crop. At Nsoko, the crop was sold to 
the Nsoko Cotton Plantation Company who also produced cotton 
there and sold it directly to Durban from where it was shipped to
England .79
Swazi producers were denied the platform to voice their 
grievances against the system which subjected them to labourers 
until the settlers abandoned the undertaking at the outbreak of 
the world slump in 1929, when the highest cotton output was 
realised since its introduction in 1904. Though the cotton output 
was the highest on a national level, reaching 3,224,182 lbs seed 
cotton compared to 2,618,913 in the previous year, the earnings 
for the year 1929-30 were a mere £26,868 compared to £37,961 
for the 1928-29 as in Table A. Not only was the impact reflected 
on European production which also slumped in the following year 
but even Swazi growers reduced the acreage hence the output 
which dropped drastically from the record crop of 3,224,182 lbs 
the previous year to a mere 1,532,132 in 1931. The rise in cotton 
output was due to the introduction of the U variety by the ECGC 
in the late 1920s whose resilience to pest attack was relatively 
h i g h . x h e  earnings were even more depressing with the gross 
national returns of £9,578.81 j t was in 1931 y that most settler 
producers left the enterprize and reverted to either pastoral 
farming or land speculation. So phenomenal was the slump that it 
pulled down the local market price from 5 pence per lb of seed 
cotton to a meagre 2 pence ,8 2 p or capitalist growers the price 
represented no challenge when considering the production costs. 
It was at this point that the ECGC revised its approach to cotton 
production and instead of pam pering com pany and settler 
agriculture at the expense of Swazi production, they turned 
towards the latter on the that since its production was
pre-capitalist, cotton cultivation even at a slumped rate could still 
pay dividends.
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In conclusion, the capitalist mode of production which had 
become predom inant in cotton production, especially  by the 
outbreak of the First World War, began to show signs of failure 
to sustain itself, a legacy inherited from the post 1910 era, when 
tenants were encouraged to feature in cotton production. This 
development was made even worse in 1917 when the Cotton 
Committee insisted on the inclusion of the Swazi grower in the 
production process instead of him to sell his labour to the 
European settler grower and to company plantations for meagre 
wages. Swazi growers became even more resistant to the wage 
labour system by the mid-1920s, especially when missionaries 
and other itinerant brokers appeared on the scene to encourage 
Swazi growers to take up the business. However, the concept of a 
market economy was still very low among many of these Swazi 
cultivators so that there was no material production by them 
until the outbreak of the World Slump in 1929, and its impact is 
treated in chapter three below.
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TABLE. A.
Comparative Output and Value for Cotton and Tobacco, and the 
prices for cotton expressed in Average L iverpool Am erican
M iddling. 1916-31. 
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SOURCE: 1. SWAZILAND COLONTAL REPORTS FOR THE YEARS. 
1916-1931 .
2. EMPIRE COTTON GROWING CORPORATION: ANNUAL 
REPORTS of the Council for the years, 1922-26.
3. J.A. Todd, "Twenty Five Years of Cotton Prices", in 
Empire Cotton Growing Review, vol. xv October, 1938. p. 278.
4. Tobacco prices could not be included in the table 
because they were not available.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE WORLD SLUMP AND SWAZI COTTON CULTIVATION,
1931-39.
In the 1930s the pressures of the market economy proved 
too strong for the triumvirate, formed of the Colonial State, the 
ECGC and the Chiefs (the custodians of the lineage mode of 
p roduction), to continue to support the lineage m ode of 
production which perpetuated the economic stagnation of the 
Swazi rural cultivators. The bonds that had held these repressive 
forces together, especially from the early 1920s, were thrown 
asunder by the wedge that h<*pked through the system  by 
creating conditions that favoured the prom otion of a market 
econom y, espec ia lly  am ong the long -neg lec ted  yet very 
significant factor in production in the rural agricultural economy: 
the Swazi cultivators.
The World Slump impact, as indicated in Table B. gave a clear 
indication of the direction cotton was to follow at the time under 
*\ consideration. In 1929, when the cotton price per lb of lint 
declined from 15 pence in 1928 to 10.52,1 not many growers had 
taken major steps to solve the problem of the slump. Apparently, 
producers understood the decline to be one of the previous 
fluctuations the business had once experienced, and one such 
memorable experience was in the years 1920-22, but then the 
recovery had taken place within a short time. Even then, the 
impact in terms of the difference between the good time price 
and the depressed one had not been as daunting as the one 
experienced in 1929. Evidence of the farmers' relaxed response 
to the depression is indicated in the output realised in 1929-30, 
at 3,224,182 lbs of seed cotton.2 But due to the continued decline 
in the Liverpool price to 9.09 pence per lb of lin t,3 it became 
clear that cotton as a cash-earner, no longer paid reasonable 
dividends. In terms of the decline in the local price of seed 
cotton, the impact was even greater because it had slumped from 
5 pence to a mere 2 pence per lb of seed cotton in 1930.4 In
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short, it was the local market price that sent a chilly message 
home and more faster than ever before to the producers of the 
commodity, particularly those who produced it on a large scale. 
W hile the acreage had gone up to 9,000 acres in the 1929-30 
s e a s  o n ,5 the following year experienced some sharp decline due 
both to the late rainfalls and the slumped commodity price. So 
serious was the depression that in 1930-31, the acreage was 
reported to be very low. Though the actual figure could not be 
given, the impression derived from the sources was that it had 
slum ped drastically , and was even worse in 1932, when it 
continued to drop down to a mere 1,000 compared to the record 
figure of 1929. In 1932 the output was placed at a mere 750,000 
lbs of seed cotton on a nationwide level. 6
By th is tim e the ECGC had m ade som e m ajor 
accomplishments in cotton farming through its introduction of the 
U4 variety whose resistance to the jassid pest was so high that
the pest did not worry the business as it had done in the mid-
1920s. Having reached this level of achievement, the ECGC did not 
wish to abandon the project imm ediately as the settlers had
done. In an effort to persist with the project, J.V. Lochrie, ECGC 
rep resen ta tive  in Sw aziland, w orked w ith H. H utchinson,
specialist in cotton production and problem s, who had also 
arrived in the country at the peak of the slum p,7 to help 
government solve cotton cultivation problems sought the support 
of the king (then paramount chief) and that of Swazi growers. 
First, H. Hutchinson plotted carefully to appeal to the king, since 
the latter was fully behind the stabilisation of food production 
and supply in the territory. As a result of this plot the king was 
asked by S.B. W illiams, Manzini Resident Commissioner then to 
lobby the support of the chiefs in cotton production. Williams also 
drew the attention of Hutchinson to the fact that a Swazi 
producer's priority was to ensure that his family were satisfied 
in terms of food supply. Since at this juncture, food production 
suffered som e sharp decline, ’the grow m ore food crops' 
cam paign was being reinforced. These crops involved maize, 
sorghum , beans, and others which constitu ted  foodcrops.8  
However, even though the other crops, apart from sorghum, were
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grown, the latter could not be substitu ted w ith any other
especially  before  m aize had spread nationw ide, and the
production of sorghum had become a matter of necessity. In 
short, sorghum constituted a staple crop, and the others were 
minor to it. However, by the time of the W orld Slump, maize
production had become more widespread than ever before, due 
to the dual role it played in the rural economy. In addition to 
being a foodcrop, maize could also be sold to trading stores either 
for cash or used as a currency to acquire certain manufactured 
goods. By the end of the 1920s, maize had become a very 
im portant crop in the rural economy and its production was 
extensive to the ex tent that when com pared to sorghum
production, the latter led maize only by a narrow margin. It was 
in 1932, for instance, that when the output in sorghum was 
41,041 muids of 200 lbs, that of maize was 30,906 muids of 200 
lb s .9 In the following year, the output in maize in SNL was even 
more stable and exceeded that of sorghum. 10
European settlers were first and foremost bent on capital 
accum ulation hence their concentration on cash crops and 
pastoral farming, businesses which yielded good profits. When 
the market price of these cash crops, particularly that of cotton, 
slumped, they turned their attention to other businesses.! 1 One 
of the major factors to consider here is that the land on which the 
business was carried out had been bought and ought to have 
yielded some profit over and above the money which was 
invested in it. When the business failed to do so, as the case was 
with cotton during the slump, other sources of revenue were 
established before the land became a l ia b ili ty .!2 In fact the 
whole system of production was capitalist while Swazi cultivators 
on the other hand relied on a non-capitalist system of production 
whose implication was that even when the business yielded the 
least of profits, the losses remained minimal compared to those of 
c a p i ta l is ts .!3 Since the Swazi had been competing with settlers 
for the cotton market from the outbreak of W orld W ar One, it 
could be said that the slump gave them some com petitive 
advantage over their settler counterparts. But let it be noted that 
at the time discussed settlers were no longer producing cotton,
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even those who persisted did so on a small scale which means 
that the latter were not engaged actively in market competition 
with the Swazi growers. It is also crucial to note that at this time 
Swazi cotton production was still hampered by the low market
price and restricted to a minimum by chiefly o p p o s i t i o n .  14
Chiefly opposition to Swazi cotton production when 
com pared with other counter-productive factors such as the 
slumped market price of the crop, becomes the lesser of the two 
obstacles that militated against the Swazi enterprise. Evidence to 
this point is provided by the reduced acreage under cotton even
among those growers who had produced cotton before the slump,
at a time when the business was still buoyant, and these were 
Ephraim Dlamini of Ngudzeni, Ephraim Tsabedze of Tshedze, and 
Enock Dludlu of Ngololweni, to name only a few of those who 
were picking up the business with some flashes of su c c e ss . 15 Yet 
another point to note is that chiefly opposition to Swazi cotton 
production was not new in the 1930s, but dated to the duration 
of World War One.
In areas which lay close to Bremersdorp, the base of the 
ECGC and that of the Resident Commissioner, S.B. Williams, some 
of those growers who were bold enough to report the threats
chiefs uttered to them against cotton production, were saved 
from the economic stranglehold, while those in the remote areas 
continued to suffer. Growers in Bremersdorp also benefited from, 
and were saved by, the frequent visitations of the officials of the 
cotton corporation. These areas were Lw andle, Gundw vini, 
M afutseni, M acetsheni, Bhekinkosi, (see sketch map) and others 
where chiefs feared that if  they were discovered frustrating 
cotton production, they might lose their political status. 16 Brian 
Manana was among the first few Swazi officers of the department 
of agriculture to receive training inside the territory. He received 
his education at Matsapha government school where he obtained 
a primary school certificate at the end of Standard 4.17 Manana 
was trained to become an agricultural officer on a government 
p lo t a ttached to M atsapha School, and was run by the 
department of agriculture. Manana also recieved lessons based
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on the problems of cotton production in his training programme. 
In fact, Hutchinson had been allowed to select from Manana’s 
group someone who would assist him in his field studies. Manana 
was actually responsible  for m onitoring the cotton project 
throughout the suited parts of the territory. He travelled together 
with Hutchinson som etim es to chiefs' adm inistrative capitals 
where meetings were held with growers in the presence of their 
respective chiefs, so that no political issues were discussed apart
from cotton. 18
At these meetings seeds and insecticides were distributed 
to the growers. To whip up enthusiasm in the cultivators, the 
inputs were distributed free, although by the mid 1930s, some 
minimal charges were made against inputs distributed. However, 
the sale of the crop was left to the discretion of the growers. They 
were, nonetheless, advised to sell even to itineran t buyers 
particularly those who exported the crop to England such as Clark 
in the Mafutseni area, E.R.S. Cheales and Language in Hlathikhulu, 
and these brokers often competed with Cotona at Kempton Park, 
who handled the businesses through South African buses which 
operated from various parts of the territory. 19 On the other hand 
those growers who were not satisfied with the terms of trade 
offered by these itinerant buyers could sell to the administration 
through the department of agriculture at two pence per lb of 
seed cotton which was at par with that offered by some of the 
b ro k er s. 20 xhe government had expected the price to motivate 
growers to produce more cotton than before, and in those areas 
where production had not started governm ent hoped that a 
stim ulus would be created. M anana was responsible for the 
purchase aspect along with the assistance of officers in the 
department of agriculture.
After his appointment, Manana was assigned to visit all 
potential cotton growing areas with the purpose of making his 
recommendations to the ECGC regarding the parts of the territory 
most suited to cotton production. Due to lack of efficient means of 
travelling, Manana relied on a bicycle to visit the areas he had 
been asked to investigate. Sometimes he travelled as far south as
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the Mamba chiefdom, at Ngudzeni whose chief was Bhokweni 
Mamba. There were not enough growers at Ngudzeni to warrant 
the time it cost Manana to travel there.
The response of Swazi growers to cotton cultivation was 
lukewarm , in Brem ersdorp, while in Shiselweni, yet another 
promising cotton producing area then, cotton was slightly more 
popular, but the extent of production was limited to one acre and 
sometimes upwards of six acres in other instances.21 The impact 
of the slump could not be disregarded when decisions to produce 
the crop were made. Growers weighed the costs of production of 
one crop against others and in the case of cotton, the majority of 
the growers felt that the costs were too great when weighed 
against the returns. Im plicitly, the slump provided alternatives 
to cotton and tobacco. It was, for instance, in the same period, 
from 1932, that dem onstration work was stepped up by the 
agricultural officers. At this time the options to cotton and 
tobacco were many, and their production costs were low which 
explains the swing in favour of other options. Maize, for instance, 
though new, compared to sorghum, was tipped to expand faster 
than the other crops. The list was expanded in 1936, to include 
even beans, and pumpkins, all of which had a young but growing 
and lucrative  m a r k e t .22  The production of these food crops 
became more attractive to growers than that of cotton because of 
the relatively lower production costs they involved producers in 
compared to cotton, particularly at a time when the profits were 
low. Second, there were more consumer markets for these crops, 
such as trading stores, most of which were within easy reach 
compared to the cotton markets. It was also during the slump 
that sweet potatoes, whose production history was already old, 
was considered an indigenous c r o p .23 The fact was that in that 
desperate situation many solutions to economic problems were 
sought by the growers and the search had sometimes met with 
some success. In Swaziland, some emergency economic measures 
were taken to correct the situation. They proved successful and 
this explains the slow response of the Swazi to the development 
of cotton.
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Swazi growers were also more receptive to the production of 
crops which did not require a major overhaul of their economic 
structure. Cotton in terfered  with many trad itional econom ic 
activities. For instance, from March through to the end of May, 
there was an abundant supply of m a r u l a  hom e-brew ed beer. 
Usually afternoon hours were spent on leisure which involved
the visiting of friends particularly among men. At these times 
they discussed political issues. Yet another activity carried out 
was hunting, most of which occurred in winter. During winter 
months chiefs also held meetings where cases were tried. At 
these meetings a roster was taken to find out who had not
attended, and absence could easily lead to expulsion. All these 
activities lasted from morning to the late afternoon hours, which 
made it very difficult for other types of work to be carried out. 
In short, the picking of cotton could have been very difficult in 
the face of these problems. In this way the wishes of some of the 
chiefs to frustrate cotton cultivation were fulfilled. However, in
the process, both the ECGC and the colonial state, had to work
very hard to achieve the diversification of Swazi a g r i c u l t u r e .24 
But the changes which occurred were in favour of the diffusion of 
the project of the ECGC and the colonial state. In short, the 
retention of the subsistence economy was strongly challenged by 
the gradual encroachm ent of the money econom y, which 
revolved  around production to m eet m arket dem ands. The 
demands on the Swazi, to respond to those of the market 
economy, were no longer suppressible due to the new lifestyle 
evolved and this included the desire to buy western goods, and 
the sending of children to s c h o o l .25
The 'grow cotton' message received different responses from 
one region to another. Some m inisters of religion saw cotton 
production as the best means of earning money to meet financial 
needs, and to im prove living standards. In Brem ersdorp and 
Shiselweni, where some of the churchmen resided, cotton found 
markets among itinerant brokers along with the markets of the 
ECGC and the department of agriculture.26 The conviction that 
cotton production would open up avenues for employm ent and 
provide other means of earning money, was the driving force
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behind the cultivation of cotton by priests. The motto to grow 
cotton, was part of the main Sunday message and these gospels 
were promulgated by pastors at Sandleni, Ngololweni, Ngudzeni, 
and Samuel Fakudze of M acetsheni. Another objective was to 
discourage labour migration to South African mines and settler 
farms, and to distant local places of employment within the 
t e r r i t o r y . 27 This, however, was meant specifically for married
members of the affected families because the indefinite period of 
absence from home bred unpalatable social problem s. It was 
argued that mines in distant South Africa were suited to the 
youth who did not have any social obligations to fam ilies.
Consequently, cotton schemes were started and dem onstration 
lessons were organised and local agricultural officers delivered 
the relevant lessons. In some places, it worked well while in 
others it did not have any effect. Most of these pastors had
adequate seed supplies to distribute to their church members to 
grow cotton on their own f i e l d s . 2  8
To understand the whole philosophy behind the setting up of 
these demonstration plots at the initiative of the pastors, one
needs to look beyond m erely what m eets the eye. Chiefs' 
disapproval of the cultivation of cotton in some areas had 
persisted in some parts of the country. Pastors were aware of it 
and wanted to avoid open confrontation with chiefs. But knowing 
that the department of agriculture and the ECGC, were strongly 
behind the production of cotton on SNL, their involvement was an 
effective means of controlling the chiefs. After the department of 
agriculture agreed to monitor these projects, it became its direct 
responsibility to make sure that they were not stopped by chiefs. 
W hen chiefs ' in terference led to the abandonm ent of the 
schemes, these would be revived, but after they had reproached 
the chiefs for their d i s r u p t i o n .29 Through this approach, pastors 
appear to have been shrewd. This astute conduct did not stop 
there but also ensured a surplus in maize and other crops. The 
pastors succeeded well in their subversive activ ities against 
chiefs' attempts to maintain a subsistence economy. Their church 
members also became courageous to p lant cotton with the
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assurance of the department of agriculture against any form of
in te rv en tio n .30
Demonstration lessons engineered by pastors did not provoke 
un iform  responses from  church m em bers. The Sandleni 
Com m unity, for instance, did not respond w ith the same 
enthusiasm  as that of M acetsheni, Ngudzeni and Ngololweni 
areas. At Sandleni, only two members are reported to have 
grown cotton before W orld W ar Two, while others responded 
after the war. Even the two early respondents began to grow 
cotton about 1934,31 two years after the official appeal had been 
extended to them. Ephraim Tsabedze and Moses Dlakubi were the 
only two respondents who began to grow cotton in the 1930s. 
Tsabedze continued to grow cotton until very recently when he 
stopped on account of ill health. Tsabedze’s home was about 
seven miles from that of Dludlu at Ngololweni which made it 
possible for the two growers to cooperate on a number of issues 
which hinged upon cotton cultivation. These issues concerned 
marketing and the lack of technical assistance. Tsabedze confined 
his acreage to three acres between 1934 and 1936. The output 
was also unimpressive. He stated that the output did not exceed 2 
bags of 200 lbs seed cotton per s e a s o n ,3 2 and this was due to the 
poverty of the soil which he cultivated. Compared to the dark 
brown and compact loamy soil on which Dludlu grew cotton, 
Tsabedze’s fields were found in an area whose soil was loose and 
sandy, which required large amounts of inputs mainly kraal and 
com post m anure, both of which were in inadequate supply. 
Unless these inputs were applied to the soil on a yearly basis, the 
surplus generating capacity of the soil declined along with the 
output. But that was not the main cause for the poor response of 
the people to cotton production in Tsabedze's area. Tsabedze 
alleged that most of the people who avoided cotton completely, 
did so due to indolence because some of them failed even to 
raise enough food to feed themselves. These people were lazy to 
the extent that they even neglected to transport kraal manure to 
their fields to help raise the productivity of the soil especially 
when it showed signs of failure to give a handsome o u t p u t .3 3  i n  
some cases even the weeding of maize fields was either half done
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or neglected altogether, and the result was either a reduced 
output or no output at all, depending on the thickness and
destructive effects of the weeds. Secondly, the climatic conditions 
of the area were more suited to the production of maize and 
other crops grown in temperate regions. Thirdly, the distance 
between the area and the cotton market was rather too long and 
daunting to some potential g r o w e r s .34
Having confined his cotton production to three acres until 
1936, the output was not impressive. When Tsabedze sold two
bags in 1936 he had received £6 as being the total income made 
through cotton cultivation, yet 1936 represented a fair season. 
The main cotton buyer in the area in that year was Cheales 
whose base was Goedgegun, and he paid a price ranging from 2d 
and 4d per lb of seed cotton.3 5 The quality of the crop was the 
main determinant of how much the broker paid and Tsabedze's 
crop had not been very impressive that year due to some pest 
attack. But yet another very important aspect was that if the
broker provided transport the charges were borne by the
producer which explains why the price was low apart from the 
fact that the crop was also unimpressive. Due to the hazardous 
roads, transport costs were rather too high for most of the
producers. However, Tsabedze did not give up cotton cultivation 
in spite of the costs which had weighed heavily on the growers, 
and he was actually saved by the fact that he succeeded to 
persuade Dludlu to pool their resources together to lessen the 
transport costs. W hat encouraged the two to persist with cotton 
cultivation was the fact that they hoped that the department of
agriculture would provide a local market in due course so that
the transport costs could be reduced, and the prom ises for 
accessible markets had been made by the agricultural officers. 
Having persisted with their request, until 1936, the ministry of
agriculture with the help of the ECGC made some provision that 
Swazi growers could sell their cotton through the local officers of 
the agricultural department. In fact this latter arrangem ent was 
expected to last for a short time because the departm ent had 
hoped to persuade some of the brokers in Goedgegun to play an 
effective role in marketing. But due to the unencouraging state of
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the roads then, the brokers were reluctant to provide the 
transport; rather they were ready to purchase any cotton that 
was brought to them by producers. In view of these problems, 
the two growers chose to sell their cotton to the market that had 
been provided by the agricultural departm ent in conjunction 
with the E C G C . 3  6  While brokers were helpful to provide the 
m arket for cotton they were reluctant to provide financial 
assistance. They did, however, provide seeds at reduced prices, 
but since the department of agriculture had provided these free, 
the brokers were supplanted by the department.
Chiefs had not regarded brokers as being subversive to the 
m aintenance of the status quo because brokers were merely 
interested in the output and not in the cultivation of the c r o p .3 7 
However, chiefs' opposition was already losing the impact it had 
had on cotton production save only in a few instances. Most of 
the growers gave the impression that showing disregard for the 
untoward attitude of the chiefs, the latter recoiled and expressed 
their disapproval of cotton cultivation in other ways. For instance, 
whenever new applications were handed in for some additional 
land chiefs turned a deaf ear to these appeals. In the chiefs' view 
the cultivation of cotton m eant that the producer had some 
surplus land, hence the chief refused to grant some additional 
land. Jeered applicants often took it up with the department of 
agriculture who intervened on their behalf. These were the 
experiences of the cotton producers of those parts of the territory 
which were suited to cotton production. Dlamini at Ngudzeni, for 
instance, had these experiences in 1936 w hen the chief 
(Bhokweni) challenged him on the question of land a d d i t i o n s .38
Confrontations with chiefs were dreaded by many growers, as 
in the case of the Mahonti Valley, (see above pp.39-43). There 
could not be a better indication of the degree of dread some 
chiefs com m anded among their people. Fear superceded the 
respect traditional authorities commanded among their people. 
Yet in most cases a chief was made to appear ignominiously rude 
and merciless by the N d u n a , administrative officer, who assisted 
to run the affairs of the chiefdom. It was in Ngololweni that the
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order not to grow cotton was sent to growers, and was thought to 
have come from the chief, yet it was the making of the N d u n a .  
The impact resulted in the m isinvestm ent of human resources 
and the unnecessary risks to which growers exposed themselves 
to redeem the rural poverty of the time. But even after the 
alleged opposition of the chief to cotton production had been 
cleared, the people continued to grow cotton there. However, 
cotton production in the valley in the m id 1930s, was 
accompanied by an addition of other crops due to the fertility of 
the valley, and secondly, due to the fact that transport difficulties 
had been a llev ia ted  through the construction  of a road, 
reasonably good cotton harvests were realised, and the valley 
also produced impressive harvests of maize and sweet potatoes 
in the late 1930s.3 9 These variables are very im portant to 
consider if one is to understand the persistence of growers to use 
the Mahonti Valley in spite of its hazards.
When one makes an overview of the spread of cotton 
cultivation at this time, it is evident that the expansion was very 
slow and even the extent of the production was insignificant. But 
one major, and striking observation is that those who grew 
cotton em erged as well-to-do members of their communities 
relative to the group who did not take it seriously. The well-to-do 
ex tended the ir farm ing com m itm ents from  cotton  to the 
production of other crops, and that opened up other avenues of 
trade for them. In due course, their socio-econom ic status 
improved. It was among such growers that modern houses were 
built; modelled on those of the European settlers. They owned a 
variety of farming equipment, like the plough, planter, weeder 
and others. Tsabedze, Dludlu and Dlamini, owned more than just 
one equipm ent of each kind so that whenever the other was 
broken and still being repaired, the other could be used to 
continue with the business. In a nutshell, the acquisition of this 
equipment freed labour power for other economic activities, and 
this explains why some growers could afford to combine cotton 
cultivation with other options with some reasonable success 
without any need to hire more labour, except in cases where 
there was an expansion in the area under cultivation. These
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producers also boasted of a food surplus, especially when the 
climatic conditions were f a v o u r a b l e .40
Already the discussion has encroached upon the terrain of 
technology which facilitated production by providing time and 
labour saving devices. Yet another issue that needs elaboration is 
that of land upon which the expanding list of crops was grown. 
Though some chiefs did not frustrate cotton cultivation openly, 
they hindered it in some very shrewd ways. Some growers 
approached those Swazi clans who had some surplus land which 
they did not necessarily need for crop production every year. 
This practice was refered to as kubo lek i sa  (the ’loaning1) of the 
land for a specific period of time. Its renewal was acceptable, and 
was determ ined by the am icable relations betw een the two 
parties. According to Swazi custom, land was not owned privately 
nor was it marketable. Granted that this was normal practice, 
there were nonetheless num erous cases w here some Swazi 
claim ed land to be their property to the extent that even the 
chief could not intervene to redistribute it; rather it was 
d istribu ted  by the clan head of the people to whom it 
b e lo n g e d .41 H istorically, such land was inherited after the 
intruders, who had expanded from Tongaland, settled in present 
Swaziland, and dispossessed pre-existing ethnic groups. The land 
on which they settled according to clans, became clan-land and 
its allocation was vested in clan leaders. Traditionally, such land 
was allocated for a specific period of time, at the end of which it 
reverted to the owner. Sometimes the owner asked for certain
services or some tangible item, for usufructuary rights to the 
land. If the land was used to plant cash crops, either a goat or a 
cow was given for the usufructuary rights of the land. In short, 
these were the means by which chiefs, who frustrated cotton
growing in the 1930s, were b y - p a s s e d .42
These obstacles were experienced in Ngudzeni by Dlamini who 
was summoned by Bhokweni to explain his objective behind
cotton production. The chief asked him to stop cotton cultivation, 
but he did not. Additional land posed a big problem which he 
solved by asking his friends among the Mkhumane and Nhleko
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clans who possessed large pieces of land, and they came to his 
re scu e .43 Dlamini's cotton fields were found some 6 miles away
from the mission station, and in some place hidden from the 
everyday view of the chief. This is an indication that even though 
the cotton growers knew that they could seek the protection of 
the king against recalcitrant chiefs, for their security in the 
imm ediate area, they rem ained on amicable term s with their 
chiefs by avoiding open confrontation. The arguments of the chief 
against cotton cultivation were that its w idespread cultivation 
would lead to the multiplication of pests harmful not only to 
cotton but to the other crops as well. Secondly, he argued that 
cotton was destructive to the soil, and if grown annually, the soil 
lost its fertility. Only the latter point sounded more plausible 
because it was based upon some empirical evidence. But since the 
grower was aware of all these problems, he had counteracted 
both the spread of pests, and that of soil exhaustion through the 
use of insecticides and crop rotation respectively. Dlamini was 
known to be one of the best and diligent growers. In the mid
1930s, when he grew cotton on more than six acres, he also 
harvested a bumper maize crop. Those in the area, whose crops 
had failed to produce a reasonable harvest in maize and could not 
provide even for domestic requirem ents, traded in grain with
Dlamini. In short, the grounds for the ch iefs accusation were 
unfounded in certain instances because the grower had sprayed 
his cotton satisfactorily, and destroyed cotton trees at the end of
the harvest.44
In the mid 1930s, Dlamini grew cotton and sent it for sale at 
Mbulungwane and Nsoko. Clark, at M afutseni, expanded south 
east to Maloma, where they were attracted by Dlamini's cotton. 
J.L. Clark and Company and Cotona had originally come from the 
Transvaal, and were among the first cotton brokers to have 
expanded to the Barberton region and Swaziland. They had
followed wherever the ECGC promoted cotton cultivation, so that
they could provide an alternative market for the crop. Initially 
Clark had handled cotton as merchants who shipped it via the 
port of Durban to its destination in England, but when the costs 
of exporting the crop exceeded the profits, Clark began to find
71
alternative markets in Johannesburg, where some manufacturing 
groups had already established t h e m s e l v e s . 45 In Swaziland, 
C lark was confined to Brem ersdorp though in 1936 they 
expanded to Maloma. Clark did not establish any credit facilities 
for the Swazi cotton growers because they feared that they might 
not get any profits from such an investment. Chiefs' opposition to 
cotton, might frustrate the endeavour, and this was known to 
Clark. Consequently, their involvem ent was confined to the 
transaction aspect of the business per  se. D lam ini's cotton 
production had been revealed to Clark by M a n a n a . 4 6  However, 
the mere fact that Clark bought the crop was a relief to those 
growers who were far from markets, particularly  at the time 
when marketing was still poor. Maloma was also isolated from 
the centre where technical assistance came, and in the case of 
Maloma the offices of the department of agriculture were in 
Hlathikhulu. Dem onstrators, who either walked or cycled there, 
had found it very difficult to visit places in the lowveld such as 
M a lo m a .47 This gap was sometimes filled in by brokers, whose 
advice on technology was not even scientific but based on what 
observation they had acquired e l s e w h e r e .4 8
Swazi entrepreneurship of this early period was not 
n ecessa rily  de term ined  by favourab le  fac to rs e ith e r for 
production or m arketing. A fter 1931, the m arket conditions 
continued to frustrate the Swazi endeavour to produce cotton, 
because the local price of seed cotton remained at 2 pence per lb 
inspite of the 1937 price rise to 7 and 5 pence per lb of cotton 
lint which ruled to the outbreak of World War Two in 1939.49 
The political atmosphere was not encouraging either but in spite 
of all these problems perseverance kept the growers going. In 
some regions, such as Bremersdorp, which were close to the 
Resident Commissioner's office, and to the office of the ECGC and 
the departm ent of agriculture, chiefs were intim idated by the 
proximity of these centres which supported the cotton scheme. It 
was these factors that fac ilita ted  the em ergence of some 
entrepreneurs in this region. Rem arkable among these was 
M atsafeni Dlamini of M afutseni, east of Bremersdorp, about 5 
kilometres away from the town. Having started cotton growing in
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the late 1920s, Matsafeni had mastered the know-how of cotton 
production by 1932. It was in 1932 that his output exceeded his 
record of 3308 lbs seed cotton in 1931, on an acreage of about 6 
and 8 in 1932 and 1933. In terms of the cotton output in 1932 
and 1933, the difference was about 2,158 lbs over that of 1931, 
since in the years 1932 and 1933 he realised 5466 and 5459 lbs 
seed cotton respectively, in spite of the low price at 2 pence per 
lb of seed c o t t o n .50 Hutchinson provided transport to the grower, 
when other growers elsew here were not given this type of 
treatm ent. His argum ent was that it would be cheaper to
transport the crop from Mafutseni than from distant places such 
as Shiselweni, where other prospective growers such as Tsabedze, 
Dludlu and Dlam ini were found. Yet another variable which 
militated against the intervention of the ECGC in those remote 
areas was the bad state of the roads which connected the market 
and the south.51
A ccording to M anana, whose testim ony has coincided
repeatedly  w ith that of archival sources, Sam uel Fakudze 
cultivated cotton from 1 9 2 7  near his home which was close to 
present day Sibusisweni High School, in M a c e t s h e n i . 5 2  After he 
had started on a one acre plot, his project attracted Bhongoza 
Masango, an agricultural officer in the region whose duty at that 
time was to carry out demonstration lessons, and he supported 
Fakudze by providing the technical aspect of the course. The 
supply of seeds and even the marketing of the crop were made 
possible by Masango's help who supplied the seeds and arranged 
some transport from the Power Company to fetch cotton from 
Fakudze's p lot. M asango had v isited  many grow ers, even
Matsafeni and colleagues, to provide technical guidance to them. 
Masango, like Kheswa, had his roots in South Africa, where he 
was born and trained in agricultural farming. Like all other
agricultural officers in Swaziland, Masango had travelled on a 
cycle from one area to the next within Bremersdorp. He was as 
dedicated to his work as his colleague Kheswa, and it was due to 
his devotion to agricultural farming that he helped to raise the 
standard  of farm ing in the areas that w ere se ttled  by
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conscientious growers. Fakudze absorbed M asango's teachings 
and translated them accurately into his farming activities.5 3
Unlike Dlamini, Dludlu, Thwala, and Simelane, who headed 
branches of foreign churches, Fakudze led a Zionist church, which 
was indigenous, in so far as it was independent of the domination 
of foreign doctrines of Christianity. The Zionist church interpreted 
the teachings of the bible from the local perspective. Any passage 
read in church was localised and used to understand political, 
social and economic problems of the time. For instance, at the 
time of the cam paign to grow cotton particularly  by Swazi 
growers, in 1932, Fakudze had taken it to mean the emancipation 
of the Swazi from the bondage of social oppression. This applied 
particularly to the labour migrants to South Africa and even to 
those who were em ployed locally, but on d istant European 
plantations. In either case the wages along with the conditions 
under w hich the Sw azi laboured  w ere sub-hum an and 
oppressive. Yet if the Swazi responded positively  to cotton 
production they could become self-reliant and emancipated from 
the exploitation of the settlers. Fakudze's message was not only 
geared towards uplifting the social and economic conditions of 
the living of his congregation but of everybody in the area. To 
this effect he invited whosoever identified him self with the 
common problems of the Swazi to attend demonstration lessons 
on his field.54
Masango was in charge of the demonstration work but even 
Fakudze had his schedule where he preached on econom ic 
developm ent for the area through cotton cultivation and other 
crops, and these took the second place of importance to the 
production of m aize.5 5 He argued that labour migration to South 
Africa and sometimes even to local places of employment, such as 
the Asbestos Mines, which were opened in 1936, represented a 
waste of human resources and some misinvestm ent because the 
returns did not justify  the amount of labour services invested 
and the inconveniences suffered.56 Not only did labour migration 
lead to the neglect of cash crop production, whose profits could 
have been used to develop the area, but it also led to the constant
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decline of output in food such as maize and other crops. His 
insistence on the latter, was meant to pacify chiefly opposition to 
his campaign on cotton production. In his own view, economic 
developm en t assum ed the im provem ent of the farm ing 
technology of the time along with the use of fertilizers which 
boosted the surplus generating capacity of the soil. Already the 
purchase of fertilizers was reported on a gradual rise by 1 9 3 6 . 5 7  
Yet another important aspect of development, as he conceived of 
it, was the construction of well-built houses, which promoted the 
growth of a healthy nation. Only then could one talk of a 
developing nation. In the long run, the infrastructure could 
im prove, and the com m unication could benefit from  such a 
growth. He advocated the construction of a school, which he later 
built all by himself but to the benefit of the community in which 
he lived. He also struggled to raise money for building a health 
clinic but the latter did not come to fruition in his l i f e t i m e . 5 8
Fakudze's timing for the demonstration lessons had been 
ideal since it occurred in the afternoon of W ednesdays when 
most people were relaxing. But in spite of the convenient time, 
the attendance was only apologetic. In the majority of cases the 
men who turned up were members of the church. The time 
Fakudze had chosen conflicted with the drinking sessions of the 
men. These demonstration lessons benefited even people from as 
far east as the foot of the Lubombo Mountain. This had been 
made possible by the Quarterly Meetings of the church. These 
meetings occurred in the second week of October, when cotton 
cultivation took place, and also in April when late spraying was 
also done. In order to avoid adverse effects on the farming 
activities of distant members these meetings lasted from Friday 
afternoon to Sunday noon, to enable those who had to travel long 
distances back to their homes to leave before dusk. It was during 
these meetings that the message to grow cotton was spread and 
the d istribution  of seeds to those who were in terested  to 
cultivate cotton. In this way, the forces which favoured cotton 
cultivation seemed too great to be successfully suppressed by 
those chiefs who disliked it.5 9 Yet another variable which pushed 
these unprogressive chiefs into a tight corner was the fact that
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Swazi cotton growers were among industrious cultivators who 
had mastered the methods of improved farming.
When the ECGC promoted cotton production in suitable 
areas, it also equipped growers with advanced farming methods 
which benefited the production of m aize, sorghum , sweet 
potatoes and leguminous crops.60 This applied technology, pre­
dated even the 1930s, but had been stepped up in the latter 
decade, through the use of fertilizers to raise the crop's capacity 
to produce m ore per acre than before. To this effect, 
dem onstration  plots had been in tensified , along with the 
technical advice. The colonial state also stepped up the number of 
dem onstrators to strike the balance between their number and 
that of the growers who needed technical advice to improve their 
farming economy. It is evident that the Swazi rural agricultural 
economy was gravitating towards a stage where it could neither 
be subsistence nor fully com m ercial. And this balance was 
maintained through to the end of the war in 1945.61
In spite of the division of Swazi growers' attention between 
food and cash crops, in 1937 their output in cotton was recorded 
separately from that of European settler farmers. In 1937, and 
1938 Swazi growers were reported to have sold to the Power 
Company 11,250 lbs and 6,178 lbs seed cotton respectively, as 
opposed to 75,608 lbs and 13,964 lbs seed cotton sold by 
European counterparts. In that same period, coincidentally, Swazi 
output in tobacco was 13,525 lbs and 22,564 lbs valued at £267 
and £445 respectively. That of the European producers was 
187,776 lbs and 322,020 lbs valued at £3897 and £9181 
r e s p e c t iv e ly .62 The nature of this development tells one that 
from the 1930s, when the cotton market was still maintained in 
B rem ersdorp  and tha t o f tobacco  at G oedgegun, some 
specialisation in the production of the crop most suited to the 
climatic conditions of each region took place. In a nutshell, it was 
more econom ical to grow cotton in Brem ersdorp than in 
Goedgegun because the conditions were more suited to it in the 
form er region, tobacco production in the latter. Yet another 
determ ining factor was the distribution of the m arkets that
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prom oted these c r o p s . 63 ln addition to these buyers were also 
some South African buses which operated in the country and 
provided transport to cotton to be marketed in J o h a n n e s b u r g . 64 
As far as the availability of the facilities of marketing cotton 
were concerned, especially in Brem ersdorp, cotton expansion 
could have easily taken place there if the profits justified the 
costs of production.
Tobacco was also grown in Bremersdorp but on a small scale 
due mainly to the remote market which made the costs heavy for 
the grow ers when considering  its transporta tion  costs to 
Goedgegun. Its only alternative market was found among the 
Swazi who smoked it, but this form of m arket was far less 
lucrative com pared to that which was provided by settler 
farm ers, based in G o e d g e g u n . 65 Cotton production in the latter 
region was limited to a small scale by the mid and late 1930s, 
and this was due to the fact that the area was less suited to the 
crop when considering the clim atic conditions along with the 
absence of a good market. A.E. Language and Company tried to 
k indle in terest among the growers, but were unsuccessful. 
Sandleni and Ngololweni produced some, but the transportation 
costs lim ited the output to a minimum. The price offered by 
government, at 2 pence per lb of seed cotton even as late as 
1938, did not provoke any reasonable  in te re s t fo r its 
c u l t i v a t i o n . 66 As a result tobacco swung the conditions in its 
favour mainly because of the availability of the local market and 
the relative low costs of production. Itinerant European buyers 
provided more incentive because of the poor trade conditions 
offered by the cooperative. Swazi growers were discrim inated 
against by the cooperative, which explains their decision to sell to 
itinerant buyers and at worst to governm ent. Some growers 
made independent decisions on which crop to grow and where to 
sell it. There was also a burgeoning class of middlemen in the 
case of tobacco marketing. Bicycles are reported to have been 
used to transport tobacco to buyers in G oedgegun and 
Hlathikhulu whose prices were higher than those offered by the 
g o v e rn m en t. B e fo re  th ese  m idd lem en  u n d e rto o k  the 
transportation of tobacco they had been apprenticed to some
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South African dealers in hide and skin trade that had been 
carried out between Swaziland and Natal.67
Those involved in this business could not hide the problems 
of bicycle transportation of tobacco, especially on the rugged and 
steep parts of the roads. But it was the better of the two evils, 
that is, comparing porterage and the bicycle, particularly  on 
account of the long distance between the two places, Ngololweni 
which was approxim ately 85 kilom etres away from Goedgegun 
where the European settler farmers were. Bicycle transport was 
reportedly sim ilar to one they had seen in Durban when they 
sold skins there. However, the latter involved the pulling of a 
two-wheeled cart by one man, and this was in town which made 
all the d i f f e r e n c e . ^  ^ On one of these trips, a participant, Luke 
M angwe, met Language. Language wanted him to transport 
cotton from Ngololweni to G o e d g e g u n . 6 9 a  slightly improved 
means of transport was suggested; the use of donkeys to pull a 
cart loaded with cotton. It was a year before W orld War Two 
began that the venture relied  upon mules which had been 
introduced as draught animals. From 1 9 4 1 ,  the transportation of 
cotton was made easier, but the money which brokers charged 
for the transport was too high for poor growers. W hile the price 
of seed cotton per lb was at 4  pence in 1 9 4 0 ,  the transport charge 
was 1 penny per 20 lbs of seed cotton, but when the growers 
complained that it was too high it was reduced to 1/2 penny, and 
that revived the cooperation between Language and the growers 
on the other h a n d . 7 0
The discussion has delved into issues of an economic and 
political nature, in which the traditional role of chiefs in rural 
areas, and in the rural economy in particular, had featured very 
prominently. The mode by which chiefs had used their power to 
stamp out tendencies geared towards the com m ercialisation of 
the ru ral econom y, particu larly  farm ing, was successfully  
destroyed by the ECGC which colluded very effectively with the 
Colonial State. But the collusion of the two forces which tamed the 
economic and political hegemony of the chiefs in the rural areas, 
was facilitated by the forces of the money economy that were
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expanding very rapidly. The very system, lineage mode of 
production, which had assisted the capitalist mode of production 
to over-ride the pre-capitalist one, was to be sabotaged by the 
Colonial State whose support to the latter mode of production had 
been very faithful. The trojan horse of the plot for the down-fall 
of the lineage mode of production was none other than the ECGC 
together with other factors such as tobacco which assisted the 
m arket prices.
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TABLE B.
THE TABLE SHOWS THE QUANTITY AND VALUE OF BOTH COTTON 
AND TOBACCO. IT ALSO SHOWS THE MARKET PRICE OF COTTON. 
THAT IS LIVERPOOL MIDDLING PRICE. 1931-39-
YEAR COTTON Liverpool Local TOBACCO
Output Value Middling Official Output Value
(lbs) (£) (d) (d) (lbs) (£)
(000) (000) (000) (000)
1931 1532 10 6 2 298 9
1932 750 3 5 2 341 11
1933 207 1 6 2 378 10
1934 296 2 6 2 375 10
1935 200 1 7 2 262 7
1936 125 1 7 2 283 9
1937 87 - 7 2 188 6
1938 20 - 5 2 322 8
1939 9 - - 4 401 10
Source: Swaziland Colonial Annual Reports. 1931-36. for output, 
value and local official price.
: The year 1937 was given the output of 103,550 lbs seed 
cotton in the Colonial Reports but the Report of the Principal 
Veterinary and Agricultural Officer. December, 31st 1938, gave 
86,858 lbs seed cotton as the output for 1937. It was also in the 
latter year's report that the 1938 output was made.
: The Times of Swaziland. July 1 8 ^ , 1940. p. 5 gave the 
cotton output for 1939.
: J.A. Todd, "Twenty Five Years of Cotton Prices", E m pire  
Cotton Growing Review, vol. xv October, 1938, p. 278.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COTTON BECOMING KING: THE ADVANCE OF COTTON 
PRODUCTION AND OF SWAZI COTTON PRODUCERS, 1939-1960.
The post-war period ushered a flury of economic projects all 
geared tow ards the rehab ilita tion  of the slum ped national 
econom y. This situation created a ttractive grounds for the
investm ent of some developed countries, and the regions to 
which capital was floated for investment were mainly found in 
the Third World, then colonies of the investors. While the colonial 
state appreciated investm ents in large p lan tations such as
forestry, sugar cane and pineapple industries due to the fact that 
these created job opportunities for the colonies, it was also felt 
that an equally great responsibility lay in the development and 
stabilisation of the rural economy. In addition to the revival of 
erstwhile cash crops like cotton and tobacco, other additions were 
made and their production was reinforced through the expansion 
of the departm ent of agriculture personnel, as well as the 
im provem ent o f m arketing and transporta tion  fac ilitie s  in 
Swaziland. However, the Swazi expanded the m arket for cash 
transactions by adding yet another dimension to it, that of barter 
trade which was popular among the producers themselves. In the 
long run, it was discovered that these trading activities had made 
the atmosphere, in the territory, conducive to the expansion of 
cash crops such as cotton and others. This fact was realised in the 
1950s, when markets for cotton, distant as they were from 
production centres, became available, and created favourable 
conditions for the grower to consider it germane to invest in 
cotton more than in any other crop.
The impact of the Second World War. 1939-45
When the Second World War broke out in 1939, the
emphasis of the Colonial State and the ECGC shifted from cotton 
production to that of maize as part of the W ar Economy. H.
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Hutchinson, who had advocated and implemented the cultivation 
of cotton in Swazi areas with the help of Manana and J.Y. Lochrie, 
another ECGC's officer in Swaziland, was transferred to go and 
manage the Food Production Scheme, whose centres were at 
M afutseni in M anzini, Siteki in Lubombo and Goedgegun in 
S h ise lw en i.l Manana went along with Hutchinson and left Lochrie 
behind, who as administrator of ECGC, did not have any impact 
on cotton production in Swazi areas until J.L. M oerdyk, then 
Agricultural Officer, assumed the duty to reintroduce cotton into 
Swazi areas in 1940.2 This revival in the expansion of cotton was 
created by the demand particularly  in Egypt where B ritish 
combatants required cotton to make explosives.3
In 1940, when the demand for cotton soared so did the price 
which rose from 2d to 4d per lb of seed cotton. On the other hand 
cotton which was sold to the government instead of the brokers 
such as Messrs Kynocks and Company, Ltd., was purchased at 2d 
per lb of seed cotton. Kynocks paid 4d per lb of seed cotton. The 
company had its base in Cape Town, but purchased cotton in 
Sw aziland through their agents who were positioned in the 
te rr ito ry .4 This price rise created an incentive for the growers to 
step up production which rose from the lowest output of 1,436 
lbs in 1940 to 21,941 lbs in 1941. In both years the company 
purchased the crop at 4d per lb of seed cotton and shipped it to 
Egypt through East London in the Cape Province of South Africa. 
This improvement in the output was due to the efforts of the 
A g ricu ltu ra l O ffice r who w orked w ith m ore than  10 
demonstrators who taught improved methods of farming to the 
Swazi to step up production in cotton to m eet the market 
d e m a n d .5 But in 1942, even though the cotton output had been 
depressed by unfavourable w eather conditions, the slum ped 
price from the record of 4d per lb of seed cotton represented 
some 50% fall, to 2d per lb. This m arket slump had been 
engendered by the inundation of the market with inferior cotton 
from the Belgian Congo.6
The depression of the price from 4d to 2d per lb had an 
adverse effect on the morale of the producers. However, prior to
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the price decline the colonial state, through M oerdyk, had 
expanded the production to Croydon, which lay close to the White 
Mbuluzi River, near present-day Dvokolwako Settlement, in 1941 
where a government-run project was initiated to motivate Swazi 
growers there to cultivate cotton.7 M oerdyk had received the 
cooperation of Lochrie, but most of the work was done by African 
demonstrators. It is important to note that at that time most of 
these efforts were concentrated around M anzini per se. The 
reasons for this conduct were simply that the demand for cotton 
as part of the W ar Effort, particularly from 1939, was treated as 
an emergency and the colonial state aimed to maximise output at 
a very low cost. In that wise, since the office and the base of the 
colonial state were in Manzini, it was cheap to concentrate within 
the latter region to cut down on any unnecessary costs such as 
those which could have been occasioned by the transport of both 
the personnel and the com m odities. Yet another reason for 
leaving out the Hlathikhulu-Goedgegun area was the realisation 
that the region was less suited to cotton cultivation save for the 
yet unexplored and least known south east part of the region. But 
the historical cotton scene had indicated its relative unsuitability 
to cotton production by the war duration. This latter reason is 
emphasised by the fact that in spite of its rem oteness from 
Manzini, then the seat of the colonial administration, Goedgegun 
was affected by the Food Production Scheme, and reasonable 
amounts of maize were raised there.8
It was in 1942, when the cotton price took a sharp nose-dive 
that yet another unfavourable event occurred and m ilitated 
against the expansion of cotton cultivation: food shortages
became acute and the colonial state shifted its emphasis yet again 
to the production of food crops chiefly maize to meet the rising 
demand. In short, even the Croydon cotton scheme was cut short 
by this intervention to the extent that very little cotton is said to 
have been produced in the following years. However, the cotton 
project was carried on at Mafutseni by some Swazi growers such 
as E. Nxumalo, D. Mkoko, and others alongside maize and other 
c r o p s . 9 The main explanation for the persistence of these inspite 
of the in tervention  of the colonial state to re in fo rce  the
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production of food crops at the expense of cotton in Mafutseni 
was that Cotona's agents, operating through the South African 
buses which passed there, allegedly purchased the crop at 2d or 
even more by the early 1940s. They were still operating from
their base in Johannesburg at that time. The colonial state
justified its concentration on food production at the expense of 
cotton because the latter was already supplied in abundant 
am ounts by the B elgian Congo. 10 j n short, this episode 
introduced some kind of an 'international division of labour* by 
allowing each region to produce the commodity it was best suited 
to supply at that tim e.H
After 1942, when government's campaign to step up 
production in cotton by Swazi growers dwindled, the incentive to 
continue to grow the crop was provided by Clark who competed 
with Cotona. 12 According to M afutseni cotton growers Cotona 
attracted more attention from them because they paid more
money per lb for their cotton compared to Clark. However,
w he ther th is in cen tiv e  p ro v id ed  by the b rokers was 
strengthened by the W ar effort or by other factors, it was 
difficult to establish since both recorded and oral sources proved 
inadequate. But since the demand for cotton by the war had 
already been glutted with the supply of inferior cotton from the 
Belgian Congo, other factors should be held responsible for the 
revived but weak interest in the crop. It was in the 1920s, that 
Clark appeared in Swaziland in search for cotton to feed the BCG A 
and some newly built textile industries in Johannesburg, and it 
seems that both Cotona and Clark were the main suppliers of 
cotton to these houses. Even the few European settlers who had 
persisted with cotton production such as Captain G.L. Wallace of 
Dinedor, sold part of their cotton to the South African brokers 
while part of it was sold to the Power C o m p a n y .  13 However, the 
output was low and that explains why the latter company 
stopped to gin Swaziland cotton and transferred to South Africa 
in 1945. It was also in the same year that the ECGC discontinued 
its cotton campaign in South Africa and Swaziland due to the 
small volume of trade in the commodity.14
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It is hard to say whether or not the effects of the war were 
positive or negative on cotton production in Swaziland. It is 
important to note that the technology required to produce cotton 
had partly been reinforced by the war demand to the extent that 
when combined with experience, Swazi growers were able to use 
it effectively at the end of the war when the market price was 
revived. At the end of the war Swazi initiatives to produce cotton 
were reinforced by brokers who promoted cotton production.
The Revived Market Price on Cotton and other Crops
At the end of World War Two, especially at the beginning 
of the 1950s, the agricultural policy of the colonial state, was to 
avoid supporting the production of one crop at the expense of 
others. Maize was one of the crops, whose production had not yet 
been stabilised throughout the country. The colonial state wanted 
the Swazi to raise production in it due to the simple technology, 
and low costs involved in its production compared to cotton. 
Secondly, when compared to sorghum, which did not require any 
special technology for production, maize was easier to grow 
because it was very light in labour. Unlike sorghum, which 
required guarding to ward off the birds which had caused 
depredation on it, maize did not need all this extra labour. The 
production of maize, in the place of sorghum, was considered one 
of the major labour and time saving devices, which freed labour 
and time for the execution of other economic activities. Yet 
another advantage of maize cultivation was that, unlike in the 
case of sorghum, whose production technology was very basic 
and simple, that of maize resembled that of cotton, where the use 
of implements like the plough, the harrow, the planter and the 
weeder were necessary.
Technological innovations made in food production were, in 
the long run found relevan t to the production  of other 
agricultural commodities, chief among which was cotton. In 1950 
the colonial state, through the ministry of agriculture, began the 
im plem entation of econom ic program m es that were geared 
towards economic rehabilitation. The main incentive to publicise
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stabilisation in maize was made necessary by the 1949-50 maize 
imports which were estimated at 25,000 bags in each of the two 
y e a r s . B u t  due to the low standard of living of the potential 
consumers measured in wages ranging from 9d per day for 
children to Is 5d per day for adult males, very few could afford 
to buy enough of the maize. At this time, imported mealie meal 
sold at 44s 6d per bag of 180 lbs each. 16 in addition to the 
expenses incurred through food purchases, money was also spent 
on school education, on fiscal obligations and other things. Maize 
as a cash earner, did not provoke adequate stimulus for the 
production to go up among Swazi growers, instead the selling of 
labour to the mines in South Africa and other lim ited places of
employm ent in the territory seemed to hold more prospects,
hence the pull factor which these places of employment showed 
then . 17 But due to low wages earned either way, and the social 
inconveniences experienced, an alternative source of earning cash 
was devised and reinforced through cotton cultivation.
At this time the free distribution of cotton seeds was made, 
the objective of which was to whip up enthusiasm  among the 
growers. The need to buy European manufactured goods in the 
1950s, created an incentive to generate capital. This level of 
trade was owed mainly to the improvement of roads, both on 
national and regional levels. For most of the rural dwellers, 
money could be acquired through the cultivation of marketable 
crops. Of these crops cotton attracted more attention, though the 
output, especially in 1947 still did not indicate whether or not its 
cultivation would expand in due course. But it was not long
before the interest indicated the direction the crop would take, as 
the statistics of production show, for instance, in 1947 the value 
of cotton was £330, in 1948 it had risen to £4,633, in 1949 it fell 
to £1,700 but made a phenomenal recovery in 1950, when the 
value was £24,688 with the output at 308 short tons of seed
c o t t o n .  18 Im plicit in these figures was that the stimulus to 
produce cotton was complemented by the rising level of farming 
technology, by acquiring inputs such as equipm ent, and the 
skills. It was also at this time that the efforts of the agricultural 
demonstrators began to pay dividends. But these figures say very
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little regarding the focus of the study, because the focus is the 
contribution of the Swazi and not that of the European settlers, 
and yet the figures reflect a gross national output. Even the 
availability of the gross national output had been reported as 
being due to the efforts of the European settlers, while Swazi 
growers were said not to have made any contribution. But the 
real story was that since the Swazi grower was still isolated from 
the market by lack of transport, his small production had been 
sold to the nearest settler farmers who registered the produce 
under their names. This historical distortion had started when 
cotton production was introduced into the t e r r i t o r y .  19
Cotton brokers such as Language whose base was in 
Goedgegun reinforced their trade by attracting more suppliers 
than before through providing them with subsidised transport to 
carry their cotton to the market. But since they were reluctant to 
indulge in the finance of cotton production in the area, their 
domain suffered some major limitations. It was this approach 
that made the administration refuse to grant them a monopoly to 
buy cotton in that a r e a . 2 0  Consequently, the region remained a 
marginal cotton producer in the territory until 1953, when most 
of the cotton produced in the territory came from the low-lying 
areas of the Shiselweni district, but not from Goedgegun, rather it 
had come from south east Swaziland which since then became the 
cotton belt of the terriotry,21 the rest of the crop had come from 
Bremersdorp. The Goedgegun cotton brokers rem ained isolated 
from the area even at this time because of its frugal policy which 
had restrained itself from setting up credit facilities to help 
finance the production of cotton. But yet another reason for south 
east Swaziland to have taken the lead in cotton production at this 
time was also the suitability of the area to cotton production in 
terms of the clim ate and the texture of the soil. It was dark 
brown loamy soil and was relatively fertile to support the crop 
without bother to rejuvenate it, at least in the initial stages of the 
business. Yet another added advantage was that the clim atic 
conditions were more suitable than those of Goedgegun and 
Hlathikhulu whose climate was more temperate and less suited to 
cotton p r o d u c t i o n . 22 Instead the last two areas were more suited
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to the production of tobacco and not cotton, which suggests that 
both the establishm ent of the market there and the clim atic 
conditions collectively favoured the production of the former 
crop and not the latter, a realisation of the early 1 9 5 0 s . 2 3
When cotton output rose, so did that of the other marketable 
options, such as maize, ground nuts, sweet potatoes and beans. In 
1953, for instance, maize production in Swazi areas in terms of 
acreage, was thought to have been 50% of the total area put 
under maize, while that of sorghum was thought to be 2 4 %.2 4 in 
the same year, the main export crops such as cotton, tobacco and 
maize, showed some revival of interest in the growers especially 
Swazi cultivators, and this was reflected in the output. The 
expansion of these crops, especially that of maize had been made 
possible by government provision of a local market. It was in 
1953 that maize sold to government by Swazi producers was 
placed at 2,500 tons, and this was representative of some 
phenomenal rise from past production and sale. For instance, in 
the years 1951 and 1952, maize sold to government was 400 
and 200 tons less than the 1953 sale r e s p e c t i v e l y . 25 But the 
phenomenal rise in the sale of maize to government as reflected 
in 1953 was depressed in the following years and that was due to 
some more lucrative markets in the territory provided by some 
local trading stores who allowed the producers to use their maize 
as currency to buy commodities they wanted. In addition to 
these local stores there were also some itinerant buyers whose 
prices were more lucrative than those of the government. This 
trend was indicative of Swazi determination to avoid selling their 
commodities to less lucrative markets in the presence of those 
which offered better prices. W hat was also rem arkable about 
Swazi trading activities was that they did not just exploit more 
profitable m arket opportunities but were aware of the most 
lucrative agricultural comm odities of the different tim es, and 
responded by producing mainly those items which paid more 
dividends. In the process government endeavour to keep an up- 
to-date register of the produce was rendered futile. Apart from 
the above avenues of trade there was also the barter trade which 
took place between the Swazi themselves where they bartered
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one item for another and this type of trade was not monitored by 
the governm ent so as to keep a correct record of what was 
actually happening in the rural areas, as far as Swazi farming was 
concerned.
The barter trade flourished in Hlathikhulu and Goedgegun, 
where the clim atic conditions had been su itab le to m aize 
cultivation, and growers exploited it successfully. On the other 
hand Hluthi, along with the cotton area, enjoyed very good fertile 
soils which supported all crops in a rainy season, but when rains 
were scarce only sorghum and cotton survived in it. From 1952 
there were some Swazi who had moved from the tem perate 
zones of Shiselweni such as Hlathikhulu and Goedgegun, to settle 
in the cotton area. Their objective, as cattle-keepers, was to 
multiply their livestock there because the area supported a very 
strong pastoral econom y due to the availab ility  of some 
nutritious grass. In this area the newcomers tried successfully to 
produce sorghum  and sweet potatoes, but when cotton was 
introduced and offered an alternative means of earning money, 
and with the market close by, its cultivation was adopted, and 
some dwellers began to think in terms of which crop met their 
immediate needs, and especially those of a financial nature. Food 
was im ported from  the areas which lay to the north and 
produced more maize than cotton. Donkeys were used to move 
the food from the areas of high production to those which did not 
produce even enough to feed the local populations, and most of 
this maize was bartered for either goats or c a t t l e . 26
Barter trade was also common between goats and the 
plough, whose use was widespread throughout the country, and 
more so in the cotton growing areas. The lowveld provided a 
viable market for the ploughs which were sold by those people 
who had traded in hides and skins in Natal, and these ploughs 
had already been used, hence they were bartered for goats, and 
sometimes a dozen chickens e a c h . 27 When plough purchases 
became cheap most cotton growers bought them in twos for 
security purposes. Ploughs at this point were viewed as one 
important area of investm ent because they could be hired out
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either for cash or for labour or for some chickens. In cases where 
the person rented out the equipm ent for more than one
season the rental took the form of a beast. In this case ploughs
became an instrument for generating income due to their labour
Cotton Expansion Into Swazi Areas
The history of cotton cultivation by Swazi growers of south 
east Swaziland bears some affinity to the experiences of Swazi 
cotton growers in 1911 and 1914, in that its beginnings are 
traced to settler farms. Here it had begun with tenant growers, 
and later it expanded to Swazi areas. In south east Swaziland, 
cotton had not been grown by Swazi cultivators until 1951 and 
Swazi pilot growers were tenants on Ian Hillary's f a r m . 28 At that 
time, Dick Fyfe was manager of the farm, and it was Fyfe who
im ported  cotton  seeds from  M agudu, to prom ote  cotton
cultivation in Swaziland. Fyfe's first attempt to grow cotton was
in 1949-50, and had done it on a small scale; as an experiment. 
When it proved to be suited to the ecology and climate, Fyfe 
expanded the area in 1950-51, from about 2 acres in the 
previous season to about 5 acres. He had been assisted by Albert 
Vilakati and Adrian Harrison in its production, and both Albert 
and A drian were tenants on the farm. In 1951, Fyfe had
harvested 4 bales of seed cotton of 400 lbs each, while the first 
output had been 1 1/2 bales, and both of these harvests were 
m arketed at M a g u d u . 29 Though the two tenants did not know 
the exact price of the crop at the market, they were given the 
impression that it was handsome. It was the lucrativeness of the 
venture that m otivated A lbert to begin cotton cultivation in 
1951, two years after Fyfe had been on it. A lbert received 
Adrian's cooperation in this venture, and the output was 2 bags 
w eighing 200 lbs e a c h . 3 0 Since the same old problem  of 
transport facilities still lingered, and very prom inently in that 
area, the two growers decided to sell their cotton to the gin 
through Fyfe. The latter accepted the arrangem ent because he 
had even demoralised them by saying that non-European cotton 
growers were not allowed to sell directly to the gin due to the
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enactment of racial laws in the country where the company was 
based, South A frica .31 Consequently, the two growers were 
advised by Fyfe him self to sell their cotton through him. 
Grudgingly, the two growers gave in and allowed Fyfe to take 
their cotton to the market in 1952-53, but were very unhappy 
with the returns of their crop. In fact, the two growers were 
suspicious that Fyfe was bent on defrauding them by withholding 
part of their money. In the latter year their suspicions were 
made even stronger by the fact that Fyfe failed to explain to 
them the terms upon which the crop was sold at the market. 
A lbert was even more suspicious than his colleague Adrian, 
because he had grown up in an area where cotton had been 
grown since 1904, and his family had partaken of the business in 
Mafutseni. As a result of his background, Albert was aware of the 
terms upon which the crop was supposed to be sold. The 
payments, for instance, were supposed to come in two parts: first, 
it was the on-the-spot payment and, second, the last payment 
which was supposed to reach the grower after the broker had 
sold to the manufacturers, perhaps double the price at which the 
broker had purchased the crop from its producer. In this case the 
producer was entitled to some percentage of the total amount, 
which was referred to as a back payment. The back payment had 
been kept dark to the growers by Fyfe with the hope that they
would not have a way of knowing about it.3 2
Unlike the exploitation prone growers of the 1910s, Albert 
and Adrian resisted by exploring alternatives to the means by 
which they could sell their cotton to the market. Incidentally, 
there were four other Swazi growers in 1953-54, who also grew 
cotton in the region. Albert initiated a general meeting of the six 
cotton growers to seek an alternative way of selling their cotton 
to Magudu other than through Fyfe. By this time, there were two 
Xaba brothers (Peter and Joseph) in the area who owned a one- 
ton-truck which they used to transport kraal m anure to their 
fields and to transport other agricultural comm odities such as 
maize from the areas of high production to those of a low maize 
o u t p u t .  ^ 3 The Xaba Brothers agreed to transport the cotton of
the growers to the market at a charge which was acceptable to
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the growers. It was in 1953 that the venture to sell directly to 
Magudu was m a d e , 3 4 an(j it revealed the possibility of Swazi 
growers producing more cotton to sell to the company. The two 
growers who had accompanied the truck became ambassadors for 
the company in the region. And this cooperation resulted from 
the company’s offer of a welcome party on the first day the 
growers went there to sell their crop. The two growers were 
Albert Vilakati and Lokhakhi Dlamini, chosen on the strength of 
their formal education which facilitated communication with the 
owners of the com pany. W hen the two returned to their 
colleagues, they dispelled the fears they had entertained about 
the alleged discrim ination that the company practised. They 
invited their fellow growers to take up cotton cultivation and 
distributed cotton seeds to growers before this responsibility 
was taken up by the company's officer. They were assured that 
the ideology of the company was to promote cotton growing not 
just by one racial group of people but by every grower who 
possessed the ability to do so, and even if the financial ability 
was not there, the company were ready to provide it. In this way 
the company had succeeded to win the growers to its side and 
more growers were attracted to support the venture in due 
course. Upon the additional delivery of seeds which the 
company's field officer, Aaron Mhlongo, made at the beginning of 
the planting season, the company had hoped to monopolise cotton 
in the a r e a .3 5 The presence of Mhlongo in the region was 
important in so far as it reinforced the economic cooperation 
between the company and the growers. M hlongo’s presence was 
also an in strum en t by w hich the com pany could  boost 
productivity in cotton in the area.
What was perhaps central to the nature of the development 
of Swazi cotton production at this juncture, was the success with 
which the company persuaded pilot growers to whip up interest 
in other grow ers to produce more cotton. This ro le  was 
shouldered by Albert V ilakati, whose comm itm ent to cotton 
production was above that of other growers. Albert was a teacher 
by profession and had been trained in South Africa. His exposure 
to the South African environment, where the history of political
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agitation had long come of age by the 1940s, when he received 
his training, was to form some solid foundation upon which the 
history of cotton growers was built. Upon return from college he 
had taught in his neighbourhood (Mafutseni) but in 1948 was 
transferred to Nkutjini Primary S c h o o l . 3 6  Due to lack of any form 
of accommodation on the school premises, Albert had sought it 
him self and found it on Ian Hillary's farm, w ithin a walking 
distance. On the farm  were other tenants, including Adrian 
Harrison who became close friends with Albert. Adrian was a 
Eurafrican. Hillary had discharged the managerial responsibilities 
of the farm to Dick Fyfe, yet another Eurafrican, whose roots 
were in Magudu, and had come to the region to seek social and 
economic asylum with his uncle, H i l l a r y . 3 7
In his second year of tenancy on the farm, Albert gained 
experience in cotton cultivation under Dick who had received 
seeds from Magudu and that is how the whole history of Swazi 
cotton production in this area began. It was due to his exposure 
to the social relations of European settlers and indigenous 
Africans in South Africa that made him sensitive to any form of 
racial and social discrim ination. But after A lbert and his 
colleagues had avoided Fyfe by selling directly to Magudu, he 
was sacked from the farm towards the end of 1953.3 8 Though 
he had not been given any explanation for the dismissal, it was 
clear to everybody who knew the history of his involvement with 
cotton marketing, what occasioned his expulsion. Both he and 
Adrian, who had also sold his cotton to Magudu, were removed 
from the farm. It seems that owners of privately owned land 
allowed their tenants to reside on their farms so long as they 
accepted  regu la tions for residence  w ithout any question . 
R ecalc itran t elem ents had been elim inated, w hich conduct 
suggests that the system  of tenancy was oppressive and 
exploitative at the same time.
However, the two were granted refuge by the chief of the 
neighbourhood, and their presence among the people in Swazi 
areas had an impact on the agricultural economy. By 1954 the 
number of cotton growers in the area had grown to twelve, and
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all these were Swazi growers on Swazi A r e a s . 39 The local chief 
had warmly accepted the idea of an agricultural officer from 
M essrs Ralli Brothers and Company with a welcom ing party 
partly financed by him, an indication that he supported the 
economic changes that were already underway in his region. The 
ch iefs  receptive attitude to the company's venture was due to 
the fact that he had noticed that cotton appeared to be the main 
commodity farmers could grow to earn money to meet financial 
needs and even buy food in adverse seasons because the area 
was drought r i d d e n . 40
While the company had succeeded to inject interest among 
the growers of the region, it had not stimulated interest for the 
cultivation of cotton on a large scale. At least the problem of 
transport had ceased to be the arresting factor; rather the main 
problem  was that the crop was labour intensive. South east 
Swaziland was the worst part of the territory in terms of isolation 
from the main centres of economic activity even by 1953, and 
even much later than that, which meant that the people of the 
area who did not see farming as an alternative means of earning 
money migrated to South Africa to seek employment either on 
the mines or local f a r m s .41 But some of those who did not grow 
cotton as a source of their livelihood, sold some of their livestock 
such as cattle, goats, pigs and sometimes chicken to raise the 
money. It was very rare in the region to find heads of families 
migrating to South Africa for employment. Those who migrated 
were mainly the youth who were pulled by some romantic ideas 
of having been to industrialised South Africa relative to their 
own home country or pushed by necessity. But even these youths 
did not go to the extent of relying on labour migration as a source 
of earning money for a living on an indefinite basis. Due to the 
racist and harsh treatment which they received there, they were 
forced to return home to find other alternative sources of earning 
a living.
But what needs more clarification is the reluctance with 
which heads of families reacted to earning a living by migrating 
to South Africa. South east Swaziland had a very thick vegetation,
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and some small bushes which needed cutting down and to be 
uprooted when land clearing was done to facilitate the use of the 
plough to till the soil. These tasks required an enormous amount 
of time and energy, and the only time when they could be done 
was winter, after h a r v e s t . 42 Already, there was some conflict 
betw een m igration to South A frica and land clearing  in 
preparation for the next planting season, and ploughing required 
the physical presence of the family head to prosecute all the 
responsibilities of cultivating his fields. Women could not, and 
were not assigned these tasks, particularly because society was 
protective of such a sex on the grounds of physical weakness 
associated with it. In consequence of these handicaps, heads of 
fam ilies did not m igrate especially in the 1950s when the 
cultivation of cotton was expanding. However, it is equally 
important to make some exceptions here because some men did 
m igrate, and left their wives with all the tasks that were 
supposed to be performed by t h e m . 4 3
In m ost cases m igrants constituted an infinitesm al 
proportion, and even then, m igration was occasioned by some 
uncommon disasters on the agricultural economy. For instance, 
when droughts destroyed crops, some men migrated for a short 
time, simply to raise enough money for food and other financial 
needs. Livestock could have been sold instead, but some men had 
not found it easy to sell livestock before they explored other less 
self-destructive avenues of earning money. Yet another category 
of migrants among men came from those who despised the life of 
a farmer and chose to earn a living on wage labour. But since the 
region had in itia lly  attracted hard workers and venturesom e 
Swazi cultivators and cattle-keepers, both of whom were bent on 
improving their social and economic standing, a class of leisure 
prone Swazi men was rare. It was these factors that discouraged 
labour migration on a large scale compared to the other regions 
of the t e r r i t o r y . 44 But even in those regions which were prone to 
labour m igration, the tim ing was very im portant, and was 
observed very closely. For instance, m igrants always returned 
home in time to clear the fields and carry out farming. It was at 
the end of ploughing and planting that migration occurred, but
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only when the season did not hold any prospects for a good crop 
would heads of families migrate leaving behind their wives to 
perform all the rest of the work, such as weeding and harvesting. 
But the results were always disappointing because the output 
would fall below even the domestic requirements of the family. 
The explanation had not been hard to find: whenever only one 
member of the family was left behind to shoulder the domestic 
tasks which included farming, looking after cattle, and others, 
there was always bound to be some shortcoming.
It is worth noting that after Swazi cultivators began to grow 
cotton as a source of incom e, they sought other related 
investm ent opportun ities w hich were supportive of cotton 
production and vice versa. Such a practice was popular, and 
among those Swazi growers whose homes lay near rivers and 
damp places which facilitated irrigation farming, however small 
the extent might have been, maize and vegetables were grown. 
These were found along the Sitilo river, because at that time it 
enjoyed an adequately reasonable flow of water all the year 
round. Crops such as potatoes, sweet potatoes were also grown 
late in July and early August, just before the planting season 
began. A market for these crops and other vegetables was found 
at Hluthi, and these activities provided an alternative to cotton 
production whose scale was also e x p a n d i n g . 45 Some of these 
crops could even be sent to Goedgegun through M essrs. Xaba 
Brothers Transport, and the costs of transportation were not 
thought to be high, at least by the producers themselves. Winter 
was the main season when the production of alternative sources 
of income was undertaken.
It is also essential to note that cotton production in the late 
1950s had not been thought of as the sole answer to economic 
problem s. There were yet other alternative solutions to the 
shortage of money, and these were used in south east Swaziland 
until very recently, especially to the time when the production of 
other crops becam e very unpredictable. Those growers who 
persisted with cotton production, such as Albert Vilakati, Josiah 
Vilakati, Lokhakhi D l a m i n i , 4 6  a n c t a few others, began to realise
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some encouraging benefits. Though it was difficult to use one 
specific measurement rod to evaluate the profits of these people, 
the use of different criteria in the assessment of their economic 
growth was deemed necessary. For instance, while investment in 
modern and well-built houses might have been perceived a less 
profitable area for investm ent, the purchase of equipm ent to
enhance cotton production in the long run and the upgrading of
the other factors of production were thought to be relevant
areas. The majority of these growers had moved from the use of 
donkeys to that of oxen (cattle), which meant that the plough 
became central to cultivation and so did draught power. There 
was a gradual shift away from complete reliance upon one plough 
per hom estead to two ploughs plus the use of other related
equipment. Those growers who had shunned cotton cultivation 
took a long time to acquire these improved technological factors 
of production, which had expanded by 1955.47
It seems Swazi cotton growers of the region became part of 
the m arket economy, particularly when one views the major 
advancements made by 1955. Having begun to upgrade the roads 
which linked the hom esteads, that were already engaged in 
cotton cultivation, to the trunk roads which led both to the 
Phongolo and Gollel (Lavumisa) border posts, tractor acquisition 
was deemed the next logical stage. At this point, those who were 
averse to cotton production and hoped that the excitement with 
which the crop was adopted would die a natural death, were 
stunned by the major step taken by Samuel Nsibande and Amos 
Matse in 1955, when the two pooled their resources to purchase 
a second-hand tractor from a local European f a r m e r . 4 8 p art 0f 
the wealth they invested in the tractor had been saved from 
their production of cotton while the other money had been raised 
through the sale of cattle. Much to the chagrin of ill-wishers, the 
two growers improved their farming technology by adding some 
of the relevant equipm ent that went along with the use of a
tractor such as the plough, planter, weeder, harrow, but in a
piecem eal m anner. These two cultivators had been growing
cotton already for three years. The impact of this development on 
those who had not taken cotton production seriously was that
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they too began to view the cultivation of the crop differently 
than they had done previously. Among this group were those 
who had avoided cotton production in favour of earning money 
by hiring their labour to some European settler farmers, and the 
wages were earned by performing farm work, something they 
had despised in their own home area. This experience made some 
come to grips with reality and later returned home to start cotton 
production as a means to earn a livelihood, due to encouraging 
profits which accrued from it.49
In 1954 cotton production was already encouraging because 
about 9 bales had been produced by Lokhakhi Dlamini, followed 
very closely by Samuel Nsibande with 7 1/2 bales of seed cotton. 
However, the acreage of the growers was estimated between 10 
and 8 acres respectively.50 In general, the production was still 
low but encouraging when one considers that the lowest output 
per grower was 2 bales. The total number of bales which were 
sent to Magudu in 1954, was about 30 bales of seed cotton all 
produced only by Swazi cultivators.51 It was due to this material 
progress that some new companies were attracted to the area to 
make investments in cotton production, for by this time the only 
company which had invested there were Ralli B r o t h e r s . 52 They 
had consolidated their economic empire in the region by sending 
one of their agricultural field officers, A. Mhlongo, to forestall any 
potential rivals. This field officer reported that Clark, whose base 
lay to the north, were expanding into the area (see above p. 61). 
But Clark were not a real threat to the economic empire of Ralli 
Brothers due to their failure to meet the credit needs of the 
growers, an effective weapon to win producers to a broker’s side. 
As itin e ran t brokers, they had m aintained their base in 
Mafutseni. A. Mhlongo, agricultural officer for Ralli Brothers and 
company, had remained cool about the expansion of Clark, until 
1955 when the latter were seen engaged in purchasing cotton in 
M akhava, which lay some 8 kilom etres to the north east of 
M atsanjeni. To this the Ralli group responded with haste and 
followed a policy of exclusion, in that they stepped up their 
involvem ent with cotton grow ers by taking a reg iste r of 
everybody who pledged to sell to them only and to no other
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broker in the region. In addition to this, in 1956 they also set up 
a gin on the banks of the Mhlatuze River, west of present day St 
Philips Catholic Mission to buy and gin cotton grown in that area. 
In this way the company was trying to allay the transportation 
problems which they had associated with the growers' 
willingness to sell their cotton to Clark in 1955.53 The company 
thought that the nearer the market the more concrete the need 
for cotton production would be. The company also stepped up the 
number of field officers to three in order to extend their 
economic control to almost every part of the area where there
were promising cotton growers, not only Swazi but even
European farmers were provided for in the a r r a n g e m e n t s . 5 4
Ralli Brothers were so fearful of being out-shone by their 
rivals that they misjudged their economic budget. They appear 
to have over-estimated the potential of the area to produce 
cotton, particularly in relation with their financial commitments. 
The fact that the company made available facilities which 
involved the transport and inputs at what appeared to be 
reduced charges, is an indication that it had over-estimated its
budget. At least the returns did not come anywhere near to 
meeting all those expenses, nor were the production figures 
promising to do so in any very near future, to improve the purse 
of the company. The most productive of the growers by 1956
sold 12 bales per producer and not more, while the majority, 
among the small growers, could produce only about 6 bales per 
season per grower. It seems the expenses of the company on 
cotton growing exceeded the returns and this might explain their 
unceremonious departure from the area and from the business in 
1957. And it was at that juncture that Clark, who had practised 
some frugality in their expenditure, began to move in to take the 
place of Ralli Brothers. The change of the economic policy in 
1959 was aimed to forestall Cotona agents who already operated 
from Nsoko and threatened to attract more p r o d u c e r s . 55
In their success to pull the brokers to their doorsteps, Swazi 
growers had not only solved their old problems which 
handicapped cotton production such as transport, there were
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other benefits which were attached to the break-through. The 
state of the roads, for instance, not only trunk roads but even 
feeder ones, were upgraded by the brokers to ensure that the 
Swazi growers identified with them and regarded them as the 
most progressive brokers. In this way Ralli Brothers had hoped to 
sabotage whatever arrangements Clark had already made with 
the growers. Ralli Brothers had not seen Clark as a strong 
contender. Yet another pull factor which was used by the Ralli 
group was the distribution of inputs to the growers. The technical 
aspect which was taken up by the field officer, should not be 
seen in isolation from the social and powerful effect it had on the 
growers. The fact that he lived among the growers, shared their 
everyday production problems and helped the growers to solve 
them, was more effective in his attempts to create an atmosphere 
of a miniature family of cotton producers for the company. Social 
ties created therefrom were not easily severed, and in this way 
the company could relax and count its long term profits that 
would accrue from the investments made in the region. This 
illusion m isled the company to include sorghum in its 
investments in agricultural f a r m i n g . 56 However, sorghum did not 
appeal to those cotton growers whose cultivation had expanded 
because they argued that it was more labour intensive than 
cotton. The labour intensive aspect came in when the crop 
required to be guarded at fruiting time through to harvest to 
ward off birds and other animals like rodents which threatened 
it. While it was possible to execute these duties during the day, 
yet another problem was that most of the rodents which 
consumed the crop did so at night and not during the day, and 
that posed a problem which was very difficult to solve.
It is important to note that these economic changes were not 
peculiar to south east Swaziland alone, but wherever cotton 
cultivation was suited, there were responses, patchy as they 
were, both in the middle and the low velds. For instance, cotton 
cultivation had been attempted in 1954 at the foot of the 
Lubombo Mountain, in the Ngomane area and even to the north 
of that area, where the Simunye Sugar Plantations are found 
t o d a y .  5 V Cotton production had been introduced there by
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Malangwane Dlamini, yet another Zionist priest who had been 
inspired by an on-going cotton project of his senior priest Samuel 
Fakudze of Macetsheni (see above p. 72-75). He had also collected 
the cotton seeds from Fakudze on one of the Quarterly Meetings 
of the church. But Dlamini received the seeds in 1954, and began 
to grow the crop late in the y e a r .5 8 Even though Dlamini had not 
begun to grow cotton until 1954, his farming technology had long 
been improved by the acquisition of a tractor in 1947, when the 
Food Production Scheme was stopped, Malangwane had been one 
of Hutchinson's assistants on the government farms, and he was 
stationed at the Siteki farm until it closed down in 1947. It was 
at the end of this scheme that he was sold a tractor at £20  and he 
used it to produce maize t h e r e . 5 9
Siteki had been isolated from the centres of economic activity 
to the extent that even the roads were very poor and certain 
parts of these roads were still im passable particu larly  by 
vehicles. The tractor had been used to transport most of the 
things that needed transportation between some areas, and in 
particular that of maize. However, in spite of the fact that Dlamini 
owned the tractor his farming did not make him any better than 
those who had not purchased one. He had depended on casual 
labour m igration to South Africa instead of using farming as a 
means to earn a livelihood until he began to grow cotton in 1954. 
Maize had not yet commanded a good price but in the absence of 
a better option it could have been used as a cash earner instead 
of migrating to distant South Africa.60
The cotton market was far and remote from Siteki, to the 
extent that cotton growers could only sell their crop to the 
m arket at Magudu. However, there was a cotton broker in 
Mafutseni, south-west of his home.61 Clark had expanded to the 
east of M afutseni to establish themselves on the banks of the 
Mhlatuze River instead of eastwards to Siteki, and in 1955 they 
continued to expand to Makhava in the south east. However, 
Clark were thrown out of the area before the end of the same 
year w hen R a lli B ro thers expanded there . In s tead  of 
concentrating on the improvement of the potential that existed in
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Mafutseni, Clark expanded to areas whose cotton production was 
already attractive. In the absence of a nearby market, Dlamini 
travelled to Magudu to sell his cotton. However, before he had 
reached the destination he discovered that the Ralli group had 
already established a depot in Matsanjeni which lay on his way 
to Magudu. That was where he sold his cotton, but after he 
trave lled  m ore than 100  k ilom etres from  his hom e to 
Matsanjeni. In 1956, however, Dlamini was relieved by the Ralli 
group who had opened up a ginnery on the banks of Mhlatuze 
River, (see sketch map) more than 65 kilom etres to the south 
east of his home area, and that was where he sold his cotton in 
1956.62
It is important to understand the main objective behind the 
determ ination of the Swazi growers to undertake long and 
expensive means of marketing cotton, when other options could 
have been used to substitute the capital intensive method. For 
instance, growers in the Siteki area could have found it 
reasonably cheaper to sell their cotton to the Barberton Cotton 
Cooperative, whose base lay south of the Mbuluzi River to the 
north of the producing a r e a . 6 3 But due to the unprofitable price 
which had been offered by the cooperative, at a difference of one 
penny, growers had chosen to travel very long distances to sell at 
Magudu, which was a long distance from the producing area. This 
is undoubtedly one area where some growers displayed some 
distinct lack of economic planning in the history of cotton 
production .
However, like other growers, Dlamini argued that even 
though cotton production involved growers in huge expenses, 
with the improvement of the infrastructure, its production would 
be one of the lucrative enterprizes. His convictions about cotton 
production becoming one of the lucrative ventures in the long 
run came true in 1959 when the Swazi contribution to the gross 
n a tio n a l p ro d u c t i n c r e a s e d , 6 4 and this developm ent was 
attributed to the availability of a local market which reduced the 
distance between the area of production and Magudu. In those 
areas where the market continued to be remote 'free transport1
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had been provided for the transportation of the crop. The concept 
of 'free transport' and 'free seeds' was a catch phrase designed to 
attract the growers to the organisation which offered 'free 
transport', when in reality there was some ifldv is ib le  charge 
made on every grower who sold to the company. The strategy 
worked very well for the company, but its danger lay in the fact 
that the moment its objectives were revealed to the growers it 
would lose the control and reputation it had established between 
itse lf and custom ers.65 However, there were many variables 
involved in the development of an amicable trade relationship 
betw een the two parties, and one that w ould prolong the 
cooperation to benefit both parties.
On the company's side these variables depended on the form 
and degree of success with which it cajoled the producers into a 
package that appeared rem edial to their im m ediate problem s, 
since to many growers, the endeavour to meet market demands 
was determined by prevalent financial stringents. These were of 
a fiscal and domestic nature. Second, as business people the focus 
of the package had to have long term plans and benefits, which 
meant that whatever sum of money was spent should provide for 
a recovery in the near future. This variable often carried with it 
some magnetic effect to tantalise the growers who were in cash 
needs, and that was effective for south east Swaziland at the time 
under consideration. Third, was the psychological variable which 
involved more than simply promising transport facilities to take 
the commodity to the market, the absence of which could have 
arrested  progress. Since at this tim e there was a keen 
competition for Swazi cotton, Ralli Brothers used a method that 
made the growers hold them in high esteem relative to their 
rivals by making available most of the facilities required to 
produce the crop .6 6 jn this case the use of psychological means 
to arrest the attention of the growers was relied upon by the 
company. On the other hand growers also toyed with one major 
variable, which was the desperate desire for the crop the 
company indicated in a bid to outstrip its competitors and get rid 
of them from the area. Having hoodwinked their customers into 
building a m iniature Ralli Brother family, the broker appeared
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certain that it would recover the expenses incurred in its 
economic expansion and the exclusion of r i v a l s . 67
Apropos of these events, which swung the variables to the 
side of the company, was some counterbalance struck by the 
cotton growers, particularly in Matsanjeni, Sitilo and Hlushwana, 
under the guidance of Albert Vilakati. W hether or not it was a 
result of realising the long term adverse effect of allowing the 
company to dictate the terms of trade it is hard to tell, since the 
leader himself confessed that he had not forseen any danger in 
consenting to every arrangement made by the brokers. Instead 
he had thought that growers should also make sure to benefit 
from the venture by drawing up their own operational strategies. 
However, what actually placed the broker in a tight corner was 
that cotton growers formed themselves into a cooperative which 
solved production and marketing obstacles in the region. They 
wanted to determine the extent to which cotton should be grown 
so that the output in food crops was not jeopardised. This was 
one of the concerns of the growers. But this objective was not 
acceptable to all growers because some of them had acquired 
some 'new factors' of production which facilitated a successful 
maintenance of the two economic worlds: food stability and the 
need to respond to the market demand. One of these factors was 
the tractorisation of the farm ing technology whose time and 
labour saving device worked in accordance w ith the elastic 
m arket demands for a diversified rural economy in post-war 
S w a z i l a n d . 68  Cooperatives and their effectiveness in cotton 
expansion in that region form a central theme for chapter seven; 
suffice it to mention that the organisation created some doubt to 
the company regarding the realisation of the ideals drawn out in 
their agenda for investment in south east Swaziland, and perhaps 
that says more about Ralli's decision to abandon cotton in 1957- 
58, in favour of other trades.69
South East Swaziland Becomes the Cotton Producer
Having made a return to the region that forms the central 
focus of the study, one realises the rapidity with which cotton
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production had spread by 1956. The colonial state had taken 
cognizance of the progress of the rural agricultural economy, 
particularly the production of cotton in Swaziland, by the Swazi. 
W hile this gesture suggests some material progress achieved by 
Swazi growers in Swazi production, still there was no systematic 
way of keeping the production figures to ensure that Swazi cotton 
was recorded. In south east Swaziland, for example, the dominant 
consumer were Ralli Brothers who transported cotton from that 
area to South Africa. This was done in the absence of a 
governm ent official to m onitor the exported amount of seed 
cotton; indeed government sought figures of output from the 
broker and accepted whatever figure was given by the latter in 
good f a i t h . Markets that were under government control were 
shunned by the grow ers because they w ere unprofitab le  
compared to those which were run by itinerant buyers in terms 
of the prices paid for the commodity. Yet again the colonial state 
did not seek means by which the interests of the growers could 
be protected against the exploitation of the brokers, an indication 
of negligence, and yet the cotton economy had been propounded 
and even reinforced by the state from the early 1950s. In the 
prom ulgation of cotton production the governm ent aimed to 
rehabilitate the shattered and deteriorating rural economy, and 
this policy had made it necessary for the state to attach itself to 
the scheme. For instance, it began to distribute cotton seeds with 
the hope that growers would respond, but at the same time it 
failed to m onitor the responses. The only interest government 
showed was that of extending technical advice through its 
d e m o n s t r a to r s .71 But even in this regard not many cotton 
producing areas were covered adequately, in fact some areas 
were only touched peripherally, like south east Swaziland.
In spite of the lack of technical education, the growers did 
well. Some of the pioneers in the venture had, by 1956, realised 
a high output in the crop. The highest output then was over 10 
bales of seed cotton, which had been produced by Samuel 
Nsibande, who had purchased a tractor in the previous year, 
jointly with Amos Matse. But the latter had fallen far below the 
above record due to lack of labour, which had led to the
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spoliation of the cotton on the fields, particularly before the bolls 
matured. The weeds which had not been removed soiled the lint 
and the result was that most of the crop was not baled for fear 
that it might bring disrepute to the name of the growers .72 When
one calculates the output per acre, the production was not
impressive because each of them had planted the crop on an 8 
acre plot. This means that the average production was 2 bales 
per acre, instead of the standard output of 5 bales per acre which 
became the average output by the 1960s in the same cotton
producing  r e g i o n . 7 3 However, it is important to note that the 
experience  involved  in cotton p roduction , w hich usually  
accumulates in due course, was still very low for such an output. 
For instance, these growers had not used chemical fertilizers in
their fields, instead they had used kraal manure, yet crops like 
cotton, that were grown specifically for the m arket, had an 
insatiable appetite for chemical fertilizers, and there appears to 
be some strong in-built interdependence between the two. The 
interdependence is often reflected in the yield capacity of the 
crop when grown with these 'concealed factors of production' 
such as the chem ical fertilizers. Third, the growers had not 
sprayed their cotton because they had not seen any cotton pests 
in the area, and yet at harvest time it transpired that some of the 
bolls had been attacked by pests and produced a very poor class 
of cotton. These factors of production needed to be constantly 
hammered into the growers' heads in the interest of p r o g r e s s . ^4
These prerequisites to cotton production could no longer be 
avoided in the absence of a variety that was independent of pest 
attacks. In fact, it seems the more the production of commodities 
expanded the more economic cooperation was forged between 
the m ulti-national corporations who handled the manufacture of 
fertilizers. The manner in which seeds depended on the amount 
and type of fertilizers used in production, raised  suspicion 
because not every type of fertilizer could be used with any seed. 
Harvest aside, even the soils required the type of fertilizer that 
was suited to its texture and only then could the results be 
h a n d s o m e .75 Suffice to mention at this point that traditional 
factors of production such as kraal and compost manure were
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quite important in the 1950s to rejuvenate the soil and raise the 
productive capacity, but these factors did not help to improve the 
output of the variety whether it was traditional or hybrid. Due to 
the low educational awareness of the producers, coupled with 
their weak purse, traditional factors of production formed the 
main backbone for cotton production and of the other crops such 
as maize. However, some growers even as early as the 1950s, had 
already begun to use some of these advanced m eans of 
production, and this step paid d ividends.76  As regards the
spraying of the crop not many growers had taken it seriously
until the early 1960s. But that oversight was to be regretted in
the long run when it arrested the progress in the expansion of 
the crop. Expansion in terms of land was not necessarily
correspondent with expansion in the output, particularly in 1958 
at a time when the pest had become comm onplace and had 
caused severe depredation on the cotton b o l l s . 77
The Swazi farmer, being traditional in many respects, had 
retained the pre-capitalist form of production, and those who 
realised progress by 1956, were ostracised by their society. This 
attitude was initiated by the less prosperous members of the 
reg ion  and expressed  through refusal to cooperate  with 
progressive growers, particularly  when com m unal labour was 
solicited to facilitate cotton production and that of other crops. 
The envious folks referred to their prosperous colleagues as 
'Black Europeans', meaning that, though they were black Swazi 
indigenes, their life-sty le  had been transform ed into that of 
European settlers. The change was reflected in the improvement 
of the farming technology employed to expedite planting and 
expand the area each grow er cu ltivated  per season. The 
improvement of the standard of living was also reflected in the 
social differentiation of the community in the r e g i o n . 78 W ea lth  
was also expressed in livestock acquisition like goats and cattle. 
T racto rs w ere h ired  out for the cu ltiv a tio n  of cotton, 
transportation of the harvest of m aize and cotton, and the 
transportation of kraal manure to the fields where cotton was 
cultivated. Those who failed to pay in cash for these services 
among the poor did so in livestock. In fact by 1958, there were 7
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tractors altogether in the south east region owned by some Swazi 
g r o w e r s . 79 Initially, those who hired the tractors complained 
about the charges as being too high, and that the owners of the 
tractors were exploiting them. In essence, this was an expression 
of jea lousy  for the p rosperity  of trac to r ow ners. Social 
differentiation was also expressed in the social relations of the 
poor people towards the prosperous through the strained and 
recoiling relationship.
During 1958 and 1959, hired labour was gradually becoming 
a feature of the rural economy. But the shift away from reliance 
on family and communal labour was very gradual, to the extent 
that even as late as the 1980s, communal and family labour were 
com plem entary to hired labour even among the already rich 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s . 80 p a r t Gf the explanation is derived from the 
culture of the people, not only of south east Swaziland, but of the 
country in general. Since most of the members of the communal 
labour force were members of the extended family, payment in 
cash was frowned upon, because it was an indication of the 
severance of the social ties that held the unit together. Extended 
fam ily members had viewed themselves as part of the whole 
social family fabric and were willingly ready to make available 
their labour services to any member who required it much in the 
same way as they, in turn, fell back on any able member of the 
extended family for support in financially bad tim es.81 However, 
in spite of this social handicap to the acquisition of labour by 
exchange means, in 1958, within the cotton producing area, 
children of school going age, whose parents could not afford to 
pay for them to go to school, found em ploym ent with the 
p rospering  Sw azi co tton  grow ers. T hat phenom enon was 
undoubtedly crucial to the development of the region in the 
im provem ent o f the in fras tru c tu re  w hich fa c ilita te d  the 
transportation of the labour power. By its nature, school child 
labour was only casual and became available when schools were 
in recess, otherw ise they worked on the cotton fields on 
weekends and public holidays. The impact of this labour was, 
however, m inim al to facilitate cotton expansion. M ost of the 
children who provided the casual labour often walked about 15
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and 25 kilom etres to and from the cotton fields. These long 
distances had an exhaustive effect on the perform ance of the 
children, apart from the fact that as children, they required to be 
constantly supervised. Supervision was meant to stop them from 
playing and to ensure that they did not uproot the crop, and 
mixed it up with the debris at harvest time. Both of these things 
were the concern of the cotton growers, and the allegation was 
that lack of constant supervision of child labour to minimise this 
conduct resulted  in the quality of the crop being affected 
adversely. W henever weeding was done, particularly at fruiting 
time, many bolls were pruned from the bushes, thereby reducing 
the potential output. But since child labour was the only form of 
labour that was available, growers had to employ i t .8 2 Other 
growers depended mainly on family labour, and restricted their 
acreage to a m anageable lim it. The argument was that child 
labour was uneconomic in the sense that is explained above, 
because the supervisor of child labour concentrated his energy on 
that aspect of work, and contributed little manual labour himself, 
which was representative of some major loss in the production
p ro cess .83
But notwithstanding all these problems, it cannot be denied 
that cotton cultivation owed its development and sustenance in 
part to child labour. Beyond that was the labour provided by 
women, a com m on feature of the developm ent of cotton 
cultivation since it had been introduced into Sw aziland in 
1904 .84  Both the European settler cotton plantations and Swazi 
cotton production were dependent on child labour, and the 1950s 
were no exception. Some of these children had built up some 
im m ense experience in cotton w eeding and p ick ing  that 
superv ision  was som etim es made necessary  only by the 
suspicions of the employers, and not that child labour was a 
drawback in the production of the crop. Even from 1955, when 
cotton production picked up once more in Sw aziland the 
employment of child labour had remained central to i t .8 5 if  child 
labour had been destructive to cotton production, the cotton 
economy could not have made the strong come back which the
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country experienced from 1955 to 1959, as the three tables, on 
production, price levels and quality, indicate below.
TABLE 1: COTTON OUTPUT. VALUE and PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
SWAZI EXPORTS fBY VALUEV 
YEAR OUTPUT VALUE PERCENTAGE
(S. Tons) (£)
1955 2,600 223,000 76.3
1956 2,650 199,000 77.0
1957 3,212 227,392 79.6
1958 2,635 178,027 56.7
1959 4,936 298,233 38.2
SO U R C E : Swaziland Colonial Annual Reports, 1955, p. 74; 1956,
p. 80; 1957, p. 78; 1958; p. 82; and 1959. p. 36; and these
figures represent the output and the value. The figures of the 
percentages are based on those found in J.B. Mcl. Daniel, T he 
G eography of The Rural Econom y of Sw aziland . Durban: 
University of Natal, Institute of Social Research, 1962, p. 241.





SO U RCE: Swaziland Colonial Annual Reports, 1959, p. 36.
TABLE3: COTTON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT- PERCENTAGE OF 





SO U RCE: Swaziland Colonial Annual Reports, 1959, p. 36.
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The impact of the boll worm was clearly reflected in the 
output, value, and quality, as shown in tables 1, 2 , and 3, above. 
The drop in the percentage, representing the crop's contribution 
on a national level compared to other crops, was not necessarily 
caused by the decline in the quality, rather it was brought about 
by the impact sugar cane made in that year on the agricultural 
sector. In spite of making its first debut, sugar cane gave a 17.4% 
contribution to the gross national product in terms of revenue in
1958, and went on to upset the table by making a 54.2% in 1959, 
and became the leading crop. However, cotton continued to hold 
on to the second place with 38.2%. What is important to note here 
is the impact the poor quality of the crop in 1958 had on the 
price of cotton in 1959. The price per lb of seed cotton took a 
nose dive from 8.12 pence in 1958 to 7.26 pence in 1959, in spite 
of a good cotton output. It was in 1959, a year after Clark had 
taken a lead in buying cotton in the region that Swaziland 
realised the highest output since the history of the crop began. 86 
It would, however, be dangerous to attribute this phenomenal 
im provem ent to the latter company, because when one looks 
back to the earlier years, the trend was steadily upward and had 
continued in that order. The most relevant observation is that in
1959, Swazi cotton contribution was still sm all and was 
estimated in the region of 20%8 7 and this did not include the 
crop sold to settler farmers instead it represents that which was 
sold to the government or to Clark. Most of Swazi cotton had 
come from south east Swaziland, where the num ber of Swazi 
cotton growers, who already owned tractors, had increased from 
two in 1955 to twelve in 1959.^8
The other crops such as tobacco and maize, which had 
competed effectively with cotton from the imm ediate post war 
era, had declined by 1959, as shown in Table C. In 1946, tobacco 
was reported as the only crop worth recording among the export 
commodities, but in 1959, its contribution on a gross national 
level, was placed at 7.5% compared to 38.2% cotton. Maize was 
weaker since in that year alone there were 55,471 bags of 200 
lbs each imported from South Africa to offset a food deficit. In
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that same year, the Swaziland Milling Company, which had been 
granted the monopoly in 1958 but only began to operate in 1959 
to buy and sell locally grown and imported m aize and maize 
products in Swaziland, purchased 42,452 bags of locally grown 
m a ize .89 But this figure does not tell the whole story surrounding 
maize output in the territory because some of the growers sold 
their m aize to other more profitable markets such as trading 
stores, or even bartered it for cattle with other Swazi growers 
whose output had been drastically reduced by adverse climatic 
conditions. Another variable which stopped Swazi growers from 
selling to the company the unencouraging price of 30s per
bag of 200 lbs which the company offered. Growers who sold to 
the company were those who needed cash, while those who sold 
maize due to lack of storage facilities chose to barter it for some 
l i v e s t o c k . 90 However, whatever the case may be, produce in 
maize had fallen relative to that of cotton, particularly in cotton 
producing areas, where growers no longer bothered to produce a 
maize surplus but just adequate for domestic consumption. To 
these growers, maize was no longer central to their agricultural 
economy the way it had been prior to the revival of cotton and 
also to the appearance of brokers who did not only solve the 
market problem but even that of credit facilities.
Tobacco could not compete either, particularly in the years 
1954 to 1959, when its percentage fell to 10.6%, 6.4%, 7.2%, 
11.0%, 19.9% and 7.5% compared to the cotton percentage of 
56.3%, 76.3%, 77.0%, 79.6%, 56.7% and 38.2% in the respective
y e a r  s .  91 The reasons are not hard to find for this trend. The 
Tobacco Cooperative, had practised discrim ination in their 
treatm ent of non-European customers which thing disadvantaged 
Swazi growers, and even involved them in major losses when 
their crop was refused on various grounds. In either way one 
looks at the tobacco market, it was demoralising to the Swazi 
producer, hence when cotton brokers appeared and extended 
their receptive attitude, the Swazi responded prom ptly in the 
post war era. Sometimes cotton was produced in very distant 
areas, whose transportation to the market became a demoralising 
experience, but in spite of those problems it continued to expand
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until 1959, when Clark arranged to alleviate these problem s, 
partially  t h o u g h . 92 i n this way cotton became the common and 
down-trodden man's economic redeemer.
The Swazi did not grow other crops such as groundnuts on a
large scale as shown in Table C. (2), but grew it on a small scale
because the crop was less profitable compared to cotton, second, 
the market was not as reliable and consistent as the cotton one. 
Yet even the European growers who had grown it stopped in 
1962 basically for the reasons that it was no longer as profitable 
as other crops like cotton and sugar cane. The table also reflects 
tung nuts, which had been grown as a plantation crop by large
scale undertakers, and its market was based in South Africa. Its
history was, however, short-lived, first because of the long time 
it took to mature, second, it was more vulnerable to diseases than 
any of the other crops, and as a result it was abandoned by the 
end of the 1950s.
When one views Table C. (2), it becomes clear that at the end 
of the war there was very little cash crop production especially in 
Swazi areas, except tobacco. However, in 1947, with the world 
m arket p rice  of co tton  rev ived , co tton  p roduction  was 
resuscitated, and it rose only to be slightly affected in 1949 when 
the planting season began rather too late due to late rainfalls and 
it was also affected by hailstorm which destroyed some of it. But 
after that it recovered, particularly from 1952 when even Swazi 
production was expanding. The only year in which there was a 
sharp drop relative to the other years was 1958, a decline in 
output which affected the value even for 1959, when the price 
per lb of seed cotton dropped as indicated in Table 2 on cotton 
prices for the years 1956-59. However, that drop, which was 
worsened by the attack of the boll worm was shortlived since in 
the next year the quality of the crop improved and even the 
output was handsome, thanks to the work of the research station 
that had been established at the Malkerns valley in 1958 under 
the auspices of the Colonial Developm ent and W elfare Fund. 
Production in cotton continued to improve as indicated in the 
output and value figures of the years that follow ed. The
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importance of the crop to the development of the nation speaks 
for itself as shown in Table C (l) of the percentages of production 
and revenue contribution to the state. Its dominance was only 
d isturbed by the in troduction of sugar cane, a plantation 
com m odity financed  by m ulti-nationals, like  the Colonial 
Development Corporation from 1958, but cotton, which became 
the down-trodden men's commodity, continued to dominate the 
second position.
Cotton expansion in the 1950s, was facilitated by the 
construction of roads to the extent that by 1959, virtually every 
part of the territory had a reasonably good surface road for 
trucks. W hile the transportation of cotton was dependent upon 
such an in frastru c tu re , so did that o f the ag ricu ltu ra l 
dem onstrators who spread the technical knowledge central to 
cotton production. In the period before W orld W ar Two, the 
diffusion of knowledge was poor owing to the poverty of the 
infrastructure. In 1958, the Colonial Development and W elfare 
Fund financed the construction of a research station at Malkerns, 
whose functioning had begun at the end of that year. Research 
could be done in Swaziland along with laboratory work, and these 
facilities helped to ease the problems of pest attack the farming 
sector had suffered for years. But these facilities took rather too 
long to diffuse to Swazi a r e a s , 9 3 a gap which was filled by Clark 
in the case of cotton. Roads are also thought to have been an 
arresting factor.
In conclusion, the study has shown the extent of the impact 
of the Second W orld W ar on the production of cotton in 
Swaziland, whose importance had declined very drastically since 
the W orld Slump of 1929-31. The revived interest in the crop 
also led to the provision of not only marketing facilities but even 
the credit facilities were made available and that in itself was 
enough to revive the already dead and forgotten, yet very crucial 
investment area for a state whose economy was export oriented, 
such as Swaziland. The following sections of the study show the 
various investm ent areas which were perceived by the growers
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and exploited to the growers' benefit, as well as that of the 
community in which they lived.
It is now time to turn attention to an analysis of some of the 
main factors in the development of cotton growing among the 
Swazi and the later period: the use of cattle as capital to finance 
co tton  cu ltiv a tio n , the em ergence of co tton  cu ltiv a tin g
entrepreneurs and the role of cotton cooperatives in the 
developm ent of cotton cultivation overlap to the end of the 
thesis.
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APPROXIMATE VALUE OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL CROPS 
EXPORTED FROM SWAZILAND. 1939-60.
YEAR TOBACCO COTTON GROUNDNUTS TUNGNUTS SUGAh








1946 18 - - - -
1947 29 - - - -
1948 30 5 21 6 -
1949 43 2 13 10 -
1950 45 25 10 20 -
1951 21 103 11 20 -
1952 30 114 12 45 -
1953 45 101 22 24 -
1954 29 155 52 36 -
1955 19 223 15 26 -
1956 19 199 16 13 -
1957 46 227 - 13 -
1958 63 178 3 2 55
1959 58 298 - - 423
1960 267
S O U R C E : This table has been compiled from a variety of sources
as set out below. The figures are only approxim ate, as it is 
impossible to decide whether the same criteria were used by all 
these sources. The Times of Swaziland. July 18th, 1940. p. 5 gave 
cotton output and value for 1939; The Crown C olonist. February, 
1943, "Cotton Production in Swaziland", p. 149, gave output and 
value for 1939-1940; Swaziland Annual Reports of the Director of 
V eterinary  and A gricu ltu ral S erv ices. 1942 and 1943, gave
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output and value for 1940-41, 1941-42; and 1942-43 on page 
10; output and value for 1944 and 1945 were recorded in the 
issues for 1944-45, pp. 15 and 22 respectively. S w a z i la n d  
Colonial Annual Reports. 1946 and 1947, p. 39; 1948, p. 32; 1949, 
pp. 7 and 8; 1950, p. 26; 1951, p. 26; 1952, p. 28; 1953, p. 63; 
1954, p. 63; 1955, p. 74; 1956, p. 80; 1957, p. 78; 1958, p. 82; and 
1959, p. 36. But for the value of sugar cf. J.B. Mcl. Daniel, T he 
Geography of the Rural Econom y of Sw aziland . (D urban: 
University of Natal, 1962), p. 241.
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TABLE C m
PERCENTAGE VALUE OF THE PRINCIPAL CROPS EXPORTED FROM 
SWAZILAND 1946-60.
YEAR TOBACCO COTTON GROUNDNUTS TUNGNUTS SUGAR
% % % % %
1 9 4 6 1 0 0 - - - -
1 9 4 7 7 9 1 - - -
1 9 4 8 4 9 8 3 4 9 -
1 9 4 9 6 4 3 1 9 1 5 -
1 9 5 0 4 3 2 4 1 0 1 9 -
1 9 5 1 1 2 6 1 7 1 2 -
1 9 5 2 1 5 5 5 6 2 2 -
1 9 5 3 2 3 5 1 11 1 2 -
1 9 5 4 11 5 6 1 9 1 3 -
1 9 5 5 6 7 6 5 9 -
1 9 5 6 7 7 7 6 5 -
1 9 5 7 11 8 0 - 4 -
1 9 5 8 2 0 5 7 1 1 17
1 9 5 9 8 3 8 - - 5 4
1 9 6 0 3 17 _ _ 8 0
S O U R C E : J.B. Mcl Daniel, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RURAL 




QUANTITY OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL CROPS EXPORTED 
FROM SWAZILAND 1939-60
YEAR Tobacco Cotton Groundnuts Tungnuts Sugar
(S. tons) (S. tons) (S. tons) (S. tons) (S. tons)
1 9 3 9 2 0 1 5
1 9 4 0 2 1 2 -
1 9 4 1 1 7 2 11
1 9 4 2 1 4 6 6
1 9 4 3 1 9 0 4
1 9 4 4 1 2 6 3
1 9 4 5 2 2 3 7
1 9 4 6 1 2 5 * - - - -
1 9 4 7 1 7 6 * 7 - - -
1 9 4 8 2 0 0 * 1 0 4 - - -
1 9 4 9 2 8 7 3 4 2 5 4 6 5 -
1 9 5 0 3 3 5 3 0 8 2 0 2 1 0 0 -
1 9 5 1 2 0 6 9 5 8 * * 5 0 0 8 0 -
1 9 5 2 3 0 5 1 , 1 8 5 * * 2 9 7 2 1 2 -
1 9 5 3 2 8 9 1 , 2 9 5 4 3 4 2 0 0 -
1 9 5 4 1 8 9 1 , 7 9 2 8 5 6 3 0 0 -
1 9 5 5 2 0 0 2 , 6 0 0 4 2 8 2 0 0 -
1 9 5 6 1 7 1 2 , 6 5 0 8 2 4 8 0 -
1 9 5 7 1 7 7 3 , 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 -
1 9 5 8 4 5 3 2 , 6 3 5 7 0 2 0 7 , 2 3 6
1 9 5 9 5 3 8 4 , 9 3 6 1 - 1 4 , 0 7 7
1 9 6 0 4 8 0 4 , 1 7 1 5 2 - 5 7 , 1 5 6
S O U R C E : Swaziland Veterinary and Agricultural Services. 1944- 
45, pp. 15 and 22 for years 1939-45; Swaziland Colonial Annual 
R e p o r ts , 1949, pp. 7-8; 1950, p. 26; 1953, p. 63; 1954, p. 63; 
1955, p. 74; 1956, p. 80; 1957, p. 78; 1958, p. 82; 1959, p. 36; and 
years 1946,1947, 1948, for both cotton and tobacco, and 1951 
and 1952, cotton output figures, were taken from J.B. Mcl. 
Daniel, The Geography of the Rural Economy of Sw aziland.
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(Durban: University of Natal, 1962), p. 241, along with the output 
for sugar in the years indicated above. In those cases where only 
a dash instead of a figure appears its either the crop had not yet 




INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN CATTLE and COTTON
1955-80
In a community whose economic base, in terms of the 
accumulation of wealth and its multiplication for re-investment, 
particularly in rural agricultural farming, was still very weak and 
uncertain, livestock filled the gap. In Swaziland cattle became the 
base upon which the agricultural economy, cotton cultivation 
particularly from 1955, was founded when there was no other 
strong source of finance. Since the Swazi society had dissociated 
land from private ownership, in the interests of saving the 
financially less able from becoming victims of the expanding 
capitalist system, cattle became the only means by which credit 
facilities could be solicited from the banks, and other finance 
organisations when they became available. But then banks, as 
financial organisations, took advantage of the situation, that is, 
the production of cotton and its dire requirements for finance 
and used it to render vulnerable cattle-rearing, which was the 
pillar of the Swazi traditional rural economy. This development 
ties up very well with the dependency theory which shows the 
m ethods capitalism  has used, through in ternational trade, to 
stagnate less developed economies of the world. It has done this 
by making these economies concentrate on the production of 
commodities which are export oriented even though the profits 
sometimes fall far below the production costs. In the process the 
less developed econom ies rem ain in that state  and more 
dependent on the developed world.
Swazi people argued that cattle-keeping constituted a 
lucrative and beneficial investment area relative to banks, whose 
interest rates were very low. Swazi growers also ploughed their 
p ro fits from  cotton back into the purchase of livestock , 
p a rticu la rly  ca ttle , and other m anufactured  equipm ent to 
promote their agricultural economy. Swazi cultivators sought the 
means of im proving their livestock  particu larly  by c ro ss­
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breeding them with the type which commanded a good price at 
the market so that they could sell them for a handsome price 
which was later invested in the expansion of cotton cultivation. 
The need to improve Swazi traditional Nguni cattle was still part 
of the demand of international trade which was selective of the 
type of cattle that should enter the market so that not only did it 
provide for local needs but even external ones thereby becoming 
an international commodity. At this point there is need to bring 
in the T.W. Schultz concept of the ’technological factors of 
production' which talks of the use of chemical inputs to improve 
the m arket value of a commodity. In this case the Brahman 
which was introduced into Swazi cattle in the 1970s became 
more profitable to sell but also more expensive to keep than the 
traditional type. Banks were avoided by some cultivators on 
account of the ir in te res t rates being exho rb itan t and 
extortionate. The discussion at this point shows how such a 
relationship led to the disintegration of the neatly knit social 
structure, as the developm ent of cotton cu ltivation  gained 
m om entum .
The economic role of cattle in the rural economy of 
Swaziland had been strictly limited to only a few areas such as 
sale w henever food production met w ith som e disastrous 
episodes, and the social role was somewhat over-shadowed by 
the economic one. But apart from cattle being sold, cattle had 
been used quite predominantly, even long before the post-war 
period, as beasts of burden, whereby they were harnessed to pull 
a plough, a sledge and they featured in transportation.! In short, 
cattle had been used from time immemorial to prom ote rural 
sources of income, and it was at this level of the economic 
structure, that cattle  predom inantly  shouldered the burden. 
However, the economic role which cattle played was expanded in 
the post-W orld W ar Two period to include a variety of other 
im portant aspects of that time. Having been freed from the 
economic noose of the chiefs in the post World W ar Two period, 
Swazi growers of the 1950s, particularly the latter half of the
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decade, displayed flashes of dexterity in economic activities, and 
these included the improvement of the rural farm ing economy 
and o ther re la ted  ac tiv itie s , w hose fina l goal was the 
improvement of the standard of living in rural Swaziland.2
However, the relationship which existed between cattle- 
rearing and cotton cultivation in the 1950s was rather more 
complex than the brief sketch above, in that sometimes it became 
problematic to tell which of the two economic activities was more 
important. Yet to the person who was directly involved, it was 
not as difficult to unravel the relationship, and avoid the puzzle 
of a chicken and an egg. In simple terms, cotton cultivation had 
been facilitated by the use of cattle, in this regard. In its initial 
stages, cotton had not necessarily depended for its cultivation on 
what T.W. Schultz calls the 'concealed technological factors of 
production ', particularly , chem ical fertilizers,3 but depended on 
compost, and more so on kraal manure. Kraal manure improved 
the health of the crop and even the quality, given that other 
variables like weather and pest attack did not m ilitate against 
the crop. But what continued to be wanting in spite of the 
widespread use of kraal manure, was the improvem ent of the 
yield capacity of the crop, which was later provided by more 
im proved Schultz 'produced means of production '.4 However, 
being unaware of the shortcomings of the crop which had been 
created by the lack of adequate funds and som etim es by the 
poverty of improved farming technology, the producer was not 
bothered by its yields. In the state of such ignorance kraal 
manure ruled supreme, and in that manner cattle provided some 
foundation  upon w hich the developm ent of Sw azi cotton 
cultivation was later built.
By 1955, the history of cotton cultivation in south east 
Swaziland, particularly  among the Swazi grow ers, was three 
years old. The plough was the most commonly used equipment 
for cultivating cotton, and it was pulled by oxen, though in some 
isolated cases, donkeys provided the draught power. However, 
since the use of donkeys delayed the com pletion of the 
cultivation process, until sometimes the suitable planting period
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was long past due mainly to the fact that donkeys are slow by 
nature, most progressive growers relied on oxen to pull the 
plough. By 1957, there were very few cotton growers who used 
donkeys for ploughing, while for the transportation of cotton to 
depots where trucks collected it, donkeys continued to feature 
until the early 1960s.5 Cotton growers had advanced to the stage 
where they bought ploughs and other implements to facilitate 
cotton cultivation. These included the harrow, though it was not 
very common then, the planter and the weeder. W here the iron 
harrow was not common, the wooden harrow, made by some 
farmers in the area, and resembling the iron one, was commonly 
used. The argument was that due to financial restrictions, poor 
growers could not afford to buy an iron harrow. However, the 
iron harrow was preferred by every farmer for the reason that it 
was more effective than the wooden harrow because of its 
weight. But the most important fact is that both forms of harrows 
were pulled by oxen to level up the surface of the field to 
facilitate the planting of seeds in straight lines. Levelled field 
surfaces did not only facilitate the planting in straight lines, but 
also helped to save seeds, which could otherwise have been 
wasted by lumps created by plough-shares.6
Cotton cultivators needed to use the plough in order to dig 
deep enough to expose grass roots to the sun so that 
regerm ination took much longer where cotton was planted, for 
cotton required that the field should stay clean of any form of 
weed at all times. In this case the weeder could be used to 
remove the weeds that grew up between the lines much later 
after planting by which time the crop's height would be more 
than five inches. Both the use of the planter and the weeder and 
oxen proved to be helpful to the growers in so far as the saving 
of labour tim e and capital for investm ent elsew here was 
concerned. After the weeder had been used to remove the weed 
between the lines, hoe-weeding was then concentrated between 
the plants and that saved both labour time and energy for 
investm ent elsew here.7
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Oxen thus played an important role in cotton cultivation in 
south east Swaziland until very recently, and with the most 
p rogressive en trepreneurs, the role oxen played in cotton 
growing only began to fade away in the late 1970s, when they 
mechanized their farms. The work had come to depend largely 
on the tractors which operated equipm ent ranging from the 
plough to the sprayer, particularly in the early 1980s.8 However, 
very few even among the farming tycoons had reached this level 
by the early 1980s, which meant that the use of oxen could not 
be written off so easily. Underlying the retention of oxen for 
draught power in the areas of cotton production as outlined 
above was the belief that tractors had the effect of making the 
soil very hard when used at planting and weeding time. Once the 
soil was pressed into a rock-like mass, the roots of the crops were 
hindered from penetrating it and that often affected the growth 
rate and even the full height of the plant was affected in the 
e n d . 9 On the other hand, the use of oxen did not lead to these 
problems which was the main reason for some of the farmers to 
continue to use them to plant and even to weed the cotton fields. 
In some cases, even harrowing was carried out by oxen for the 
same reasons given above which made farmers to shun the use of 
a tractor for planting and weeding. These fears were not 
unfounded rather they were based on the experiences of some 
farmers who were engaged in cotton cultivation and had worked 
on European farms in their youth, where they accum ulated 
enough experience on the problems of farming, and those which 
were created by the use of a tractor in p a r t ic u la r .  10
In its initial stages of production, cotton was not particularly 
confined to those who owned cattle or donkeys. There was a 
difference between cattle ownership and cattle-keeping in the 
Swazi social set up. Those people who owned large numbers of 
cattle often divided them up and 'loaned' out some to their 
relatives usually for indefinite periods of time. The reasons 
behind the 'loaning' out of cattle to relatives and sometimes even 
to non-rela tives, were m any, but three w ere particu larly  
important. First, if the cattle owner kept far more cattle than any 
of his neighbours or community members, he started to make
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arrangem ents for the transfer of some to relatives who either 
kept very small herds of cattle or none in certain instances. The 
main cause for transferring the cattle in this regard was fear 
that those in the community who envied the owner for the large 
herd of cattle might either steal the cattle or bewitch both the 
owner and his cattle. But it was not just any needy relative that 
was given the cattle to look after rather it had to be one whose 
character was acceptable to the cattle owner. The needy relative 
had to possess some very important attributes of a diligent man: 
responsible and trustw orthy.! 1
Secondly, it had to be a relative or a colleague who was well 
known for being a careful and successful herder. Either the cattle 
owner had some first hand information on this attribute or was 
advised by some relatives or colleagues whom he trusted not to 
m islead him. Such a person was approached and requested to 
accept custody over the cattle . This a ttribu te  was often 
accompanied by an innate scientific knowledge, on the part of the 
custodian, of some herbs that were used to ward off some bad 
omen that often affected the multiplication of the cattle and other 
livestock. Such innate attributes were not necessarily  found 
among people who already owned cattle, rather some of these 
people 'built their kraals' in the course of practising their herbal 
sk ills . 12 in such cases, the custodian was often given a heifer for 
the responsibility of keeping the cattle, as some form of payment 
for the treatm ent he was going to administer to the cattle. In 
addition to the payment, he also enjoyed access to the services of 
the cattle in farming, where they were used as draught animals. 
He also had access to the kraal manure which accumulated in his 
byre and even helped him self to the milk of the cows. The 
benefits were quite considerable in return for the custody he 
p rovided .
Thirdly, there was a category of people who did not own 
cattle, but who recognised the importance of keeping cattle as 
rural dwellers, and they had eked out a living from the soil as 
farmers. Often these people knew those among their relatives, 
and sometimes even friends and colleagues, who owned large
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numbers of cattle, and who might not suffer any inconvenience 
due to loaning part of their cattle to them (needy relatives). 13 In 
this category the in itiative often lay with the person who 
required the cattle, and he was the one to approach the abundant 
man for the assistance which he required through a loan in cattle. 
The reasons are as specific here as in those cases where the 
owner of cattle took the initiative to seek the help of either a 
herbalist or the services of a responsible potential herder. In this 
case, however, the reasons were specifically agricultural, either 
the farming of maize or cotton, and was accompanied by access 
to kraal manure. The response of the owner was often governed 
by the repu ta tion  of the po ten tia l custod ian  w ith in  his
community, if he had a long history in the community, but if not,
his reputation was often investigated from his immediate former
community. This was done for security reasons. Expertise in 
cattle keeping was not always seen as a determ ining factor,
though if the custodian had had an exposure as a herder, that 
served as an added advantage to his favour. 14
Apart from this traditional practice where cattle were
transferred from patron to custodian, in the 1950s when cotton 
cultivation expanded most of those people who did not own any, 
and had used donkeys for cultivation, began to solicit the
cooperation of those cattle-ow ners whom they knew. 15 The 
im pact of this social cord had held society together, and 
continued to knit, not just extended families, but even society
together, and at this point cooperation was strengthened even
more than before. At least in 1957, when the scale on which 
cotton was grown began to expand per grower, those who owned 
large numbers of cattle, for instance upwards of 60, had found it 
more convenient to reduce their cattle to manageable levels to 
facilitate herding even by young b o y s .  16 Herdboys were mainly 
young boys because older boys had either gone to school or felt 
that they were too old to look after cattle and went to seek 
employment to earn cash. On the other hand the head of each 
family had become fully engaged in cotton cultivation since the 
average acreage had grown up to about 5 per season, and only in 
few cases did the cultivated land exceed the above number per
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grower per season. 17 At this point cotton cultivation was more 
extensive than intensive, which meant that there were more 
acres put under the crop per grower per season than the actual 
amount of cotton that was harvested. At least this indicates the 
degree of excitem ent with which cotton cultivation had been
carried o u t .  18
The symbiotic nature of this socio-economic cooperation, 
which built up some interdependence betw een the various 
parties involved, was determined by the needs of each party. 
L abour was no longer the abundant and u n d er-u tilised
commodity in the production process it had once been at the time
when the crop had ju s t been in troduced. In short, this
cooperation, which was built on the terms on which cattle were 
'loaned out', became the foundation upon which the wealth of 
some present entrepreneurs was built. This form of cooperation
built itself into an intricate socio-economic network whereby the 
d estitu te  m em bers seem  to have neatly  id en tified  their
shortcomings and sought economic assistance from those who
possessed a firm economic muscle, and the long term objective
was to im prove their weak socio-econom ic background. For 
instance, most of those who became custodians of other people's 
cattle did not own even p l o u g h s .  19 In the same community there 
were people who had already purchased ploughs which were 
pulled by donkeys, at a time when a 'span' of more powerful 
anim als was required. In the event, the 'one-legged ' farm er
approached his own kind to forge some economic cooperation to 
help bridge the 'gaping' need. Most of the cultivation tasks in this 
regard were alternate, in that while they attended to one of the 
party’s farming on one day, the next day they did work on the 
fields of the o t h e r .20
But the problematic issue which remained unsolved was that 
of the purchases of ploughs by people who did not own cattle. 
One of the questions concerned the means by which the plough 
was bought and the objectives, when there were no oxen to pull 
it. Perhaps to avoid repetition, donkeys had been used and while 
the farming was monocultural and subsistence oriented, donkeys
142
were good enough to meet the economic needs of the grower but 
when the farm ing econom y became diversified , some more 
pow erful anim als were required, and oxen filled  the gap. 
Ownership of cattle was not a determinant for plough purchases, 
a point already mentioned, because a dozen chickens or even a 
goat could be bartered for a plough. The underlying factor in all 
these cases of plough purchases was the need to respond to 
farm ing requirem ents, and not for any other purpose. The 
significant role played by donkeys in a subsistence oriented 
economy cannot be overlooked, but the focus of this study is not 
on this aspect. Suffice to say that donkey power was central to 
the survival of many families, since donkey ploughing was even 
hired out where money or some livestock were used as currency 
to settle the costs of the s e r v i c e s . 21 In this way, donkey 
ploughing paved the way for ploughing by oxen.
Most of the diligent farmers who depended on loaned cattle' 
for cultivating cotton were shrewd business-minded people who 
had been curbed from the ownership of cattle and prosperity in 
general by their destitute economic backgrounds. For instance, 
after the cooperation, which had been forged betw een the 
econom ically handicapped farmers, time had been set aside to 
cultivate fields of people who did not own the forces of 
p r o d u c t i o n . 22 in these cases either the payment was made in 
kind, that is, an agreement was signed where the host agreed to 
weed cotton fields of his patron. Already, access to cattle, 
whether owned or 'loaned', bred a class of clients for even other 
clients, and those who were ingenious were successful in using 
these advantages to boost their economies. The spoils were often 
shared equitably between the owners or custodians of the forces 
of production. But there were cases where these noble terms 
were violated, particularly if the two people belonged to different 
religious beliefs. One such case in 1 9 5 8 ,  for instance, was 
revealed where one member was a Christian and did not believe 
in cultivating his fields nor those of the clients on Sundays, since 
that could have conflicted with his Christian beliefs that 'sunday 
was a resting day not only for human beings but even for the 
animals because it was a holy day'. On the other hand, the other
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party, who was not a Christian, went ahead to cultivate not only 
his own fields but even those of his clients and pocketed all the
proceeds w ithout sharing them with the other m ember of the
d u e t . 23 i n this way, the economic advancement, growing out of 
the cooperation was grossly unequal, and this was no unusual 
conduct on the part of businessmen, since the business involved 
shrew dness and som etim es a high degree of d isreputable 
conduct. On the other hand the maintenance of the plough and 
other re la ted  m eans of production  were shared equitably 
between the undertakers of the business, at least in principle 
while in practice it was a different case, since shrewd members 
always found a way of evading the financial o b l i g a t i o n . 2 4
The benefits which accrued to these businessmen as a result 
of their involvement in plough and oxen hire to those who did 
not own these means were often invested in the improvement of 
their farming technology. In this manner one of the tycoons in 
the area, built up his wealth on such stealth and beguiled means.
Before the end of 1958, having grown cotton for only one season,
1957/58, he had already purchased a plough and two head of 
cattle, both of which were young b u l l o c k s . 25 However, his 
progress on stealth was successfully  com plem ented by his 
diligence and devotion to cotton production. He had used part of 
the money earned from cotton and payment in kind, collected on 
the cultivation of other people's fields, wisely to boost his cotton 
cultivation. It was in 1959, a third year of his cotton cultivation 
that he began to use chemical fertilizers to boost the surplus 
generating capacity of the soil, particularly in those areas where 
it was d e c l i n i n g . 26 B y  that year he already owned two ploughs 
and four head of cattle, after he had joined his colleague with 
only one plough and no cattle. He also decided to approach a 
relative to ask him to lend him three oxen and the purpose was 
to facilitate farming, and he promised to return them on the 
following season, and that was exactly what he did. He also 
decided to sever ties with his erstwhile colleague, who was still 
as poor as he was when the two formed the economic duet. The 
latter had not purchased even a plough. However, either in 
com passion or in retu rn  for the surplus value he had
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ap p ro p ria ted  from  his re tro g ress in g  co lleag u e , he (the 
progressive one) offered to sell the old plough to him late in 1959 
at a give away price of about 25 pence mainly because it was 
already old, and needed some major r e p a i r s .27
The role cattle played in the cotton economy became very 
com plicated when the cattle  which were loaned to needy 
relatives were later used by the custodians to build their own 
class of clients through the cultivation of the latter's cotton fields. 
It was the custodian class of clients, however, that appeared to be 
more exploitative of the plight of those cotton growers who did 
not own any means of production. This exploitation was even 
more com plicated in those cases where the have-nots did not 
have even money for the payment of the services rendered to 
them, instead they had chosen to pay in kind, and their labour 
was given a very low value. This gross inequality  in the
evaluation of the labour services of the have-nots became clear 
when some of them found themselves weeding the fields of their 
pseudo-patrons for the rest of the cotton planting s e a s o n . 28
The use of a sledge for transportation purposes became 
widespread in south east Swaziland after 1955. However, this
period also coincided with the gradual expanding use of a tractor 
for transport, an aspect which became very im portant when
more bales had to be taken to the local depots from where they 
were picked up by the company’s truck. The widespread use of 
the sledge was made necessary by the expanding output in maize 
and cotton whose transportation from the fields could no longer 
depend upon porterage as the case was when the demand was 
not as elastic as it became in the mid 1950s. Growers who
depended on hiring draught animal power for ploughing were 
caught in a vicious circle, since not only did they end there, 
particularly  in fair seasons they had to hire draught animal 
power for the transportation of the output from the fields. In the 
case of cotton, it was when bales required to be moved to nearby 
depots in particular that oxen were hired to transport them on a 
s l e d g e . ^^ However, the sledge soon displayed some shortcoming 
by exposing the bales to stumps which were not uprooted from
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the pathway, and these stumps tore the bales and the contents 
were spoiled. Because of this shortcom ing, the sledge was 
replaced by wagons in some cases, both long and short o n e s . 30
In the case of short wagons (carts), only two oxen were 
required to pull one, unless there was a steep hill that needed 
climbing before reaching the depot. In the latter case, four oxen 
were harnessed. However, regarding the long wagon which often 
took the maximum of six bales, six oxen were harnessed. 
Sometimes eight oxen were harnessed to pull it on long distances. 
Long distances were undertaken to transport the bales to the 
depots from where Ralli Brothers truck collected them, especially 
because depots w ere found along the m ain roads. This 
arrangement was not convenient for everybody since some of the 
growers were as far away from the main roads and depots as 
seven miles, and even the route which led to these depots was 
generally hazardous due to slopy gradients and sandy river 
b e d s .31 All of these factors caused transport problems even by 
wagons, and this explains the need to harness six or more oxen to 
pull the wagons. At least at the time when modern means of 
transportation were not available or in restricted circulation, the 
use of wagons was the only reliable means of transportation and 
cattle were the main force behind the wide usage of the wagon. 
In this manner oxen did not only play a significant role in the 
development of cotton cultivation at the production stage, but 
remained central to the whole process until the crop was finally 
sold to the market.
In the 1960s, most of the cultivators of south east Swaziland 
had come to realise the central role wagons played in the 
development of cotton cultivation. This significant role loomed 
prominently in the transportation aspect, not only of the baled 
cotton, but sometimes even at harvest time. This was common 
among those growers whose fields lay far from their homesteads, 
sometimes they were as far as ten miles, and it was cheaper to 
send many empty ju te  and plastic bags to the fields so that 
picked cotton could be packed in them and later on the same day 
be loaded on the w a g o n . 3 2 Porterage was avoided to save labour
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for investment in picking, and in this way ample labour was used 
profitably in picking more cotton than it could have been if the 
labour was employed for transportation. While it would be wrong 
to rule out the possibility of using donkeys as draught animals, it 
seems that oxen were preferred to donkeys on agility and even 
for the reasons that oxen were more powerful than donkeys. This 
fact cannot be denied more particularly because in the cultivation 
of the fields, the donkey was being replaced by oxen by the late
1 9 5 O s.33 These wagons were often hired out to transport the
cotton of those growers whose means of transportation were 
limited to porterage. Wagon supply in the region was limited, and 
ownership of one was yet another sign of economic growth and 
prosperity. In short, wagons, just like a full span of oxen, were 
signs of prosperity and were not very common.34 Money that 
was made on such businesses all revolving around cotton, was 
invested in the development of either the land or any aspect of 
cotton cultivation.
The importance of oxen and the wagon also became
noticeable when Malang wane Dlamini travelled more than 75
miles from his home area at the foot of the Lubombo Mountains 
to the market at Magudu (see above p 106). The wagon was 
loaded with cotton and pulled by oxen to Magudu only to be 
intercepted by Ralli Brothers' truck at M atsanjeni. The use of
oxen was even depended upon by the growers who owned 
tractors which could have been used for transportation as in the 
case of the latter grower. The main reason to use oxen when the
tractor was available was not simply that the farmer perhaps did
not have confidence in himself as a driver, but rather he was 
afraid that the fuel m ight run out before he reached his
destination. There were not as many fuel stations then as there 
are t o d a y . 35 But oral research made claims that cases where such 
long distances were undertaken, the oxen did not belong to the 
grower but were 'loaned' cattle. Lack of consideration for the
animals was believed to be common among the custodians of 
'loaned' cattle and they were the ones who undertook long
distances, and even ploughed twice a day, in the morning and
afternoon, a practice which weighed very heavily on the health of
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the animals. This conduct was looked upon by cattle owners as 
representative of the misuse of animals, and resulted in the 
recovery of the 'loaned ' c a ttle .3 6 This reaction led to the 
deterioration of the social relationship that had been built upon 
this culture. In the long run, the zeal to expand one’s cotton fields 
and accumulate capital through the use of 'loaned' cattle led to 
the deterioration of the foundation upon which the social fabric 
had leaned. It is, however, important to note that such conduct 
was rare, and wherever it was spotted it resulted in the recovery
of the cattle.^ 7
Yet another social aspect of cattle rearing which developed in 
the area, late in the 1950s, and was reinforced by certain factors 
in the years that followed, was arranged marriage between the 
have-nots and people who owned large numbers of cattle. In this 
case the initiative lay with the father of a daughter who was
either in puberty or had not even reached that stage. In order to
build up both a kraal and later a span of oxen, a daughter was
given to some rich man and l obo lo  was paid in cattle.3 8 This 
social development indicated the impact of the money economy 
on south east Swaziland. As in other instances, however, this
development was not commonplace but confined to some of those 
families who had been financially handicapped by lack of cattle 
which played a key role in the development of cotton cultivation. 
This custom was part of Swazi culture, and predated the cotton 
era, but the dimension which cotton added to it in the late 1950s, 
was that the daughter's father used such a marriage to get cattle
(payment for l obolo)  immediately after the agreement had been
sealed. Yet another social developm ent was the practice of 
m arrying one's daughter to men who were rich , and not
necessarily men who were reputed for a good conduct as the
practice had been before the cotton era. In short, cotton 
expansion and its looming dependence on cattle had adulterated 
the social system of kwendzisa - arrangement of m arriage for 
one's daughter to men of good reputation, particularly in their 
c o m m u n i t ie s .39 n  is> however, important to note that not all 
poverty-striken fathers fell headlong to this evil practice.
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However, not every man who acquired cattle in this manner 
invested them wisely, particularly in the development of cotton 
cultivation, since that was the main motive behind arranged 
marriages in the late 1950s. But in cases where cattle were 
invested in cotton cultivation, the investm ents assum ed the 
purchase of requisite inputs such as tractors. In itially  these 
tractors should have been bought to promote the owner's farming 
economy, but this objective was often diverted to other less
exerting areas of investment such as the hiring out of tractors to 
those who needed their services. The services were paid for in 
cash, in goats, or sometimes in half a dozen chickens, most of 
which were consumed instead of being kept to m ultiply and 
expand other investments. These were spent instead on a lavish 
lifestyle which developed under the guise of the development of 
cotton cultivation that expanded in the 1 9 6 0 s .40  The main 
explanation behind such a flamboyant lifestyle was that wealth 
which had been acquired on a silver plate ended up in some 
misguided investments. But there were exceptions, where wealth 
acquired through arranged m arriages was invested  in profit 
generating areas, for instance, the developm ent of cotton 
cultivation. In cases where tractors were bought along with their 
small wagons or carts, those growers who did not possess such 
efficient means of transportation, hired these tractors. In this 
manner cotton cultivation was promoted mainly by means of
inputs whose purchases were made possible by the owners’ 
access to cattle.41
By the early 1960s it was becoming obvious that cotton 
growers of south east Swaziland required some additional finance 
other than that which was provided by their cattle to maintain 
the expansion of cotton cultivation. For instance, spraying had 
become unavoidable for every grower due to the rate at which 
pests had m ultiplied correspondingly with the extent of their 
destruction on the crop. At this time there were no credit
facilities which had been extended to the benefit of the Swazi
grower, especially  those with rates of in terest which were 
manageable to the Swazi grower. Cattle were sold to raise the 
money which was invested in the purchase of requisite inputs
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such as fertilizers, insecticides and others. The type of seeds 
which were planted then were such that unless some chemical 
fertilizers were used, the growth and fruiting ability of the crop 
were often affected adversely. W hile small livestock were sold, 
particularly in areas less suited for cotton cultivation such as 
Sandleni and some areas in Hlathikhulu and Goedgegun, in areas 
where the scale of cotton production had greatly increased, 
money raised through the sale of some small livestock, fell short 
of the production costs. In south east Sw aziland, cotton
cultivation had expanded by the early 1960s, and therefore more
money was required to purchase adequate amounts of inputs, 
and cattle were sold to bridge this financial g a p . 42
In 1 9 6 5 ,  the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank was 
inaugurated by the king with the purpose of financing not just 
cash crop production, but farming in g e n e r a l . 43 As part of its 
economic package to the Swazi was the bank's ambitious plan to 
help promote Swazi entrepreneurship in the construction of flats 
to ren t out in the urban areas. C otton grow ers were
accommodated in the package which concerned itself with the 
development of Swazi agriculture. In its initial stages, the bank 
had signed out loans to farmers without requiring them to give 
security against the money. However, the financial grants made 
in good faith soon proved to have many loopholes, chief among 
which was the grower’s deliberate avoidance of repayments not 
only at the specified times, but altogether. Consequently, in 1 9 7 2 ,  
the bank introduced the need for security against any credit
facilities that were sought from it by the f a r m e r . 4 4  jn the case of 
SNL growers, security assumed the form of cattle, and tractors in 
the case where the farm er owned one. It was hoped that the 
security would make the farm er more responsible than he had 
proved to be before the introduction of security measures. Before 
the introduction of security, whenever farmers failed to meet the 
repayment deadlines, excuses given were generally based on the 
destruction of the crop by climatic conditions, even when the 
season was good. In fact, farmers had avoided their payments 
deliberately, and not because of crop failures which affected the 
profits of each g r o w e r . 4 5
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The repercussions of this scheme on the growers were great 
not only in disrupting farming but in other areas. Cattle that had 
been given as security  to the bank w ere branded, and 
instructions given to the debtor not to sell the branded cattle, or 
send them away from his byre, nor even harness them as beasts 
of burden. Growers who failed to repay their debts forfeited their 
cattle unless they had other sources of income to raise the sum of 
money equivalent to the bank loan plus interest. In the latter 
case cattle were not lost to the bank, because it had accepted 
such an arrangement. The social repercussion of this security was 
adverse because some producers forfeited cattle that had been 
loaned to them. W henever the cattle were forfeited  in this 
manner the irresponsible custodians were stripped of such rights, 
and this led to them (custodians) failing to prosecute their 
farming commitments. The future arrangements were that unless 
the potential custodian was well-known to the owner no cattle 
were given under the previous arrangem ent. U sually social 
relations became very tense and there was lack of cooperation 
between the affected parties. In certain cases custodians reported 
some of the cattle to have been stolen when they had actually 
been sold to raise money to promote cotton cultivation. However, 
whatever strategy was followed by the custodians to swindle 
their patrons, the truth about what actually happened to the 
cattle was revealed in the long r u n . 4 6
There were many other areas in which cattle and the money 
raised through their sale was invested in an effort to promote 
cotton cultivation. Cattle were also invested in the purchase of 
the means of transportation, particularly from the late 1960s. 
With the cotton output having expanded to sometimes more than 
100 bales of seed cotton per grower in the region, the Clark 
transport became inadequate to take all the bales at the time 
growers expected their cotton to be sent to the m a r k e t . 4 7  Some 
growers operated on very stringent budgets which forced them 
to sell their crop at specific times, and when these expectations 
were not met, due to limited transport, they purchased individual 
means of transport. Not every grower who entertained these
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feelings, however, possessed adequate credit to purchase his 
own transport, be it in the form of cattle or cash. As late as 1967, 
farm ers still practised the habit of pooling lim ited resources 
together in order to meet these needs.48 Cattle were often sold to 
raise the money for the purchase of trucks. If a used truck was 
available in the area, particularly on European farms, cattle were 
used as currency to buy the truck. One such example is that of 
Messrs Xaba Brothers1 Transport whose transportation of cotton 
began in 1953, and rescued Swazi cotton growers from being 
exploited by European settler farmers, particularly in the case of 
A lbert V ilakati, A drian H arrison, David D lam ini, Lokhakhi 
Dlamini, Josiah Vilakati, Amos Matse and Samuel Nsibande. The 
last two growers, who had been successful in establishing 
them selves in cotton growing, owed their prosperity  to the 
venture made by the Xaba Brothers. Even they had used cattle to 
start off the business in transport.4 9
The 1970s changed the face of the history of cotton 
production by showing some major steps which were taken by 
some farmers to invest their cattle in the acquisition of title deed 
land, as opposed to communally held land in SNL. The reasons for 
this development were mainly economic, in that privately owned 
land, provided more security to the farmer and gave him more 
latitude for land improvement whose benefits were reflected not 
only in the expansion of the output but even in the quality of the 
commodity that was produced. Private land was secure in the 
sense that the farmer did not suffer any interventions from the 
chief about his land use patterns, the customary sanctions against 
land enclosure and other related problems that could have had 
some adverse effects on cotton production. Investors in the 
developm ent of cotton cultivation needed far more than the 
average amount of land the chief allocated, because their plans 
were rather too ambitious to be met by traditional means of land 
distribution. Not only did they concentrate on cotton, since the 
climate favoured it, but they attempted to grow food crops as 
well such as maize and others. Having acquired tractors they 
were able to expand their farm ing and even com plete the 
planting of all the crops long before the season was over. Such an
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expansion could only be met through the acquisition of privately 
owned land,50 but this did not mean abandoning allocated land 
on SNL, hence some continued to keep their feet in both worlds. 
Cattle had been used as currency sometimes, though it had often 
been found convenient to sell a certain number of cattle and pay 
for the farm in cash. Payment in cash avoided all the unnecessary 
suspicions of swindling from either side which might have been 
the case where cattle were used directly for the paym ent.51
However, it would be wrong to give the impression that in 
most of the cases, cattle were used without any other form of 
subsidy from the financing organisations to purchase private 
land. For instance, most farms were only purchased in the mid 
1970s, and by this time the Swazi Bank met part of the financial 
requirem ents of the farmers. But in this case cattle were not 
required for security since in those cases where the farmer failed 
to repay the loan the farm could be confiscated by the bank. In 
fact, the farm remained a property of the bank until the loan had 
been repaid in full, in spite of the fact that part of the price had 
been met through the sale of cattle. In most cases the farmers 
who acquired farms through these means worked very hard to 
repay the debts and the farms were later registered under their 
names. It is crucial though not to lose sight of the direction of the 
argument, and that is to try and show that cattle formed the 
basis upon which such prosperity was built. The profits from this 
investment were often ploughed back into the purchase of cattle 
and land improvement and these were later reflected in the rise 
of the cotton output per farmer. 52
In those cases where farmers feared credit organisations and 
therefore  avoided com m itting them selves to any financial 
institution, cattle were the source of the finance. Not only did 
these farmers sell their cattle live to meat factories or any other 
form of buyer, but they opened up butcheries in the rural areas. 
The argument was that butcheries, where beef was sold, yielded 
more profit than the sale of live cattle did. In the butcheries, not 
only was there sold raw beef, but some of it was also cooked, 
roasted and sold particularly to hungry passers-by, or even to
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local drunkards since it had become common practice to attach 
some bottle store to each butchery, or in certain instances, sell 
home brewed beer. In either case, the rate at which both raw and 
cooked or roasted beef sold, was high because drunk people had 
a high appetite for meat. The profits which accrued to the farmer 
from these businesses were ploughed into cotton cultivation, and 
when the season was fair, resulting in a handsome output and 
good returns, m ore cattle  were purchased to continue the 
economic interdependence between cattle and the cultivation of 
cotton. The type of cattle that Swazi farmers had kept until the 
late 1970s, and particularly the beginning of the 1980s, were the 
Nguni scrub cattle, small but had a high degree of resistance to 
m ost of the diseases that attacked c a t t l e . 5 3 But with the 
expansion of the money economy, and particularly for the finance 
of cotton cultivation, traditional Swazi cattle proved unsuitable 
for the market demands because of their small body which was 
reflected in their low weight. However, some of the farmers,
particularly  those who were prosperous cotton growers, had 
already begun to replace their traditional Nguni cattle with the 
m odern type, whose rearing was geared specifically  towards 
meeting m arket demands.
This stage of economic growth had been brought about
through cross-breeding the Nguni type of cattle with the modern
market oriented breed of the Brahman. This cross-breed of cattle, 
popularly found today in south east Swaziland, had yet other 
very unpleasant effects on the purse of the poor farmer. Unlike 
the Nguni breed, whose resistance to diseases was relatively high, 
that of the Brahman, was relatively low. As a result of the
susceptibility to diseases, farmers had to ensure that their cattle 
were injfoculated at the beginning of each season, to protect them 
against the attack of any of the diseases that often broke out in 
the region. Failure to carry out these iiypoculation measures often 
involved farmers in some major losses whose im pact was also 
reflected on the development of cotton c u l t i v a t i o n . 54 There were 
different types of farmers in the region in terms of ideologies: 
there were those who, even though they had agreed to cross­
breed their Nguni scrub of cattle with the Brahman (whose
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rearing was meant first and foremost for the market) but who 
refused to in^oculate their livestock against diseases that broke 
out and those who became full converts. The Brahman was 
believed to have initially come from America and was being 
introduced into Swaziland on the basis of its strength in the 
market for those farmers whose farming economy was already 
market oriented. South east Swaziland was already settled by 
such a class of farmers irrespective of the fact that some of them 
were still poor to afford to m aintain the new breed that was 
introduced. The strength of the market demand for the Brahman 
could not be disputed, and the fact that by 1980, the Brahman 
had already spread throughout the region among the cotton 
farmers was adequate evidence of the many attractions it held 
apart from the fact that its physical appearance tantalised the 
farmers to get it to cross-breed with their c a t t l e . 5 5
However, those farmers who had cross-bred their cattle with 
the Brahman but did not iufcoculate the cross-breed of cattle 
against epidemic diseases in that area paid very heavily for the 
consequences of that negligence. Each season experienced a 
different kind of epidemic whose impact was heavy on livestock. 
On the other hand, there were those farmers who resisted cross­
breeding and whenever they sold their Nguni type of cattle, they 
were paid below expectation and the effects were seen in the 
reduction of the fields they had previously cultivated with cotton. 
In some cases the land was not reduced but due to the lack of 
adequate capital with which to purchase the inputs the output 
was always disproportionate to the amount of land that had been 
cultivated. In both cases, the farmers were not so much against 
cross-breeding their cattle as the purchase of the medicine they 
required to maintain their livestock. In fact some of the farmers 
had been suspicious that the government wanted to kill their 
ca ttle  de libera te ly  by in troducing  the B rahm an that was 
susceptible to so many diseases, and also that the introduction of 
the latter breed was a strategy for the government to promote 
the businesses of those companies that produced the medecine 
they were being advised to b u y . 55 in this way the farmers saw 
them selves being pushed into some tight corner where they
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needed to buy the m edicine in order to protect their cattle 
against any diseases that threatened to wipe out their source of 
finance for cotton cultivation. As indicated above this group of 
farmers was opposed to any form of credit facility other than 
that which was provided by their cattle, first, because they were 
suspicious that the organisations were bent on swindling them, 
and this attitude was strengthened by their observations of what 
happened to some of their colleagues in the region among those 
who became poor by the interest rates that were charged by the 
organisations which provided them with some credit facilities in 
the past. Secondly , the farm ers had lacked som e clear 
understanding of how the financial organisations operated in 
terms of the interest rates which banks charged their customers 
against any loan they were granted.5 7
In those cases where the cross-breed was close to the pure 
breed of the imported market oriented cattle, the problem was 
that farmers could not harness these cattle for ploughing, because 
they resisted being harnessed. Where force was used to harness 
them, the equipm ent for harnessing was either torn or broken 
thereby creating some unprecedented delay and loss in time. 
Sometimes in the case of the yoke which took long to break the 
oxen were strangled to death or some major injuries sustained 
and these caused unnecessary delay to planting. In some rare 
cases even the farm er or his assistant would be injured, yet 
another cause of delay in the planting schedule.5 8 As a result of 
the widespread impact of the commercialisation of cattle in an 
effort to balance the interdependence between agricultural and 
pastoral farming, particularly that of cotton production, farmers, 
even poverty-striken ones were gradually forced to rely more on 
the tractor which they hired from those who owned it. The hiring 
of a tractor was very expensive particularly for the poQr farmers 
more so because the rates were more than E20.00 per hour by 
the late 1 9 7 0 s.59 Either the farmer in this case sold the cattle to 
raise money for the hire of the tractor or sold a big number of 
cattle to buy his own tractor to facilitate cotton production. And 
that was the main purpose of the whole scheme, that of cross­
breeding cattle to mechanise the farming sector to improve the
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quality of production in all the crops. Secondly, to raise the 
output per grower because the acreage certainly expanded when 
the tractor was employed to do the cultivation of the fields, 
relative to what actually happened when cattle were still the 
only force behind farm ing.60 But the purchase of a tractor was 
only possible in cases where the farmer owned more than twenty 
heftd of cattle, which num ber could have com fortably raised 
sufficient money with which to purchase a used tractor. In a
nutshell, the im pact of cotton cultivation on farm ers did not 
necessarily  strike some equitable balance betw een the two 
economies: cotton cultivation and cattle rearing. In some cases,
the survival of one meant the doom of the other. For instance, a
cross-breed of the Brahman worked out very well for those
farm ers whose dependence on oxen for the developm ent of 
cotton cultivation, particularly as draught animals, was minimal 
while its effects on the poor farmer, who depended on the oxen 
for cotton cultivation as well as for its transportation from the 
fields and to the depot, were disastrous.61
It was not difficult to get a Brahman bull to cross-breed the 
Nguni stock of cattle because government had set up a scheme 
whereby each farmer could be lent one to keep for a specific time 
to mate with his Nguni stock. The cross-breed required large 
amounts of grass and water, which development was convenient 
for those farmers who already owned farms which were enclosed 
to keep at bay other cattle from competing for the grass which he 
had reserved for his cattle. This turn of events became clear in 
the 1980s, when the grazing grounds were shrinking very 
rapidly in the face of cotton expansion. The only available space 
where cattle could be grazed were the hills which did not permit 
for cotton cultivation due to lack of arable and fertile land. But 
whenever droughts struck, the hilly grazing grounds dried up 
faster than other areas, making it difficult for farmers to continue 
to graze their stock there. It was at this point that owners of 
private farms were approached by those who did not own any, to 
seek permission to graze their cattle, but on a certain charge per 
cow per month. The charge ranged from about E2.00 to E3.00, 
depending on the amicable relations which might have existed
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between the two p a r t i e s . 6 2  But there were very few among the 
poor farmers who could afford to pay for their cattle to graze on 
p riva te  farm s, and w henever d roughts s truck , and one 
spectacular example was the severe and destructive drought of 
1985, and other years before, the losses could be as high as 15 
herds of cattle or even more per h o m e s t e a d . 6 3
In an effort to facilitate the commercialisation of cattle-
rearing, the governm ent also went ahead to establish grazing 
grounds, where cows were acceptable, and on these grazing 
grounds only the pure bulls of the imported breed were kept to 
cross-breed with the Nguni cattle. To facilitate the scheme so that 
everybody who w ished to partake of it gained  access, 
government did not insist on cash for the rental of the cows 
which were being cross-bred, rather an agreement was clinched 
betw een the two parties whereby at the end of a year, 
(depending on the number of cattle the farmer had sent to the
ranch) one cow could be held by the government as rental for the
services of grazing, cross-breeding, and also providing the 
required medical treatment while the cattle were still held on the 
grazing grounds. All these responsibilities were shouldered by 
the g o v e r n m e n t . 64 But not every farmer had accepted the latter 
arrangement, some argued that payment in cattle was a loss to 
the farm er and yet whenever one cow was sold and payment 
made in cash, some of the money could be saved for investment 
elsew here. Among the p rogressive cotton grow ers, money 
realised from selling the crop was used to pay the rental for the 
retention of cattle on the ranch. In spite of the financial costs 
incurred through sending one's cattle to the ranch, the project 
was believed to be satisfactory and supportive of the cotton 
industry. But the main problem was that it was the already rich 
farmers who were granted the right to send their cattle to the 
ranch while the poor had their applications filed up. And this 
attitude had some adverse effects on the development of cotton 
cultivation particularly by poverty-striken f a r m e r s . 65
In spite of the problems of grazing grounds, Nguni cattle 
were reduced to the minimum in south east Swaziland. Most of
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the cattle found there were cross-breeds of one kind or another, 
particularly by 1980, and the explanation was the bias of the 
market for the cross-breeds. Those business organisations who
bought cattle did so for reasons of slaughtering the beasts to sell 
the beef. Nguni cattle lacked the commercial weight because the 
buyers had already begun to buy cattle on the basis of the weight 
each cow produced at the market by 1980,66 anci the smaller the 
weight the little  would be the money, and in that case the
expenses of cultivating cotton would not be m et adequately 
without seeking other avenues for financial support required to 
produce the crop. On the other hand the cross-breeds possessed a 
commercial weight, and yet another added advantage was that 
their beef was tender relative to that of the Nguni stock which 
was hard but tasty. Those who operated butcheries had found 
selling beef of cross-breeds more profitable than selling that of 
the Nguni scrub c a t t l e . 67 i n 1980 two of the richest cotton
growers of the region were hit very hard by drought conditions
so they could not settle their debts with the bank. In order to
settle the debts, one of them sold about 200 of his cattle, all of his 
400 or more goats, while the other one sold all of his 200 or more 
cattle to raise money to settle the debts which were in the region 
of E30,000 each. Because they had started on other businesses,
they had just managed to purchase adequate fertilizers to plant
in the follow ing season w ithout recourse to any b a n k . 6 8
However, what is worth noting is that had it not been for the 
cross-breed stock of cattle which were sold to raise the required 
money, the farmers could have forfeited their farms or some of 
the farm ing inputs like tractors, trucks and part of the other 
investments such as stores.
Those Swazi who resisted to cross breed with the Brahman 
crossed their cattle with the Afrikander, which did not resist 
harnessing to pull the plough and do the other related ploughing 
tasks. The Afrikander was even less susceptible to the common 
diseases that attacked cattle in the area, and it could be milked, 
roles which were resisted  by the Brahm an. In short, the 
Afrikander supported cotton cultivation by providing the draught 
power for most of the work that farming entailed and required
159
that it be done by o x e n . 6 9 it could also be sold at a better price 
than that at which the Nguni cattle were sold. Its beef was more 
tender compared to that of the Nguni, but slightly below that of 
the Brahman even in quality. Its maintenance was cheaper than 
that of the Brahman because it did not die in large numbers even 
if it was not innoculated. Its distribution among the farmers in 
the region was more determ ined by the m arket price than 
anything else. The shortcomings of the Nguni cattle appeared too 
big for it to compete effectively for the other roles such as those 
which were filled in by the Afrikander in particular JO
The discussion has shown that cattle formed an important 
foundation upon which the cotton industry was built in south 
east Swaziland, and later the two economic sectors became 
clearly interdependent, particularly in 1955 when cattle were 
bartered for tractors, and the money which accrued from this 
was invested in the purchase of more cattle and those inputs 
which allowed for the continued expansion of cotton cultivation 
to m eet the m arket demands. In the years that follow ed, 
particularly in the 1960s, cattle boosted cotton cultivation by 
acting as a means for acquiring capital from those financial 
organisations which provided it. Most of the rural entrepreneurs, 
displayed some traditional view of cattle-rearing by showing that 
its survival was dependent upon the cotton profits. Empirical 
evidence proved wrong the view of the static economic role cattle 
played in the Swazi rural economy when cattle became the pillar 
of the farming economy. However, later and particularly in the 
1970s and 1980s, not every cotton grower could afford the 
expenses it involved, and that was the beginning of the 
impoverishment of some farmers.
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machinery for ploughing, 15 August, 1972.
61. In terv iew  Sam son M khonta, A gricu ltu ral D em onstrator, 
M gam udze, 29 N ovem ber, 1985; and Sam uel Shongw e, 
Hlushwana, 29 November, 1985.
62. Interview Deacon Nsibande, Hlushwana, 16 November, 1986; 
James Vilakati, Makhava, 16 November, 1986; Esaw Sikhosana, 
Makhava, 16 November, 1986.
63. This figure is based on samples made in south east Swaziland 
in 1985, at the beginning of the planting season. However, the 
figures include even calves which died young due to some 
negligence on the part of the farmers. Interview Venn Dlamini, 
N salitje, 29 Novem ber, 1985; Alfred Gamedze, N salitje, 29 
November, 1985; Elliot Ntshangase, Nsalitje, 29 November, 1985.
64. Sna Box 7 File 7/37 Memos of the Veterinary Officer on 
progress in cattle breeding in the lowveld, 5 August, 1972; Box 8 
File 7/44 Extension Officer to the Principal O fficer for the 
Veterinary Department, 28 November, 1972.
65. Yet again this was a view expressed by some farmers whose 
applications had been with the Veterinary Officer in Nhlangano 
for more than six years while some rich farmers hardly waited 
for a year to be granted permission to send their cattle to the 
ranch. Interview Alfred Gamedze, Nsalitje, 29 November, 1986; 
Alfeus Sithebe, Mgamudze, 29 November, 1986; Elliot Ntshangase, 
Nsalitje, 29 November, 1986, all these were among those who 
were d issatisfied  with the way the applications were being 
processed.
66. Interview  Almon Jele, Lavum isa Cooperative Ranch, 25 
August, 1987.
67. Interview Johannes Nkwanyana, Lavumisa, 25 August, 1987; 
E llio t Shiba, M atsanjeni, 16 N ovem ber, 1987; and Samuel 
Shongwe, Hlushwana, 16 November, 1987.
68. At least two of them did not hide the fact that the extent of 
the 1980 drought had brought them to their knees. Interview 
Johannes Nkwanyana, Lavumisa, 25 November, 1980; Elliot Shiba, 
M atsanjeni, 25 November, 1980; corroborated by some workers
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on the farms such as Samson Ndwandwe in the case of Elliot 
Shiba of Matsanjeni; and Abel Matse, in the case of Nkwanyana of 
Lavum isa.
69. Interview Aaron Dlamini, Nsalitje, 25 August, 1987; Zablon 
D lam ini, M atsanjeni, 25 August, 1987; Amon M ngom etulu, 
M atsanjeni, 25 August, 1987; Samson M dluli, M atsanjeni, 25 
August, 1987; Musa Mbhamali, Lavumisa, 11 December, 1987.
70. Interview Bafana Motsa, Sitilo, 11 December, 1987; Amon 
M ngom etulu, M atsanjeni, 11 December, 1987; Samson Mdluli, 




COTTON CULTIVATING ENTREPRENEURS and SOCIAL 
DIFFERENTIATION, 1955-85.
Rural areas were generally, until the post war period, 
associated with economic stagnation. Hence only unenterprising 
people were thought to reside in rural areas, and eked out a 
living by cultivating some crops, and even these crops were 
thought to be mainly food crops. It was assumed that their cash 
was earned through m igrant labour when farming work was in 
recess. With the post war period came a wave of opportunities for 
investm ent and m arketing, which helped to d iversify  the 
agricultural economy to include the cultivation of cash crops as 
well. Previously, in chapters 2, 3, and 4 we have surveyed isolated 
pockets o f Sw azi e n trep ren eu ria l a c tiv itie s  in M anzini 
(Bremersdorp), Shiselweni and Lubombo. The focus now shifts to 
south east Sw aziland, p a rticu la rly  H lushw ana, M atsanjeni, 
Makhava, Ngwavuma valley, Lavumisa, Sitilo and Nsalitje, as the
latter area dominated cotton cultivation from the mid 1950s. In
Sw aziland, the present cotton belt had been eschew ed for 
settlem ent until the 1950s, and this zone became the leading 
cotton producing area, particularly by Swazi small scale producers 
in the 1960s. It was in south east Swaziland yet again that a 
m ultip lic ity  of trading opportunities em erged in the 1970s, 
thereby leading to a burgeoning group of rural entrepreneurs. It
was due to the impact of outside brokerage, upon which cotton 
cultivation leaned, that by the 1970s, there were already some
rich rural entrepreneurs whose profits accruing from cotton were 
reflected  in the im provem ent of their hom es, the farm ing 
equipm ent, accum ulation  of ca ttle , farm s and lastly  the 
improvement of the community by providing health services, and 
schools. However, these developments, made the farmers more 
dependent on the cotton m arket and later on the financing 
o rgan isation  for the capita l they needed to expand their 
businesses.
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South east Swaziland was initially used to support a pastoral 
industry mainly by European settlers, and by a trickle of Swazi 
cattle-keepers. The area had concentrated m ainly on cattle- 
rearing until the 1950s when cotton production was started. 1 This 
pastoral economy of the region had been made necessary by the 
poverty of the means of communication, and this disposition led to 
the absence of m arketing facilities particularly for agricultural 
commodities. This pastoral economic monopoly was broken into 
by Ralli Brothers who set up a cotton gin at Magudu. Due to the 
m eagre local supply made worse by the com petition for the 
comm odity there, the company expanded across the border to 
Swaziland. Oral evidence alleges that in 1950, only one EurAfrican 
grower sold the crop to the company while Swazi growers only 
responded to the demand on the third season of cotton production 
in the area in the 1950s, and these responses occurred on 
EurAfrican private farms, the details of which are in chapter four.
E arlier Swazi entrepreneurs operated under more 
unfavourable conditions than their successors of south east 
Swaziland who began to grow cotton in the 1950s. First, the 
clim atic conditions were not very suitable mainly in Hlathikhulu 
and Goedgegun and the neighbouring areas. Manzini was the only 
suitable area when compared with the former, but still the climate 
of south east Sw aziland proved more congenial than that of 
Manzini. Second, the ecology was also less suitable when one 
considers the texture of the soils which supported cotton in the 
1950s in south east Swaziland. Generally, the soils of Hlathikhulu 
and Goedgegun and some parts of Manzini were loose and sandy 
and therefore less fertile  to support cotton unless chem ical 
fertilizers were applied abundantly to the soils to step up output. 
On the other hand, south east Swaziland was endowed with a 
congenial clim ate which was warm enough to encourage fast 
growth. And the soils were loamy dark which retained moisture 
for considerably long periods of time. Also due to the thick 
undergrowth and forests, soil fertility  was high and supported 
healthy crops whose output was also handsom e. Very little  
fertilizers were applied to the soils at first, and even when not
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applied, the crops were still fresh and healthy.2 In short, the 
expenses on inputs incurred by entrepreneurs of the 1950s in 
south east Swaziland were minimal compared with those of their 
forebears who had grown cotton in less congenial zones of the 
territory. But it seems natural factors were interdependent with 
man-made ones such as the Schultz factors of production.3
It was not long after Swazi growers sold their cotton directly 
to Magudu that the company there began to meet their production 
needs partially. Ralli Brothers provided the growers with inputs at 
low costs, and these inputs went along with a field officer who 
imparted some rudimentary knowledge on the use of the inputs. 
These factors were not available to the entrepreneurs in the 
1920s, and when they became available in the 1930s, technical 
advice remained poor particularly because the growers were far 
from the administrative centres where offices of the department 
of agriculture were found. Poor communication was the main 
obstacle even in the 1950s for south east Swaziland, but Ralli 
Brothers filled the gap. Earlier Swazi growers did not have access 
to these broker facilities because there were few brokers and 
those did not afford credit facilities.4 Yet another factor was that 
there was very little competition among brokers to force them to 
induce growers to rally behind them. In the 1950s, competition 
created the need to make available most of these facilities in 
order to forestall rivals, in the case of Ralli Brothers.5 Competition 
im proved the conditions of production for the growers hence 
there was more Swazi participation in cotton cultivation in the 
1950s com pared to the earlier period. And yet another very 
influential variable in favour of Swazi growers in the 1950s was 
that growers could sell their crop and get the money on the same 
day while earlier growers, particularly those who sold through the 
South African buses, received their money after some long time of 
waiting for it. Transport was available to facilitate the transactions 
and the benefits from the trade were made more concrete and 
immediate by the availability of the means of transport. In 1959, 
when Clark opened a market at Phongolo, which was much closer 
than Magudu, growers could even organise their own transport 
because it was still cheaper to pool their crop and take it there
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them selves at the opportune tim e.6 On the other hand, earlier 
growers particularly  those in Shiselweni, had no contact with 
cotton markets except for those which were provided by settlers 
such as Language and Cheales. But even the latter two served as 
agents for some companies in South Africa because they were 
denied perm ission  to open trad ing  grounds like  gins in 
Sw aziland.^
For Manzini growers in the 1920s and 1930s the availability 
and proximity of the Power Company gin at Bremersdorp then, 
did not make them any better than their distant counterparts 
save only in a few instances such as M atsafeni.8 These few 
isolated exceptions were made by the promising cotton output of 
growers but on the whole growers had to find their own transport 
to send cotton to the gin. Consequently, very little stimulus to the 
production of more cotton was provided by the nearness of the 
market. The company had also failed to stimulate interest in the 
growers by creating credit facilities and transport, something 
which explains the insignificance of cotton cultivation even among 
the promising few.
Social differentiation became noticeable by 1955 in south east 
Swaziland, particularly when growers like Samuel Nsibande and 
Amos Matse pioneered the tractorisation of agricultural farming.9 
After these farmers acquired the tractor they invested its services 
appropriately to raise more money to m ultiply their areas of 
investment. These areas of investment assumed the form of cattle, 
the purchase of tractor wagons. These facilities were hired out for 
cash, and two years later the growers were able to add one more 
tractor and seperated so that each could use his tractor 
independently of the other and bear all the maintenance expenses 
accordingly  w ithout the assistance of the other. Individual 
ownership of tractors yielded profits for the growers at different 
rates, and Samuel became more successful than Amos. The factors 
which facilita ted  the m ultiplication of Sam uel's profits while 
Amos's stagnated were mainly technical because both growers 
cultivated cotton in Swazi Areas where access to the land was 
gained w ithout any charge. Sam uel leaned m ore upon his
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erstwhile European friend where he received technical help to 
maintain his tractor, to maximise output on his cotton fields by 
using the inputs appropriately. On the other hand, Amos did not 
have such contact and his approach to the problem s he 
encountered was a trial and error, and as such his cotton output 
was low due to the poor mechanical maintenance of his tractor. 10
Contacts with European settlers have formed some bedrock 
for the establishm ent of rural en trepreneuria l activ ities as 
experienced even in chapter 2. Iliffe has also given cognizance of 
this factor in his study of cash crop production and social change 
in T an g an y ik a .il It is important though to note that one does not 
suggest that Swazi growers were incapable of standing on their 
own, rather this illustration shows the importance of exploiting 
fru itfu lly  long-standing experience in the activity  prosecuted. 
European settlers already had a long history of involvem ent in 
commerce, and some of them had come from Natal where they 
had some contact with cash crop production hence the relevant 
technical advice they offered their Swazi clients. Incidentally, 
Samuel’s European friend had migrated from Natal and had once 
been involved in cotton production but after arrival in Swaziland, 
where the market was remote, his interests shifted remarkably to
p asto ra lism .12
The difference between those who exploited European 
contacts in the 1950s and those of the earlier decades of the 2 0 ^  
century is that while in the earlier decades Europeans were bent 
upon keeping the Swazi as their dependants in order to use them 
to produce cotton to sell to them cheaply to boost their meagre 
output, those who emerged after the Second W orld W ar, guided 
the Swazi to become independent in due course. In short, the 
technical investm ent was a long term  one and those who 
m aintained these contacts and exploited them  to maximum 
benefit realised progress in their business as the cases of Samuel 
and others will show. In 1957, two years after Samuel and Amos 
had purchased their tractor, Albion Matse, Simon Sihlongonyane, 
and others followed suit, but made very little progress mainly 
because they lacked the know-how and the technical guidance
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w hich Sam uel had e n j o y e d .  13 it is im portant to note that 
e n tre p re n e u ria l sk ills  w ere d ev e lo p ed  e ffe c tiv e ly  w ith  
appropriate guidance, and w herever the la tte r lacked  some 
promising entrepreneurs fell by the way side. Take for instance, 
A lbert Y ilakati, Petros Dludlu, David Dlamini, Josiah Vilakati, 
Deacon N sibande, and others who were pioneers and diligent 
growers but due to failure to secure technical advice and credit 
facilities they were pushed to the background like the Swazi 
entrepreneurs of the earlier decades. 14 One should not forget the 
technical support given by Ralli Brothers, but its weakness lay in 
the gross inequality  which punctuated its d istribution of the 
technical advice and credit facilities to various needy growers. 
This unequal credit and technical distribution was determined by 
the volume of trade undertaken between each grower and the 
company. Small scale and less progressive growers received little 
or no assistance, save in those areas where R alli Brothers' 
monopoly was threatened by other rivals like C l a r k .
Yet another demoralising handicap was the lack of education 
for the growers, something that the state began to provide in the 
mid 1960s, as the discussion below will indicate. Lack of education 
in relevant areas of production took too long to m aterialise in 
spite of the government's support for cotton production from the 
beginning of the 1950s. In the case of south east Swaziland state 
intervention to provide the necessary requisites for the industry 
to stabilise remained wanting due to the poverty of the means of 
comm unication such as roads and transport for the agricultural 
officers. The area was visited very occasionally and even then 
travelling w ithin the area was very treacherous and left some 
farm ers unattended. D ifficu lty  in travelling  posed another 
problem  and that was failure on the part of the agricultural 
officers to spread technical knowledge to those who needed it at 
the right time, and this handicap was exacerbated by the fact that 
growers were scattered all over the area which made the distance 
between different growers enormous particularly for a pedestrian 
demonstrator. Even Ralli Brothers' field officer found it hard to 
reach every grow er who was engaged in cotton cultivation 
because he was also a pedestrian. It has, however, transpired in
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the discussion above that in certain instances this gap was filled 
by some European farmers, while those who did not have that 
contact shared their problems among themselves particularly with 
progressive cultivators. But in most cases it was the blind leading 
his kind hence some of the growers deteriorated to the point 
where they found it hard to recover. Similar developments were 
noted by J. Iliffe in his study of cash crop production by the 
Chagga of Tanganyika where their contact w ith Europeans 
stimulated interest in t r a d e .  16
After Ralli Brothers stopped promoting cotton growing in 
south east Swaziland between 1957 and 1958, Clark took over and 
prom oted Swazi cotton growing. Initially  they operated from 
Magudu, but in 1959, a year after they (Clark) succeeded Ralli 
Brothers, they transferred their gin to P h o n g o l o . 1 7  The gin at 
Phongolo was about 20 kilom etres from M atsanjeni-H lushw ana 
and less than 7 kilom etres from Nsalitje. The nearness of the 
market enabled those farmers who owned ox-wagons and tractor 
wagons to transport their cotton there instead of waiting for 
company transport. In short, some growers could sell their crop 
when they wanted to, and received their money on the spot. The 
same applied even to the transportation of inputs like seeds and 
fertilizers. The company had also encouraged growers to visit the 
gin w henever they had technical problem s w hich required  
assistance instead of waiting for the field officer who visited the 
area at his c o n v e n i e n c e . ! 8 When the field officer visited the areas 
late growers were involved in unnecessary losses, and to avoid 
this they visited the gin themselves. In the same year, 1959, the 
Swaziland Milling Company established itself in the country and 
took interest in promoting the farming methods of growers in an 
effort to boost output mainly in m aize .!9 But in the course of 
improving the farming skills of the cultivators, the company found 
itself promoting cotton cultivation as well since the skills required 
to produce maize were the same with those required to cultivate 
cotton. W ith these developments, the ministry of agriculture was 
enjoined to extend its extension services even to distant growers, 
as far south as south east Swaziland. That was part of the package 
clinched to secure the finance from the company for extension
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services. Roads were improved to facilitate travelling to those 
areas which were affected by these projects. In the latter area, 
which forms the focus of the study, farmers who partook of the 
schemes were E llio t Shiba, Johannes Nzuza, Samuel Shongwe, 
Albert Vilakati, David Dlamini, Josiah Vilakati, Petros Dludlu to 
name a few. The selection of these farmers was made on the basis 
of their progress in farming and this information was solicited 
from various dem onstrators fam iliar with the farm ers. Initially 
free inputs were made available to the farmers to grow m a i z e . 20
This financial assistance was maintained until 1961, when a 
Crop Scheme was started and supported by the SMC along with 
the m inistry of agriculture. The objective of the scheme was to 
improve the farming methods of the cultivators by raising output 
per acre of the crops they grew particularly maize and cotton, 
crops that had become the main backbone of the common man's 
rural farm ing e c o n o m y . 21 In short, the scheme aimed to turn 
farmers into intensive cultivators as opposed to extensive ones. 
There were three stages of training through which growers were 
supposed to pass before they could be certified to have met the 
requ irem en ts of the p rogram m e, and these  requ irem en ts 
necessitated grouping the growers according to their already 
acquired skills. However, those whose farming methods were still 
backward started with the first stage and progressed gradually to 
the last one. The first stage was known as the pupil farmer, 
followed by the advanced farmer, and finally the m aster farmer 
which was the target of the tra in ing .2 2 To facilitate  the 
adm inistration of this schem e, there were a few registered 
farmers who joined the competition and were given free inputs. 
The best farmer, judged according to his articulation of all the 
basics of the lessons and the quality of the crops grown won the 
tournament, whose prize was a bicycle. To arrive at the decision 
as to who was the best farmer, those who monitored the scheme 
watched all the stages including the tilling of the soil, planting, 
weeding and spraying of the crop and finally the mature stage to 
know whose crop was of high quality. But it is important to note 
that the package that was sold to the pupil students included 
seeds, fertilizers and insectcides among the inputs which the
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growers received .23 Administrators of the scheme had assumed 
that the pupil farm ers already owned the necessary farming 
technology and yet some did not. It was in 1962, a year after the 
project had been institu ted that E lliot Shiba, who had been 
farming for three years, approached Ida Potgieter to borrow a 
sprayer, however, some of the inputs like the sprayer were 
provided by the sponsors in the mid 1960s.24
The scheme was continued until 1971, by which time it had 
expanded to many areas in the country and covered mainly maize, 
cotton and tobacco. It is important to note at this point that the 
scheme was not meant to spoon-feed the growers with all the 
necessary requisites to improve output in their farming economy. 
This is made clear by the scheme's provision of some inputs while 
others were left to the grower to provide, as the case of Elliot 
Shiba has indicated. Elliot had begun to grow cotton in 1959 at the 
same time as Johannes Nzuza, and the two had cooperated on 
alm ost every level of their farm ing.2 5 in 1962, when Elliot 
borrowed a sprayer from Ida, he shared the services of the 
equipment with Johannes Nzuza to promote their farming. Elliot 
forged some cooperation at this level with other colleagues such as 
Philemon Nxumalo, Abel Nxumalo, Samuel Vilane and others all of 
whom were in his area, M atsanjeni. How ever, the scheme 
benefited  the farm ers d ifferen tly  in spite o f the equal 
opportunities they were given by its administrators. By the end of 
1963, E lliot, Johannes, Philem on, and Abel had bought other 
farming equipment to expand and improve their cotton cultivation 
and other crops. But it transpired during field studies that such 
equipment were hired out on a rental by some farmers who had 
been lent by European owners.26 The owners of these inputs had 
avoided charging rental while custodians were paid in cash for 
renting out the equipment, an indication that some farmers took 
advantage of any available opportunity to accum ulate capital 
hence the rapid im provement of their farming technology and 
accum ulation  of p roperty  w hich la te r fa c ilita te d  social
d ifferen tia tion . 27
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To com plem ent the pupil/advanced/m aster farm er
program m e, research  was undertaken by the m in istry  of 
agriculture into the problems which hampered the improvement 
of agricultural farming particularly in SNL, where Swazi growers 
carried out their rural economic activities. At this point, the 
m inistry was aware of the obstacles which m ilitated against
optimum maize production but were not sure of those which 
hampered progress in cotton cultivation, one of the crops which 
prom ised to be an a lternative  source of a live lihood  to
m i g r a t i o n . 28  it w as in 1963 that the m inistry mounted a 
programme whose objective was to create the Central Swaziland 
Producers' Cooperative Union to coordinate the already existent 
cooperatives and also go ahead to form more of such societies. 
These two programmes: research into problems which hampered 
Swazi interest in cotton, and the creation of cooperatives were
though t of as being  com plem en ta ry .2 9 Xo fac ilita te  the
prosecution of these projects a Cotton Im provem ent Fund was 
created by the Colonial State and adm inistered through the
ministry of agriculture. The fund was created to finance activities 
which were concerned mainly with the im provem ent of cotton
cu ltiv a tio n .30
As part of the recommendations of the research carried out by 
the m inistry of agriculture, it was agreed in 1963 that an 
institution be set up to train extension officers and even provide 
short courses to cotton growers. The objective was to improve the 
farming methods of the Swazi in order to boost the output in the 
long run. According to the plans of the state there was supposed 
to be some training centre to benefit farm ing by training
extension officers and provide short courses for those farmers 
who were ready to partake of such programmes. Consequently, in 
1964 the Swaziland Agricultural College and U niversity Centre 
(SACUC) was opened at Luyengo,^ 1 the present agricultural 
campus of the University of Swaziland. SACUC went a long way 
towards meeting the needs of cotton growers and those of other 
cultivators. The provision of education preceded that of credit 
facilities because the state felt that unless the obstacles to 
farm ing had been made clear to the farm ers, credit facilities
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would not help boost the output in any of the crops grown. It was 
felt that education should come first where the question of 
appropriate investm ent of resources would be given attention so 
that when finance was finally  prov ided  w aste w ould be 
m inim ised. The education which was offered at Luyengo was 
aimed to provide a basis even for the formation of cooperatives 
and the way in w hich these w ould function . R egarding 
cooperatives, farm ers were enlightened on the benefits of a 
cooperative spirit and the various problems which got solved in 
farm ing  th rough  c o o p e r a t i o n . 3 2 After each training session 
demonstrators were dispatched to those areas where farmers who 
attended the training grew cotton and other crops to monitor the 
progress and farmer adherence to the principles of farming. But it 
has to be mentioned that in the majority of cases demonstrators 
did not reach every student farmer in time and in certain cases 
some farmers were not visited due to the poverty of the roads
and transport.3 3
In addition to monitoring the progress of the farmers, 
demonstrators also distributed cotton seeds, and this aspect of the 
development of cotton cultivation was resumed in 1964 after it 
had been pushed to the background for reasons unsubstantiated 
upon in the 1950s. The ministry of agriculture, in conjunction with 
the Cotton Advisory Committee, formed in 1958, in the same year 
the M alkerns Research Station was form ed, had assumed the 
responsibility of seed distribution and gave technical advice to the 
g r o w e r s . 3 4 H ow ever, the A dvisory C om m ittee rem ained  
ineffective due to lack of finance to carry out its advisory duties 
to cotton growers until 1964, when it began to take active interest 
in it with the support of the c o l l e g e . 3 5 it became clear that the 
C entral P roducers' Cooperative Union (CCU); and the other
organisations set up to promote cotton and other crops could not
effect any positive change due to the lack of credit facilities
especially for Swazi growers. The Cotton Research Committee, who
continued to release their recommendations to the Colonial State 
on the m ethods to be adopted in order to im prove cotton 
production in the SNL, also em phasised the need for credit 
facilities specifically for Swazi growers whose business on SNL did
179
not qualify them for loans with any of the merchant banks due to 
lack of s e c u r i t y . ^ 6 in fact, even though the Cotton Research 
Com m ittee was concerned w ith cotton production  and the 
problems which militated against it, the Colonial State on the other 
hand aimed to give attention to all crops grown by small scale
farmers and to comm ercialise the rural agricultural economy in 
general. The other crop which the state wanted to support to raise 
its output was maize, and this concern was made unavoidable 
both by the falling output and the amount of maize the SMC
im ported from  South Africa each year to o ffset local food 
deficits. 37
The recommendation of the Cotton Research Committee to 
establish a bank to finance Swazi entrepreneurial activities was 
given some serious consideration by the Colonial State to the 
extent that on 28 February, 1964 a committee consisting of four 
members met to deliberate on the is s u e d 8 its chairman was P. 
Ballenden and his committee drew up a very broad outline on the 
functions of the would-be bank. The committee suggested that the 
bank be called Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank and the name
was later changed to Swazi Bank, to agree with the main objective
of its formation. The Swazi Bank was initially formed to meet the 
needs of Swazi growers, and the change of name was effected 
after independence  w hich was in 1968. The com m ittee 
recommended that the bank should create first, a housing credit 
where emphasis was laid on loans for high density urban housing 
and where possible be made to urban authorities for the purpose 
of housing. Second, agricultural credit where priority was given to 
short and medium -long term development credit for title deed 
farmers. It was also emphasised that the cooperative movement 
which was already one year old then should be expanded and 
short term loans made to these cooperatives. Third, it should 
make popular the idea of savings by opening up a savings account 
department in the bank. Fourth, at a later stage the bank could 
lend money to a statutory industrial development c o r p o r a t i o n . 3 9
As regards credit for agriculture, the types of credit required 
were "Annual crop credit for Swazi farmers; medium term credit
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for farmers; long-term credit for Swazi high value crop production 
schemes; annual crop credits could be extended to title  deed 
farmers when sufficient funds are available; m edium -long term 
developm ent cred it for non-governm ent settlem ent schem es; 
medium-long term development credit for title deed farmers; and 
short-term  credit for the holding g r o u n d s " . 40 According to the 
recommendations of the committee the bank was supposed to be 
launched towards the end of 1964 with an initial government loan 
of R400,000 for the years 1964/65 and 1965/66, and that 
supplementary loans be sought from the funds of the Agency for 
International Developm ent to enable the bank to campaign for 
recognition and support from  potential custom ers. The date 
recommended for the inauguration came to fruition and the bank 
was launched at the end of 1964/65.41 It was hoped that the 
bank should be able to stand on its own after the initial financial 
governm ent support had been secured. In its in itial stages of 
functioning the bank made small loans to farmers without asking 
for any security until 1969, when it became clear that some 
farmers did not appreciate the bank's gesture of alleviating their 
problem of lack of credit facilities by deliberately avoiding to 
settle their loan accounts on agreed dates. But it is important to 
note that loans were not made to cotton growers only but even to 
those who cultivated maize. At that point it was agreed that crops 
would be held as security against the l o a n s . 42 But this blunder 
was soon brought to the notice of the bank because when crops 
were destroyed by adverse weather conditions there would not be 
anything for the bank to claim against the loan from the growers. 
As a follow-up on this issue of loan and security yet another 
programme was introduced in 1969, the Crop Production Scheme, 
mounted with the objective to test the reliability, and ability of 
the farmers to settle their loans at agreed t i m e s . 43
It is crucial to note that Cotona Cotton Ginning Company who 
established them selves at M atsapha Industrial Site in 1965,44 
CCU and other organisations such as the C otton Advisory 
Com m ittee all cooperated with the bank. In fact, the bank 
coordinated the activities of the these organisations in that for 
their operation, which centred on farming, they relied on the bank
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for f i n a n c e . 45 At the beginning, the bank did not want farmers to 
approach them on an individual basis, but encouraged them to 
register with local cooperatives, obtain membership tickets which 
they used to obtain credit with which they sought inputs from 
retailers or cooperatives. All purchase orders were endorsed by 
cooperative leaders to be valid, and this qualification was meant 
to reinforce a cooperative spirit among the farmers. Membership 
of every farmer with a local cooperative was helpful to the bank 
to track down those farmers who avoided r e p a y m e n t s . 46 But 
what is important for purposes of the study at this point is to 
show how farm ers benefited from these developm ents to the
point that some of them became rich, the other aspects of the
history of cooperatives have been given attention in chapter
seven.
Insistence on grower membership with a local cooperative to 
qualify for a licence to secure credit for his farming applied only 
to small scale farmers on SNL, while Swazi title deed farmers did 
not require such membership. However, only by the late 1960s 
did Swazi farmers begin to buy title deed land in south east
Swaziland. But even before title deed farms were purchased, some 
Swazi growers on SNL already produced upwards of 100 bales 
each per s e a s o n . 4 7  Cotona were interested to attract such farmers 
to them by offering better credit facilities than their small scale 
counterparts received. For instance, even transport was provided 
for a big output. Instead of leaving the onus with the farmers, 
Cotona took the trouble to monitor every stage of the production 
until harvest time. This initiative was made necessary by the 
presence of Clark and Company at Phongolo who were feared by 
Cotona because of the competition they presented to them for the 
cotton grown in the lowveld. The two had a long history of rivalry 
for cotton producers in South A f r i c a 4 8  and Swaziland (see p.60). 
By the late 1960s Clark were offering these facilities but to group 
farmers in each region instead of dealing directly with productive 
individual farmers. The farmers who attracted Cotona in south 
east Swaziland were Samuel Nsibande, E lliot Shiba, Johannes 
Nzuza, Samuel Shongwe, Amos M atse, Aaron M atse, Simon 
Sihlongonyane and o t h e r s . 4 9 j n order to undercut their rival,
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Cotona went beyond ju s t offering sim ple inputs like seeds, 
fertilizers and insecticides to even purchase tractors and other 
farming equipment for their client farmers. This panicky conduct 
by the broker was exploited  by some farm ers to im prove 
them selves by seeking more finance to expand their cotton
p ro d u c tio n .50
Broker competition for Swazi cotton in south east Swaziland 
after 1965 when Cotona established their gin at Matsapha, served 
as a strong factor to jerk up cotton output, and expand the area 
under cultivation in that region. These developments opened up a 
new chapter in the history of cotton cultivation in Swaziland as a 
whole and more particularly for the south eastern part of the 
country. It was in the period post 1965 that even those cultivators 
who had begun to grow cotton in 1959 and early in the 1960s, 
began to acquire more improved farming technology like tractors. 
And it was also in the latter part of the 1960s that farmers in 
M atsanjeni revived their defunct cooperative, the M atsanjeni 
Cotton Fam ers' Cooperative U nion,51 whose history is treated in 
chapter seven below. All these developments only occurred when 
the level of production for the farmers became noticeable and 
comm anded some bargaining power however lim ited it m ight 
have been in other aspects. But these developments were utilized 
by farmers for their benefit though on different levels since while 
some of them  gained m aterially  others did not, hence the 
emergence of a group of rich farmers along with those who were 
still poor. It is also im portant to note that even government 
organisations or committees set up to promote the improvement 
of the rural economy displayed some gross inequality  in the 
technical assistance they extended to the farmers. In fact, even 
dem onstrators paid more attention to already developed and 
progressive farmers at the expense of those who were still very 
poor and whose farming methods were backward. This unfair 
distribution of the technical advice was reported to have been 
caused by the fact that rich farmers provided refreshm ents and 
food for the demonstrators each time they visited their fields. On 
the other hand poor farmers could not afford such refreshments, 
and as a result their farming methods were neglected. In short, it
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would be wrong to blame brokers only for the divided attention 
the ir dem onstra to rs  gave to the farm ers because even 
government ones followed on the footsteps of the f o r m e r . 5 2
In 1969, a year after Swaziland became independent the 
government set up a Seed Production Programme and attached it 
to the Malkerns Research Station, which was not far from SACUC. 
The scheme did not necessarily specialise in cotton but also gave 
special attention to foodcrops, particularly  m aize which was 
already the staple crop. Before 1969, seeds for all crops grown in 
the country were imported from South Africa where they were 
produced. But these seed imports displayed glaring shortcomings 
in that they were not suited to the different types of soils where 
both maize and cotton were grown, nor had their producers taken 
into account the different climatic zones and conditions under 
which the crops were grown. These seeds also required specific 
fertilizers which were both suitable for the support of those seeds 
or varieties plus the texture of the soils where the crops were 
g r o w n . 53 To know which region was suited to which fertilizer 
took a long time to achieve for the ministry of agriculture and 
advise the farmers accordingly, and the farmers who mastered 
this aspect first were those who attended short courses in farming 
at Luyengo. It was during these courses that farm ers' attention 
was drawn to this aspect of farming in so far as it affected both 
m aize and co tton . In a sense these program m es were 
complementary to one another. Even though the adm inistration 
showed awareness of the problem s which m ilita ted  against 
farming in general, the main obstacle to the prosecution of the 
recommendations of the Research Committee was lack of transport 
facilities for demonstrators and extention officers in most of the 
districts as already pointed out above.
However, some of these problems, particularly those which 
concerned the want of technical advice were alleviated by the 
institutionalisation of the Cotton Board in 1968, the same year 
that Swaziland became independent. The Cotton Board consisted of 
three main standing officers, namely; the Chief Executive Officer, 
the Technical officer, and the S e c r e t a r y . 5 4 There were other
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m embers who were invited each time there was a meeting
organised by the board to discuss problems of cotton production. 
The Cotton Board succeeded the Cotton Advisory Committee which 
had been formed in 1958 to look into the issues which centred on 
cotton production and made recommendations to the ministry of 
agriculture. The Cotton Board cooperated with the Cotton Research 
Committee and the former made some input into the work of the 
committee by recommending the types of varieties they thought 
would be suitable to various regions. Their recommendations also 
had some bearing on the output capacity of each variety along 
w ith the capacity  to re s is t certain  d iseases , and their 
recom m endations were based on the observations of their 
technical officer. At the centre of all these activities was the
m inistry of agriculture which coordinated their work. But it is 
crucial to note that in south east Swaziland, which was more than 
150 and 200 kilom etres away from M anzini and M babane 
respectively, where decisions were taken at the offices of the
m inistry, the dissem ination of technical knowledge was very 
piecem eal and d ifficu lt.5 5 T h e  roads which linked these urban 
areas to the cotton area were in a bad condition and had been 
neglected in terms of maintenance particularly in summer when 
rains fell frequently, and farmers needed the technical advice 
more then because that was the planting season. And whenever 
v isita tions were finally made very few farm ers were given 
attention which made some growers find their own solutions to 
the production problems they encountered. 56
When the Seed Production Unit was introduced in 1969, it 
was followed very closely by a Cotton Production Scheme which 
was also implemented in the same year. However, in that year
was also begun a maize growing campaign, and both schemes 
aimed to introduce new seed varieties which were suited to 
different ecological and clim atic conditions. The Cotton Board 
coordinated this scheme which was financed with a fund from the 
United Kingdom but administered by the Swazi Bank. For the 
Swazi Bank this was an opportune time to fam iliarise Swazi 
farm ers with the regulations involved in loan allocations, 
particularly the question of interest which fluctuated and how the
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fluctuation took place, the need to honour an agreement entered 
into between the two parties. Farmers who participated in the 
scheme were selected from region to region but from diligent 
farmers. M ost of the farmers who were selected came from 
Manzini because of the nearness of the area to the offices of the 
Cotton Board, Cotton Research Committee, the Bank and the 
m inistry of agriculture. A few were selected from south east 
Swaziland, and those who came from the latter region were among 
those whose homes and fields lay close to the road to facilitate the 
movement of those who monitored the w o r k . 57
The Cotton Board and the ministry of agriculture were charged 
with the administration aspect to help facilitate the improvement 
of grower entrepreneurial skills in the long run. Cotton had 
already become one of the cash earners in south east Swaziland in 
SNL and the prom otion of its cultivation was top on the 
governm ent's agenda for the econom ic developm ent of rural 
farming. However, it was difficult for the administrators of the 
scheme to convince the Swazi growers to give more attention to 
cotton than to maize especially in those areas which were less 
suited to m a i z e . 5 8 The scheme was a dismal failure in Manzini 
while in south east Swaziland there were farmers who made good 
use of the opportunity by acquiring the necessary know-how of 
cotton growing and to use the credit facilities. Most of those who 
had been selected to partake of the scheme came from already 
productive farm ers, which was an indication of the project's 
weakness because it was supposed to develop the methods of 
those farm ers who still faced production problem s. Productive 
farmers were drawn from cultivators such as Samuel Shongwe, 
Jerome Mhlungu, Elliot Shiba, David Xaba, Johannes Nzuza, to 
name a few who benefited hence their farm ing methods and 
cotton output i m p r o v e d . 59
The receptive attitudes of farmers in south east Swaziland 
was accounted for by the high demand for cotton there presented 
by Clark and Cotona. Yet another explanation was that the area 
was less suited to maize, a crop which had made farmers in 
Manzini less willing to reduce its production in favour of cotton
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because the climate was more suited to maize production than to 
co tto n . 60 jt was in south east Swaziland that growers who were 
involved in the scheme were also supported by Cotona with 
farm ing technology such as im proved sprayers than the old- 
fashioned type they had used. Some of the farm ers purchased 
new tractors because those which they owned were already old 
and not effective enough to facilitate expansion in their farming. 
It is also important to consider the price levels of the crop as one 
of the influential factors in making the attitudes of farmers there 
more receptive to the ideals of the Cotton Scheme than other areas 
in Manzini and elsewhere. For instance, in 1967 prices per kg of 
seed cotton doubled, and that trend continued in subsequent 
years as shown in Table D. The positive attitude of the 
administration towards the rising demand for cotton was reflected 
in the support it gave to the cotton production programmes and 
its attempts to form those relevant instruments which supported 
the schemes. For farmers, the real incentive to step up production 
was the price rise in 1967 which had doubled that of 1967 in 
1 9 6 8 .^ 1  it  js im portant to note that brokers did not separate 
output from quality from the price of seed cotton per kg. Cotton of 
a low grade was given a low price and in order to get an income 
correspondent with the output farmers produced a good quality 
crop which also maintained a good reputation with the b r o k e r s .62
The rise in the cotton price and the availability of credit 
facilities, enabled some farmers like Samuel Nsibande to purchase 
private farms at the end of the 1 9 6 0 s .63 Cotton production on SNL 
suffered a num ber of lim itations in that the amount of land 
assigned each farm er was determ ined by the chief and his 
adm inistrative  officers. Its expansion was ju s tif ie d  by the 
expanded food demands of each family but cotton growers had 
found it hard to convince chiefs for more land, more than the 
average amount allotted to growers with big fam ilies. To offset 
this land deficit, for the sake of meeting the market demand for 
cotton, some farmers began to purchase title deed l a n d .6 4 Most 
European farmers at the close of the 1960s were looking for 
buyers for their farms since they were leaving the country and 
returning to South A frica. European farm ers d isapproved of
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working under an African government due to racist justifications 
in the majority of cases. However, the departure of these farmers 
was a blessing to the progressive Swazi growers because the 
terms upon which they purchased the farms were favourable to 
the weak financial position of the potential buyers. The local 
market for these farms was very poor due to their unfavourable 
geographical location: they lay in the lowveld where there were 
no big rivers to facilitate irrigation farming. In short, farming in 
the area was entirely dependent upon rainfall which meant that 
investm ent in them represented some m ajor loss for buyers 
unless whosoever bought them invested in pastoral farming which 
flourished and has rem ained so even to this day .65 The only 
people who were willing to purchase the farms were Swazi cotton 
growers most of whom could not afford hard cash, and in order to 
raise cash for the farms they sought financial backing from the 
Swazi Bank, while some of the finance came from Cotona, a local 
broker who had some considerable vested interest in cotton.6 6
At the beginning of the 1970s, growers who provided a fertile 
ground for the Cotton Scheme, were those who already produced 
about 50 bales and more per season per grower. These were 
Samuel Nsibande, Elliot Shiba, Johannes Nzuza, Philemon Nxumalo, 
Abel Nxumalo, Amos Matse, Aaron Matse, Albion Mbhamali, and 
others. The increased number of tractors was also correspondent 
with the amount of cotton produced per season per grower. For 
instance, there were 357 tractors in Swaziland in 1971 and these 
were owned by Swazi growers, and in 1972 the number had 
increased to 364. In Shiselweni alone there were 139, Lubombo 
91, Manzini 71, Hhohho 63, and south east Swaziland fell under 
S h i s e l w e n i . 67 i n the latter region, which grew mainly cotton, 
farmers like Elliot Shiba, Samuel Nsibande, Johannes Nzuza, and 
Amos Matse already owned between two and three tractors each 
by 1971. Nsibande already owned title deed land in that year, and 
there was more land to be cultivated and grown with cotton by 
1971 hence his decision to buy three tractors.68
It is important to note that by the 1970s, at a time when the 
wars of liberation  gained momentum in M ozam bique, more
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refugees from  there entered the country, some legally  while 
others did so illegally. Those who entered the country unlawfully 
sought asylum with some farmers in the lowveld where they 
hoped to hide away from the law and avoid arrests by the police. 
This development occurred at a time when the demand for labour 
was high on the cotton fields. Family and other hired local labour 
supplies were inadequate in the face of the expanded extent of 
cotton cultivation. Child labour was only available on weekends, 
during public and school vacation holidays when children, looking 
for school fees, sold their labour to the farmers but again that was 
too casual to meet the rising demand.6 9 it is difficult though to 
say which group of refugees were more exposed to exploitation by 
the farmers between unlawful ones and those who entered the 
country legally. Unlawful refugees were not registered in the 
country, did not reside in refugee camps located at Ndzevane in 
the Big Bend area. Unregistered refugees could not seek the 
protection of the state against exploitation by farm ers because 
they were unknown in the country , and reg is tra tio n  was 
deliberately  avoided because they disapproved of living in
cam ps.
The question of labour cannot be underplayed at this time 
particularly among the rich farmers who possessed most of the 
factors which facilitated its attraction to meet the market demand 
of cotton. Some of these factors were the adequate supply of food, 
clothes and shelter all of which were required desperately by the 
refugees. Some of the farmers already operated shops or trading 
stores which were construed by some of the refugees to be signs 
of richness. A ccording to oral evidence food was supplied 
adequately to attract more refugees to come and seek protection. 
On those farms where shelter was very poor few refugees were 
attracted. Most of the farmers provided just the above facilities 
while others added pocket money at the end of each month to 
attract more from those who did not provide these to hold the 
labour from  leaving. This developm ent becam e one of the 
inducements for labour in 1972, and later it was expanded to 
wages. Most of the refugees appreciated this gesture, and because 
there was no con tro l over their m ovem ents in the area
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particularly on weekends, they met and shared their experiences 
w ith their d ifferen t m asters. Free m ovem ent served as a 
deterrent and was regretted later by those farm ers who were 
reluctant to pay wages to their labourers in addition to food and 
the other things. The result was that frugal farm ers lost their 
labour to those who already paid wages.7*
Some of the illegal refugees met often with the legal group 
housed at Ndzevane and shared their financial progress from 
working on cotton fields. Later there was some piecemeal addition 
of refugee labour on some of these farms, particularly those which 
were easy to visit by means of public transport from the refugee 
camp. At Lavumisa, for instance, Johannes Nkwanyana, who began 
to grow cotton in the early 1970s, was one of those lucky farmers 
who received this l a b o u r . 7 2  Elliot Shiba at Matsanjeni, Johannes 
Nzuza and others received a few stray aways because they were 
far from the main road where the public buses from Ndzevane 
ran. To avoid confrontation with the local Royal Police, farmers 
had to register these strays so that if anything went wrong they 
should be held responsible but since most of the farmers wanted 
to avoid such responsibility they decided not to register any 
strays and that was a good excuse for paying the workers low 
wages. But rich farm ers succeeded to attract more of these 
workers, and in cases where local accommodation was lacking, 
arrangem ents were made to accom m odate them  tem porarily  
during the week and they were driven to the camps on weekends. 
W hile this latter conduct eased accommodation problem s, some 
refugees frowned upon it and went to look for work with those 
farmers who did not send them to the camps. In fact, most of the 
refugees did not bother much about the poverty  of the 
accommodation because they thought it was the better of the two 
evils; camp conditions and poor shelter on the farms. To some the 
camp was sim ilar to a prison where there was restriction of 
m ovem ent and pun ishm en t for the in frin g em en t of the 
regulations governing their accommodation there. On the farms 
these restric tions were non-existent. However, on the part of 
those farmers who insisted on driving the labour back to the camp 
the main problem was not only losing the labour to other farmers
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but the expense involved in the transportation due to the long 
distance which was more than 60 kilometres each way and the 
poor condition of the road which linked the cotton area to the 
cam p. 73
The im plications of this labour com petition were 
considerably serious for the poor farmers. Very few refugees 
sought asylum with poor farmers due to lack of entertainments 
and low wages, compared to rich farm ers whose wages and 
conditions of service were better. However, in spite of these 
shortcom ings, some refugees found asylum  with these poor 
growers. Aware of their vulnerability of losing labour to rich 
farmers, poor farmers, who also wanted to improve and expand 
cotton cultivation due to the revived price, already at 19 cents per 
kg of seed cotton by 1972, offered attractive conditions to keep 
the labour.7 4 Refugees were treated like fam ily members by 
working along with their hosts, had access to all the benefits 
which were enjoyed by the patrons. Some of the refugees were 
even given Swazi names and called by the surnames of their 
patrons to pro tect them against any suspicion by political 
authorities like chiefs. But the latter were easily bribed to register 
the refugees as nationals and members of their chiefdom s. 
Registration with chiefdoms as nationals allowed these people 
access to a number of facilities such as public education which 
only nationals were entitled to.75 Young men of school going age, 
who had been attending school in their country at the time of 
their departure were often supported to receive  education, 
worked on weekends and public holidays or school vacation but 
even then along with members of the families who provided them 
asylum. But some of these M ozam bicans exploited  available 
opportunities to get whatever they wanted and left, while others 
rem ained incorporated members of those fam ilies w ith whom 
they lived. In some cases school-going young men, remained with 
their patrons until they attained the desired level of education 
when they moved to seek employment anywhere they chose in 
the country since they were already considered nationals. Most of 
them already spoke Siswati  well (the national language) and were 
not discrim inated against nor debarred from getting employment.
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And since some of the rich farm ers already operated shops, 
restaurants, bottle stores, garages and workshops, where these 
young men were employed, poor farmers who had brought up 
some of the opportunists were deserted in favour of rich farmers 
who offered relatively better wages. Whichever way one looks at 
it the plight of poor farmers was exacerbated by the failure to 
attract and hold labour in adequate supplies. There were 
exceptions, however, where some educated refugees did not 
desert their patrons. In those instances where they went to look 
for work in urban places permission was sought and granted by 
the poor patrons.7 6
It was in the mid 1970s that some of the rich farmers opened 
up garages in the lowveld to provide mechanical repairs to cars, 
tractors and trucks in the rem ote cotton area. M ost of the 
Mozambican refugees boasted of a variety of skills which involved 
m echanics, bricklaying, plumbing, and the like. In addition to 
farm ing and the operation of stores and bu tcheries, rich 
entrepreneurs also added garages and these were E llio t Shiba, 
Johannes Nkwanyana, Mbhavumane Ntshangase, to name a few. 
At these garages, as m entioned above, some of the skilled 
refugees were employed to run the business but at a very low 
cost. The need for the establishment of these additional businesses 
was created by the expanded extent of cotton cultivation made 
necessary by the elastic d e m a n d .7 7 The elastic demand for cotton 
was also reflected in the price levels of the crop per kg, and the 
levels are clearly reflected in Table D. By 1973, the price of seed
cotton per kg was already at 32 cents and 36 cents in 1974. Even
though it dropped down to 25 cents in 1975, in 1976 it rose again
to 35 cents.7 8 Most of tractor m aintenance which Shiba and
Nkwanyana offered at their garages was concerned more with 
panel beating tractor dents than with changing oil, and other old 
parts which needed to be replaced with new ones. Poor farmers 
who could not afford regular service for their tractors, and the 
replacement of the old parts sought used parts from the tycoons 
who operated these garages. This is an indication of the social gap 
which had been created by cotton production in the area between 
the different social groups of farmers. The social gap was also
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expressed in the lifesty le of the different farm ers, and the
explanation lay in the farmers' shrewdness and ability to take 
advantage of the factors of production to prom ote their cotton 
production . R elevant investm ent of refugee labour services 
yielded more profits for some f a r m e r s .7 9
In considering the lifestyle of some of the rich farmers, 
particularly in the late 1970s, one could realise that most of the 
well-built houses of rich farmers were constructed at that time, 
and the architecture had some close affinity to that of the 
Portuguese which was commonly noticeable in urban places
especially  M babane and M anzini. However, that is a mere
digression, the main issue at this juncture is the conduct of rich 
farmers to their less able colleagues. Mozambican labour aside, it 
is crucial to exam ine the m anner in which cotton growing 
entrepreneurs invested the profits which accrued from investing 
in cotton by the em ploym ent of ex tra-territorial labour. For
instance, the maintenance of tractors of poor growers was often 
paid for in labour services by the clients. These terms of settling 
the cost for tractor m aintenance was often suggested by the 
clients because they did not have enough cash to meet the 
expenses. In some cases it was not a question of little money but 
it was the farm ers' attempts to save money for investm ent in 
inputs such as insecticides which were very expensive.80 For 
instance, 10 litres of insecticides cost in the region of E500.00, and 
yet not many farmers could afford that amount. With one litre a 
farmer could not spray more than 10 acres when the minimum 
amount of land cultivated by each small scale grower per season 
was 30 acres and more in a fair season.81 Yet another factor to 
consider is that cotton needed to be sprayed quite often, as often 
as every two months, depending on the amount of insects, and 
this had to be continued until the harvesting period was over.
In view of these requirements farmers would rather pay for 
some of the tributary services to cotton production in kind such as 
garage costs, because owners were also in favour of that 
arrangement following the rising demand for labour. Poor farmers 
also depended upon their rich counterparts for fuel for their
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tractors.82 Payment in kind for these services had an adverse 
impact upon the cotton of the clients. This was due to the fact that 
patrons were left to determine, quite arbitrarily, the amount of 
labour time clients were expected to offer in return for the inputs 
and tractor m aintenance they were given by rich entrepreneurs. 
This trend has been seen by some as representative of some 
exploitation of financially  weak producers by their rich and 
p rogressive  coun terparts . Som etim es th is approach  sounds 
plausible though some of the clients in south east Swaziland did 
not look at it from that angle. But sometimes it is important to go 
beyond what the testimonies of the people, whose problems are 
being reported to read the implications of the relationship. It is 
not enough to concentrate on the superficial social relations of 
p roduction  of the parties  invo lved  but to exam ine the 
im plications, and in this regard clients were forced to reduce 
labour time on their fields in favour of their patrons'. W ithout 
client labour some of the rich farmers could have been forced to 
reduce the scale of cotton cultivation on their fields.83
The hire of labour by clients to supplement that of the family 
was inconceivable in the light of the shortage of cash for its 
paym ent. Fam ily  labour was therefo re  supp lem ented  w ith 
communal labour, and this labour has been looked into by John 
Tosh in the case of the Langi of Uganda. However, Tosh's findings 
show that communal labour in Uganda was representative of some 
transitional stage from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist system of 
production in those areas where cash crop production was gaining 
ground.84 in south east Swaziland the system was prevalent long 
before cash crop production was begun and it has still remained 
an integral part of the production for both capitalist and pre­
capitalist systems of production. According to oral evidence lack of 
labour supply has been the main cause for the retention of 
communal labour, and in certain instances its retention has been 
made unavoidable by the presence of destitute members of the 
extended family who were maintained by their kin and payment 
for the support was made in k i n d .85 i n some instances as shown 
above, poor cotton growers who sought technical assistance from 
their rich counterparts have retained the system of 'communal
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labour'. However, the latter aspect of 'communal labour' needs 
some qualification because it was not optional but compulsory to 
the extent that even the labour time was determ ined by the 
patron and there was no democratic conduct in its determination 
and yet traditional labour was optional and democratic hence its 
drawback in production. P.T. Bauer, basing his study on W est 
A frica, reached the conclusion that A frican capitalism  was 
hampered by their (African) financial obligations to their destitute 
kin, and this discovery bears some affinity to that of the Swazi 
c u ltiv a to r  s. 8 6 But even in the cases where destitute members of 
the extended family offered this form of labour, there was some 
feeling of obligation that if the labour was not forthcoming, the 
financial support enjoyed by the poor folk would dry up. This 
constant fear had some compelling effect upon some of these 
people, and the behaviour was no longer in conform ity to the 
traditional form of communal labour and even the amount of 
labour time given was a determinant of the future cooperation of 
the rich member of the extended family with the poor relatives.87
Traditionally communal labour was difficult to supervise and 
it was hard to set the tempo for its performance since that often 
led to conflict between the host and the work party. The cause of 
the conflict was that supervision was equivalent to a capitalist 
system of production where the labour was purchased. In the 
latter case the supervision was necessitated by the need to 
maximise profit since the system operated on capital and the need 
to avoid running the business on some loss. Due to these problems 
most of the entrepreneurs avoided communal labour particularly 
on a large scale.8 8 However, the engagement of members of the 
extended fam ily in cotton production was quite extensive and 
these were drawn from the poverty-striken m em bers of the 
extended family who needed support in food, clothes and even 
shelter. Due to their desperate social and economic position, they 
depended largely on their able relatives who were already rich 
from cotton cultivation. In this case the supervision of the labour 
was extensive, and the tempo for the prosecution of the work was 
set by the patrons. This dynamic development, which occurred in 
the social relations of production between relatives, said much
195
about the impact of capitalism on the community that was deeply 
involved in cotton production and trade. In practical terms this 
type of labour could no longer be referred to as communal save 
only the form the reward took and that was still in kind. In some 
instances where the patron was unhappy with the labour, and 
dispensed with it, the relations were strained but due to the 
desperate economic position of the client, the latter took the 
initiative to repair the relations.89 However, poor farmers, who 
also worked for their patrons, drew quite heavily on communal 
labour for their cotton cultivation. Unlike the rich entrepreneurs 
who treated this labour like hired labour, poor farmers retained 
the traditional social relations of production in order to maintain 
the relationship because their rural economy was still dependent 
on it, and even by the early 1980s, this old form of communal 
labour was nurtured.90
But participants in communal labour by the late 1970s and 
early 1980s were mainly those people who could not make any 
progress either in food or cash crop production.91 Since the 
reciprocal aspect of the labour had been lost it was hard to retain 
the title 'communal labour' instead some people referred to it as 
'rented labour', literally  meaning that the hosts entertained the 
participants for the duration of the labour time and dispensed 
with them at the end of the session. However, some of the work 
participants rotated among those farmers who needed labour and 
were rewarded in kind, that is, in food and drinks. Most of the 
participants in this type of labour wanted subsistence hence they 
became customers to different farmers in the cotton growing area 
in a bid to accumulate adequate short term supplies. In short, 
those who possessed the ability to attract labour did so and 
realised profits from it while those who could not were pushed 
into the background, and this trend is emphatic of the view that 
the ability to exploit available resources for the improvement of 
cotton cultivation fanned the process of social segmentation.92
According to oral evidence Elliot Shiba bought his first farm 
in 1976 from a European farmer, Hebrst, who was also leaving 
Swaziland and returning to South Africa like other settlers who
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disapproved of working under a Black government. His success to 
convince the farm er about his ability to pay for the farm was 
facilitated by his access to finance in the Swazi Bank and Cotona, 
both of which were simultaneously willing to finance the project. 
This econom ic developm ent is sim ilar to that which Gunnar 
Myrdal alluded to in his study of economic growth in developing 
countries when he suggested that economic growth does not 
benefit everybody to the same degree.93 it w as in 1978 that 
Shiba purchased his second farm, and in the latter case the Trans- 
Natal Cotton Ginning Company (J.L. Clark) financed the project and 
the terms of the loan repaym ent were settled cordially between 
the broker and the client. It was also at the same time, late 1970s, 
that Johannes Nkwanyana of Lavumisa also purchased his two 
farms from two different settlers who were on the verge of 
returning to South Africa.94 His strategy was equivalent to that of 
Shiba in that he approached both the Trans-Natal Cotton Ginning 
Company and the Swazi Bank for finance. His success in cotton
growing helped him to accumulate enough money with which to
pay the deposit while the bank paid the balance and he claimed to 
have settled the loan for one of the farms in a period of two 
year s. 9 5 However, in 1980 the year when drought conditions hit 
the area hard, particularly in the 1980/81 planting season, the
crop was unim pressive and the output was also adversely
affected. Both farmers were hit hard by the drought to the extent 
of selling some of their livestock to settle their loans some of 
which were already outstanding. Part of the money for this had 
com e from  the side-line  businesses w hich w ere operated 
concurrently with cotton cultivation.96
Side-line businesses dated back to the mid 1970s, when 
investm ent in cotton was lucrative. Most of those farmers who 
began these businesses did so to raise additional cash to finance 
cotton cultivation. These farmers were Johannes Nkwanyana who 
owned a grocery, butchery, petrol filling station, restaurant, bottle 
store and a vegetable shop all of which were already in operation 
by 1980 when field studies were carried out.97 Elliot Shiba on the 
other hand operated two trading stores, a restaurant, a butchery, 
petrol filling station, motor spare parts and a fruit shop, and all
197
these businesses were run by him along with cotton growing,98 jn 
addition to these businesses each of the two farmers also reared 
cattle. Livestock in some cases, such as in the cases of Samuel 
Nsibande and Johannes Nkwanyana, were used as initial capital to 
finance cotton production.99 jn other instances such as those of 
Elliot Shiba, Amos Matse, Johannes Nzuza and others, livestock 
were a result of profitable investment in cotton cultivation. 100 
But in both cases, business in livestock was interdependent with 
cotton cultivation, a point developed in Chapter Five. This form of 
interdependence was also established between cotton and other 
businesses from which cash was drawn to supplement finance for 
cotton production. In adverse seasons when the output was 
depressed, money was drawn from the other investments to settle 
instalments with the Swazi Bank or Cotona or Clark.101 Money 
raised through these side-line businesses was also invested in the 
purchase of less expensive inputs like fertilizers, paym ent of 
wages, purchase of insecticides and that of repair parts for the 
tractors and trucks used in the transportation of labour and 
in p u ts . 102 However, it is important to note that even though 
these businesses were helpful to support cotton cultivation, the 
time farmers spent on their management diverted attention away 
from cotton and the result was the adversely affected output and
q u a lity .103
According to some entrepreneurs, side-line businesses need 
not be seen to have exclusively been beneficial to owners but to 
the com m unities in which they were operated as well. This 
applied to all the businesses particularly when the long distances 
which linked cotton areas to the business centres are taken into 
consideration. For instance, the distance between Nhlangano and 
the Cotton Belt, was estimated at 100 or more kilometres which 
made frequent visitations there very difficult for a people whose 
means of travel and the money to pay for it were poor. The 
provision of these facilities, which included trading stores, 
butcheries, repair garages, petrol filling stations and cotton 
cultivation, led to the improvement of the infrastructure which 
linked the area to Matsapha, where the Cotona gin was, and to 
C lark 's gin at Phongolo. Invariab ly  this netw ork  becam e
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widespread and linked the area to virtually every part of the 
country particularly  business places. More com m unity schools 
were constructed under the auspices of the cotton growers, a new 
era because schools had previously been built by government. 104 
Due to the availability of money and the realisation of the need 
for children to receive education, more schools became available. 
In addition to schools the community also constructed local clinics 
where minor health problem s were solved, and by the early 
1980s there were more than one clinic in the area. 105
The developments discussed in this chapter can be related to 
Table D below. The table shows the output and value of the crop 
that was produced each year along with the price of the 
commodity per lb/kg from 1960 at a time when the output was 
still low due to the backward farming methods which were used. 
In 1961, the governm ent introduced the pupil/advanced/m aster 
farm er schem e whose objective was to im prove the farming 
methods of the farmers, but its effect only became noticeable 
after 1965, when the output began to rise.106 However, at that 
time there were many other factors which contributed to the rise 
in the output. One of these factors was the local cotton market 
which was provided by Cotona. Second, it was late in 1964 that 
the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank was established to finance 
small scale farmers who had failed to qualify for loans with any of 
the local merchant banks. Loans to these small scale farmers were 
made available in the planting season 1964/65.107 However, both 
Cotona and the Swazi Bank only became effective in the years 
which followed after their establishment, and 1967 is one of these 
years because it was in it that the bumper crop of cotton was 
realised as shown on table D. However, the years which followed 
thereafter were hit hard by drought conditions hence the slumped 
cotton output which ruled until 1971 when it began to improve 
along with the output in the crop, and also in the price at which 
the crop sold.108 It was in 1971, for instance, that the output rose 
from a small 7 short tons output in 1970 to a record of 10 short 
tons in 1971. This revival was also influenced by the revival in 
the price of the crop from 7 cents in 1967 to 15 cents in 1971,109 
a rise which was more than 50%, and there is no doubt that this
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development had a positive effect on the output in cotton. These 
events attracted more cotton growers, some of w hom llO  had a 
strong impact on cotton production in the Cotton Belt. It was also 
at this time that the labour shortage was alleviated by the influx 
of Mozambican refugees, as the wars of liberation became more 
destructive to the rural econom y there. This influx became 
stronger after the 1975 independence w hich pushed the 
disgruntled National Resistance Movement of M ozambique into 
wars of sabotage. As a result the output rose more than before as 
reflected on the table. The price of the crop was yet another 
powerful attraction and stimulus for more cotton production.
In conclusion, the Hla Myint vent-for-surplus model, whose 
improved version was propounded and applied to W est Africa by 
J.S. Hogendorn, helps in the analysis of the factors which attracted 
farm ers to south east Swaziland in the 1960s and 1970s in 
particular. The 1970s attracted more growers due to the booming 
trade in cotton that had been facilitated by the improvement of 
the infrastructure which made it easier for the administration to 
disseminate technical education to the farmers. The departure of 
some settlers to South Africa enabled some growers to acquire 
farms on favourable conditions. This factor ties up well with the 
credit facilities which were provided by brokers such as Cotona 
and Clark, that were later supplemented by the establishment of 
the Swazi Bank.
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V ilakati, M atsanjeni, 20 O ctober, 1980; Sam uel N sibande, 
Hlushwana, 20 October, 1980.
106. Sna Box 98 File 145/2 Report of the Chief Agricultural Officer
on progress of the pupil/advanced/m aster farm er project, 21
August, 1966.
107. Sna Box 98 File 145/2 Report of the Swaziland Credit and 
Savings Bank on finance for small scale farmers, 31 May, 1966.
108. S w aziland  G o v ern m en t: M inistry of A griculture Annual 
Report, 1971.
109. S w aziland  G o v ern m en t: M inistry of A griculture Annual 
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110. Those who were attracted by the improvement in the price 
of cotton in the 1970s were Johannes Nkwanyana, Mbhavumane
Ntshangase, Samuel Vilane, Abel Tsabedze and others. These 
farm ers are among those who have made some phenom enal
advancements in cotton production in the area.
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TABLED.
THE TABLE SHOWS THE QUANTITY OF EXPORTED COTTON. THE 
NOMINAL PRICE PER POUND. AND THE VALUE OF THE EXPORTED 
CROP IN THE YEARS. 1960-85
YERAR QUANTITY PRICE VALUE
(short tons) 
(000)
(cents per kg) <R)
(000)
1960 4 6 267*
1961 5 7 719
1962 3 7 413
1963 6 7 870
1964 5 7 695
1965 7 7 504






1972 12 19 2053
1973 13 32 2484
1974 18 36
1975 23 25 4999
1976 12 35 4095
1977 15 49
1978 22 39 8663
1979 16 46 6572
1980 23 52 11102
1981 25 12499
1982 14 52 6914




SOURCE: Kingdom of Swaziland: Annual Reports of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1961-66; 1967-71, Appendix 2; 1972-74, Appendix 
3; 1975-1985, Cotton B o ard : Annual Reports, for the output 
statistics; for prices from 1961-1972 see the 1972 report. For the 
years 1973-85 see Cotton Board: Annual Reports.
* 267 was expressed in British currency, pounds, and yet from 




THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE UNIONS IN COTTON 
CULTIVATION, 1954-85
The cooperative unions, particularly in the agricultural 
sector, were formed to protect the interests of producers against 
exploitation by purchasers. The initial objectives of these unions 
hinged upon the m arketing of the items produced, and when 
producers pooled their commodities together, particularly  when 
the demand for the items became elastic, they utilised their 
bargaining pow er to look for lucrative purchasers. To the 
m arketing  resp o n sib ilitie s  w ere also added those of the 
im provem ent of production standards through the provision of 
basic inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides within the 
easy physical and financial reach of the farmers. This step was 
still part of the endeavour to satisfy the m arket demand by 
encouraging farmers to step up commodity production. In south 
east Swaziland this aspect was handled by the M atsanjeni Cotton 
Farmers' Cooperative Union (Matsanjeni Union) which was formed 
in response to the expanding volume of trade in cotton. J.S. 
Hogendorn's version of the vent-for-surplus theory predicted that 
the proper utilisation of the factors of production would lead to 
some expansion in the volume of trade and that that would later 
provoke som e boom ing cond itions. South east Sw aziland 
experienced this in the late 1970s, when the infrastructure had 
been tremendously improved to cater for the trade in cotton. And 
also due to the available multiple investm ent opportunities the 
cooperative  expanded its responsib ilitie s  by includ ing  the 
operation of other businesses such as farmers' grocers. The union 
also purchased a tractor to hire out first and forem ost to the 
members and later to other farmers. The money which accrued 
from these enterprizes was used to support the efforts of the 
union to promote the development of Swazi cotton cultivation.
Matsanieni Cotton Farmers' Cooperative Union
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Matsanjeni Cotton Farmers' Cooperative Union was formed in 
1954, according to oral evidence. It was formed at the initiative of 
Swazi growers in that area who already grew cotton by that year, 
and these were Albert Vilakati, David Dlamini, Samuel Nsibande, 
Deacon Nsibande, Lokhakhi Dlamini, Josiah Vilakati, and Amos 
M a ts e .  1 The year 1954 was the second season since these
cultivators had started to grow cotton in south east Swaziland,
and the champion of Swazi cotton growing and of the formation of
the cooperative was Albert according to the oral evidence offered
by these farm ers.2 The Cooperative Union was formed due to the 
problems of cotton marketing the farmers had faced in the region 
from the beginning of cotton cultivation. Initially, the Union had 
solved the problem of transport by persuading those people in the 
area who owned trucks to hire. This is the type of transport they 
asked for to transport the crop to Magudu, and in the following 
year, 1955, Ralli Brothers offered their truck to the growers as 
transport for their cotton at what they prom ised to be a small 
c h a rg e .3 However, Albert and his colleagues persisted with their 
hired transport from the Xaba Brothers until 1956 when the latter 
company assured them that the charges would be reasonable. 
Before the growers, who were members of the Union, accepted the 
offer they asked the company for assurance that the arrangement 
would not be exploitative in the long run.4
By the time the growers accepted the package it was still not 
clear whether or not the growers would be safe from exploitation 
by sending their cotton to Magudu by the company's transport. 
But since the company offered other inducements such as seeds 
and insecticides at reduced costs, some farmers persuaded their 
colleagues to accept the package and began to send their cotton to 
the market on Ralli Brothers' transport. It is, however, important 
to note that the acceptance of the Ralli Brother package had been 
made possible by some misunderstanding which arose among the 
farmers and divided their opinion.5 While Albert and others were 
reluctant to accept the terms given them by the company since 
they did not give any latitude of choice regarding the sale of their 
crop, other farm ers, who were in the m ajority, gave in. The 
division between the farmers on this issue, was caused by the
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suspicion that Albert and his friends, David and Deacon, were bent 
on turning the Union into an instrument by which they wanted to 
get favours from brokers, favours which would benefit them as 
individuals and not the Union in general. Albert was the Chairman 
of the Union, while the others were members who assisted him to 
run the affairs of the Union.6 However, no m atter how logical 
these allegations might sound, it is difficult to accept them given 
the am ount of tim e the Union had been form ed with the 
unacceptable executive in office. It was at the end of the second 
year of the Union’s formation that the division began to interfere 
with the fulfilm ent of the Union’s objectives. At the time the 
d ivision occurred, it stopped the Union from  striking some 
bargaining power with brokers such as Ralli Brothers and Clark, as 
far as the price at which growers could sell their crop to the 
broker was concerned.^
C onsequently , po ten tia l m em bers of the U nion were 
discouraged from joining by the disgruntled elements. By 1957, 
the Union was left with only a handful membership of 10 and that 
made it hard for it to run its affairs effectively. The main
handicap was that a small membership yielded very little money 
because the Union depended for its fund on the joining fee of 10 
shillings per member per year.8 Money was one of the factors 
which led to the downfall of the Union in that the Chairman,
A lbert, was reported to have consistently refused to give a 
statement of how the funds were being spent. He had also refused 
to be checked on how the money was invested to yield some
profits for the benefit of the members in the long run. In short, 
the running of the Union’s affairs was lacking in democracy in 
much the same way that the leadership and its committee had
been formed. Albert was reported to have been a self-appointed 
chairman on the basis that he possessed some better standard of 
formal education, mainly because he was a teacher by profession 
and he was more qualified to administer the U nion.9 The latter 
excuse for w ielding all the power was the main cause of the 
secession by other farmers other than that of the embezzlement of 
Union funds, particularly when one considers that by the time of 
the division there were less than 20 registered and paid up
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members. These members had paid a membership fee of only 10 
shillings per head per year which was not enough to cause all the 
complaints about the executive having used the money to develop 
themselves at the expense of others. At that time there were also 
lim ited opportunities for the investm ent of the money to yield 
profits that could have been of assistance to the farmers in the 
long run. 10
By the end of 1957, the Union was already defunct, and
rem ained in that state until after 1967 when it was revived. 11 
This revival occurred after the Central Sw aziland Producers’ 
Cooperative Union was formed in Manzini in 1963 at the initiative 
of the M inistry of Agriculture. The Central Swaziland Producers' 
Cooperative Union (CCU) was formed in response to the attempts 
by some farmers, like those of Matsanjeni, to find an instrument 
by which they could facilitate trade and meet the transportation 
problem s which arrested cotton marketing and the purchase of 
inputs that farmers required to promote the cultivation of cotton 
and o ther co m m o d ities .! 2 According to oral evidence, the 
M atsanjeni Union was revived in 1967 by some of those farmers
who had opposed the manner in which it had functioned in the
1950s. E llio t Shiba, Johannes Nzuza and other colleagues are
believed to have been the main moving force behind the revival 
of the Union. But it was argued that since these farmers were
among those who had plotted the downfall of the first form of the 
Union, Albert and those who sympathised with him, opposed the 
recuperation of the Union by those people who had caused its 
downfall in the 1950s. 13 In fact, when the Union was revived in 
1967, the in itiative had come from CCU. The latter Union
encouraged farmers to sell their commodities in bulk, that is, pool 
their produce together in an effort to beat the transportation costs 
in each area. It was also thought that this system could strengthen 
the bargaining position of the farmers whereby they could look
for a consumer whose terms of purchase were more lucrative than 
o thers. Since the M atsanjeni U nion was the only cotton
cooperative in the country then, CCU wanted to revive it and use it 
as a model for cooperatives formed by indigenous farmers in 
response  to p rob lem s w hich ham pered  p ro g ress  in the
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improvement of the rural economy. CCU also suggested to the 
farmers that if they wanted to apply for credit facilities from the 
Swazi Bank, it (CCU) would insist on every farmer to produce a 
m em bership card from his local cooperative, and that could 
qualify farmers for the finance they required. In certain instances 
the credit facilities were handed to the farmers through their local 
cooperatives and that presented an opportunity for the rich 
farmers who had already formed the executive for the Matsanjeni 
Union to benefit from that fund more than any other group of 
farmers. For instance, some farmers who were in the Matsanjeni 
Union Executive, such as E lliot Shiba, are believed to have 
purchased tractors soon after their Union had been revived. 
Suspicious growers in the area concluded that the money Elliot 
and colleagues had used to purchase the jointly owned tractor had 
been taken from that which CCU had given as a loan to improve 
the facilities of the Matsanjeni Union. However, Elliot Shiba and 
colleagues told a different story by pointing out that the money 
had been secured both from their savings and from the Swazi
B ank .14
According to oral evidence when rich farmers engineered 
the revival of the Matsanjeni Union they had perceived of some 
opportunity to improve their farming economy. The professed 
objective for the revival of the Union at that time was to meet the
marketing needs of the farmers in the area and provide farming
inputs, m ost which were obtainable far from  the area and 
involved farmers in heavy expenses. 15 However, some of the 
farm ers thought that the revival of the Union by those rich 
colleagues was meant to promote their interests and not those of 
the farming community in general. It was thought, for instance,
that the rich farm ers wanted to use the Union to ask for
inducements from the consumers like Clark and Cotona. These 
consum ers were keenly interested to win the support of the 
farmers in the area in order to establish some long term economic 
c o o p e ra tio n . 16 However, it is difficult to know what the main 
objective behind the revival of the Union was other than to 
improve cotton cultivation by providing technical advice to the 
farm ers, both members and non-members. This was achieved
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through the cooperation of the Union with the Cotton Board whose 
technician visited the area casually from its formation in 1968.17 
The intended visit of the technician was announced in advance so 
that farm ers could spread the news throughout the area. The 
technician usually conducted dem onstration lessons on a farm 
regarded by the executive and the technician as central to most of 
the farmers in the area. These lessons were due to the initiatives 
of the executives of the U n io n . 18
To alleviate the transport problems of bringing inputs from 
distant retail stores, the Union also constructed some sheds where 
they sold most of the farming inputs to cotton growers. These 
inputs were purchased through a loan the Union secured from CCU 
each planting season. Since farmers were aware of the financial 
and other inconveniences which they encountered in an attempt 
to purchase inputs from  d istant retail shops, they did not 
complain about the prices at which the inputs were sold by the 
Union. A nother achievem ent which the Union made was to 
purchase a tractor in 1969 which was hired out to those farmers 
who needed it and could afford the rental. 19 But this tractor hire 
was yet another cause of some d issatisfaction  among those 
farmers who felt that the conduct of the executive was corrupt. It 
was circulated among the executive members before any other 
member could have access to its services. Some farmers began to 
spread the rum our that executive members did not pay for the 
services of the tractor nor paid even for the fuel instead these 
maintenance expenses were met by those farmers who were not 
the executive. But it is important to mention that these suspicions 
were spread by farmers who had disapproved of the revival of 
the Union by those who had plotted its downfall in the 1950s. In 
short, the disgruntled elements were also looking for something 
they could use to avenge themselves for having been discredited 
in the 1950s.
However, the attempts to discredit the executive of the 
revived Union in the late 1960s were futile due to many factors 
which assisted the executive to prove more productive than its 
predecessors. These factors included the formation of CCU which
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reinforced the existence and effectiveness of the Matsanjeni Union 
by financing it, and the Cotton Board which provided technical 
education to the farmers to iron out most of the problems which 
they encountered in the production of cotton. To the common 
farm ers who were not aware of the governm ent supported 
program m es, all these developm ents were accredited  to the 
efforts of the executive of the Union because when they compared 
these achievements with those which Albert and colleagues made 
in the 1950s the two were not comparable at all. The Union 
membership grew and was more than 500 farmers in Matsanjeni 
and neighbouring areas by 1970, three years after the Union was 
re v iv e d .20 It is important to note that membership to the Union 
was not compulsory nor automatic which means that farmers had 
to take the initiative to seek membership with the Union and pay 
the membership fee of E l ,00 each year.21 Even if the executive 
was corrupt in so far as it misused Union funds, it could have 
taken the farmers a long time to notice it due to the confidence it 
had already built in the farmers by this time, the early 1970s. 
This view was expressed by most of the farm ers who were 
interviewed on field research, that is, the executive were being 
black-m ailed by the dissatisfied elements about its corruption. 
This confidence, which farmers had in the executive, was even 
made stronger in 1971, when some new cotton varieties of 
albacala were introduced and proved more resilient to pest attack 
and had a higher yield capacity than earlier varieties.22
But on the other hand, the executive failed to convince all the 
farmers in the area, both registered and unregistered, to pool 
their output and sell it together through the U nion. The 
explanation for the farm ers' refusal varied from  one year to 
another depending on the ruling price, which meant that in those 
years when the Union's price was better than those of the other 
consumers or even competitive, farmers sold their crop through 
the Union to cut down on the transportation c o s t s . 23 Some of the 
brokers had begun to offer transport at reasonable charges in an 
attempt to attract more customers to them. It was not easy for the 
Union to prevent brokers from dealing directly with growers as 
explained above, and especially  when brokers offered more
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competitive prices than those of the U n i o n . 24 This trend remained 
effective to date, and those farmers who were Union members 
had done so in order to benefit by way of purchasing inputs from 
the Union and also have access to facilities such as the hire of the 
Union tractor to cultivate their fields. Since some of the members 
did not have enough cash to purchase enough inputs from the 
cooperative, they were allowed to get some inputs on credit and 
were contracted to sell to the Union so that the costs were met in 
that way. But some avoided to do so and sold instead where they 
thought the price was more profitable and forgot conveniently to 
settle their accounts with the Society altogether. Since the money 
had been secured from CCU, the latter sought means of recovering 
it, and arranged to deal with farmers jointly with the Matsanjeni 
Union from 1973,25 and its involvement is discussed below.
.C.C.U and the Matsanieni Union 1973-76
After the M atsanjeni-Lavumisa region took the lead in the 
production of cotton in Swaziland from the 1950s, the main focus 
of consumers shifted from other areas to the cotton belt, and that 
was also true of the m inistry of agriculture, particularly  after 
independence. Part of the decision to intervene and seek to 
prom ote cotton cultivation in the area, was to reinforce the 
objectives farmers had to form a Cooperative Union that lacked an 
impact on cotton cultivation, because of lack of support from 
farmers to raise the crop’s output in the area. To this effect CCU
did not deal with the farmers directly as an alien body, but
through the nom inal M atsanjeni U n i o n . 26 The early 1970s saw
some rise in cotton output and some officials of CCU and some rich 
cotton farmers instituted a programme that was meant to process 
cotton seeds into oil products in the south eastern part of the 
country where most of the cotton was grown. It was due to these 
objectives that CCU took up the responsibility of uniting the 
farmers in the area to help improve the output in c o t t o n . 27 CCU 
had hoped to achieve this by providing farming inputs to the 
farmers in the cotton areas on credit with the hope to recover it 
when farmers sold their crop to them at the end of each season. In 
1973, their first year of this program m e in M atsanjeni, the
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farmers cooperated well with the group but in the following years, 
after they noticed that CCU was even charging higher interest 
rates than their own union, some of the farmers avoided to sell to 
CCU and sold instead to Clark at Phongolo where the conditions 
were still better relative to those which obtained in S w a z i l a n d . 2 8  
But in spite of this dissatisfaction some farmers stayed on and 
bought their farming inputs from CCU and also sold the crop to 
them. In that way the farmers argued that the transportation 
costs were being reduced drastically, both for the inputs and even 
for the disposal of their crop to the market and on that score they 
stayed on with CCU.
In 1976 CCU withdrew its support for the cotton farmers in 
M atsanjeni because its attempts to promote among the farmers a 
spirit of a purposeful cooperative had failed. However, in spite of 
this failure some of the farmers benefited from the venture and 
these positive results involved among other things the use of the 
right type of seeds, fertilizers and other inputs to produce 
handsome results. These inputs were sold to the farmers at the 
Union's offices and that reduced the transport costs of bringing 
these inputs from distant places such as Nhlangano, Manzini, and 
others by individual farmers. This attitude took root both among 
those who had cooperated with CCU while they served as an 
executive of the Union and later spread even to those who had 
avoided CCU because they thought that it had come to the region
to exploit them by selling to them inputs at very high prices and
charge them high interest rates for the credit facilities they were
provided. This occurred after the farm ers had realised  that
membership gave them many benefits such as saving money on 
tran sp o rt.
By 1976, the membership was reported to have been more 
than 100 rich 'big' famers, and most of them were eager to 
partake of the benefits extended to the m em bers, and these 
included the hire of a tractor at a reduced charge for members to 
cultivate their fields.2 9 Yet other benefits were those of buying 
shares with the Union to get some profits at the end of each year. 
The Cooperative began before 1976 to lend out money not
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necessarily to farmers in the area, but even cotton growers whom 
they knew well from outside the area, however in the latter case 
the rates of in terest were higher compared to those of the 
members. It was in the same year that the Union increased the 
number of tractors from about one in 1973, to about 7 in 1976, 
and more farm ers could have access to tractile  services. 3 0 
Through their active involvement in their support of the Union's 
activ ities, m ost farm ers were able to u tilise the facilities it 
provided to improve cotton cultivation. The renting of the tractor 
was made possible and easier because the majority of the farmers 
opposed the initial rental of E20.00 or more per hour for tractile 
services and forced it down to the region of E15.00 or slightly 
more per h o u r . 31 Because there were more farmers who needed 
the tractor services, even the depressed rental was still helpful to 
m aintain the tractors and yield some profit which allowed the 
Union to expand its tentacles to other investment avenues.
It was due to the cooperation of the farmers that the Union 
was able to respond more relevantly to the production problems 
of the farmers in the area. These ranged from the provision of 
virtually all the basic farmers’ requirements, and these were sold 
at the offices of the Union to all farmers who needed them. 
Farmers had also insisted that the accounts books be audited by a 
governm ent accountant every year to check the m istakes 
com m itted by the office bearers. It was hoped that this 
development would counteract the embezzlement of Union funds. 
But then, this type of arrangem ent, ideal as it m ight have 
appeared, suffered adversely from a number of loopholes in that 
the farm ers did not send an independent represen ta tive  to 
monitor the session and evaluate the authenticity of the exercise. 
And even before auditing was done, the farm ers needed 
somebody to ensure that all the entries had been made along with 
the deductions reflected and that all these things were shown on 
the accounts books a c c o r d i n g l y . 3 2 W hile some of the farmers 
suspected that several receipt books were used, both real and 
fictitious ones, and that not both forms of receipts were indicated 
on the general account books, other farmers, who constituted the 
m ajority, were not aware of these problems, and they did not
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know of an effective m ethod to exterm inate this undesirable 
practice. However, since there was no clear evidence that these 
allegations were authentic, it was assumed that all was well, and 
auditors had found it hard to spot the tricks which were used to 
d ivert Union funds to prom ote other office bearers' private 
businesses. But in spite of the misuse of Union funds, most of the 
farmers supported the Union after their frustration with the rate 
of interest CCU charged. At least farmers had hoped that the 
Union could use the crop to bargain for a better buyer between 
the two brokers instead of being committed to one consumer even 
when his purchase price was no longer lucrative. In Swaziland, 
these buyers were rep resen ted  by C lark w hose base was 
Phongolo, and Cotona, who operated from their base in Matsapha 
Industrial S i t e . 3 3
It is, however, important to note that bargaining for a 
better buyer, in terms of the price of seed cotton per kg being 
higher than that offered by the other worked out well to the
benefit of office bearers. This was the case particularly where the 
officers persuaded buyers to give them inducements so that they 
could sell the crop to them at whatever price they p a i d . 3 4 jn 
short, the crop was not necessarily sold to a buyer who offered a 
higher price than the other, but one who prom ised a fat bribe. 
What it all meant was that officers used their positions to bargain 
for a fat bribe, and the consumer who bidded in that direction was 
given the crop, and in the end growers were given a raw deal. 
W hichever way one tackles the problem of the failure of these 
unions to inject some incentive into the growers to raise the
output, the source of the failure to do so need not be sought in the
way farmers responded to the broker price, but in the manner in 
which they saw themselves as either beneficiaries or losers since 
they were the ones upon whom production r e s t e d . 3 5 And when 
this was finally noted by the growers, particularly late in the 
1970s, the interest in supporting the Union simply slumped, and
that was facilita ted  by the keen com petition w hich existed 
between the brokers themselves. Oral evidence also revealed that 
even the knowledge of the exploitation of farm ers by office 
bearers, in collusion with brokers, was facilitated by the research
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of each broker on the activities of the other and the purchase 
mechanism of each along with that of the Union office bearers. In 
the end the findings were not published, but were circulated in a 
very surreptitious manner to some individual farmers, and as a
result of this conduct, some farmers decided to sell their cotton as 
individuals to the broker they thought offered better terms than 
those which were offered by the U n i o n . 3 6 Consequently, it was
decided that the form ation of a stronger Union could most
possibly alleviate these problem s, and eventually in 1977 both 
European and Swazi rich farmers in the lowveld decided that a 
national cooperative be formed to protect the interests of cotton 
growers against those of the brokers where the two clashed, and 
that was how the Swaziland Cotton Cooperative Society (SCCS) was 
formed to look into the problems of cotton marketing. It attracted 
mainly rich cotton farmers to sell to it, and it took off the ground 
in 1979 when it began to sign out big loans to its c u s t o m e r s . 3 7
The Swaziland Cotton Cooperative and Cotton Cultivation
From its birth, the SCCS enjoyed a membership of 500 
fa rm e r  s. 3 8 This m em bership consisted of indiv idual farm er 
m em bers or som etim es m em bership was acqu ired  through 
affiliated cooperatives, and the major cotton cooperative at this 
time was still the Matsanjeni Union. The SCCS had drawn up a list 
of extremely ambitious objectives, and it was hoped that that 
would guide it in its operations. First, it sought to protect 
individual farm er interests against those of the brokers who
consumed Swazi grown cotton. Second, it also wanted to safeguard 
farm ers against exploitation by cotton consum er agencies both 
within and those who came from outside the country. Third, the 
cooperative wanted to provide financial help to the cotton farmers 
who had taken up membership with it at low interest r a t e s . 3 9 
According to the layout of these objectives, SCCS had a clear vision 
of the future for cotton cultivation in the country, but lacked some 
practical grain of intelligence. However, it aimed to buy all locally 
produced cotton and then sell it in bulk to those consumers who 
were interested, and in that fashion it had hoped to use that 
position to bargain for a good price. But the long term objective
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was to process the crop into some textile goods in the country. The 
Society had already approached some potential tenders who had 
expressed interest in joining it to provide money to establish such 
an industry, and this arrangement would offer a handsome price 
for the crop. A handsome price would be an incentive to growers 
to increase the land under cultivation and consequently the 
output could, in a corresponding manner, do like-w ise. That 
development could follow after the SCCS established a plant where 
the crop could be separated from the seeds so that only the lint 
could be exported while the seeds were retained to be processed 
into oil products l o c a l l y . 40
The objectives of SCCS were tested in 1979, when a 
program m e, which involved the lending out of money to the 
members was implemented, but SCCS lacked a clear policy of 
adm inistering the credit facilities to its m em bers and other 
customers. Part of the evidence that the scheme was ambitious 
was shown by the way in which it handled its transactions. 
Farmers who applied for the loans had their applications granted, 
and to that effect the Society, which had been given an 
operational loan by the Swazi Bank, gave small loans to its 
customers in good faith in that it did not ask for any form of 
security so that it could be held against the money it signed 
a  w a y .  41 While the names of the debtors had been clearly marked 
out on the registers of the Society, the latter organisation lacked a 
system of ensuring that every farmer, with a loan, would honour 
his commitment by selling his cotton to the Society at least until 
the loan had been settled then he could sell wherever he wished 
thereafter. In short, it needed to introduce some binding clause to 
the customers. By the end of the planting season of 1978/79, the 
total amount of money the Society had given away as loans was 
more than E 2 m . 4 2  When the harvesting season set in it was clear 
that the crop had been affected adversely by the clim atic 
conditions, and this forced the farmers, who had hoped for a 
bumper crop and good year for profits, to sell where they did not 
owe any money so that they recieved all of the money and used 
some to pay their debts with the Society. The agreement with the 
latter was that farmers should sell there so that the debts could
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be cleared whether or not the crop was a bumper. This could 
have also enabled the Society to honour its obligations to the 
Bank, the organisation which had given them the initial capital to 
start off the business. To bypass the Society was easy because 
there was no mechanism by which such a conduct could have 
been counteracted by both the Society and even by the broker 
who had been promised the crop by the Society in the country. In 
the long run very few farmers honoured their financial obligations 
to the Society. Some of the farmers complained about the interest 
rates being too high and when they discovered that there was no 
method by which the Society punished those who dodged the 
payment of the loans, they all avoided selling to it and finally that 
pushed the Society into a tight corner where it could not find any 
money for the settlement of the bank l o a n . 43
However, after some farmers had sold either to Cotona at 
Matsapha or Clark at Phongolo, they paid part of the instalment to 
the S o c i e t y . 44 The reason to avoid selling to the Society, was that 
farmers' incomes were not very impressive which meant that the 
deductions the Society wanted to effect could have ruined their 
hopes of saving for the following season. Most of the instalments 
were much higher than the average farmer's income particularly 
in 1979 and the years that followed immediately after the latter 
year due to the adverse weather conditions which attacked the 
crop at that t i m e . 4 5 The 1979/80 planting season was not 
d ifferent either which meant that there were two successive 
seasons whose cotton output had been depressed, and farmers 
continued to avoid selling to the Society for the reasons already 
stated above, and instead they sold directly to the b r o k e r s . 46 
Unlike in the previous season where some of the farmers had paid 
part of the instalm ent to the Society, there was some deliberate 
avoidance of the payment in the latter season. The explanation 
was that farm ers were deliberately avoiding their instalm ents 
because they had seen some of the senior farm ers doing it 
successfully. The attitude of deliberate avoidance to honour 
support for a society created by them for the sake of promoting 
their cotton cultivation, was not uncommon hence even at 
M atsanjeni as discussed above, a similar attitude was noticed
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particularly from 1 9 7 3  to 1 9 7 6 ,  when farmers dodged C C U . 4 7  But 
this attitude was not only characteristic of the non-office bearer 
members, rather it was a conduct which even officers exhibited 
and the latter were the ones to stake out a lion's share of the 
money, and were among the culprits who avoided deliberately to 
honour their contract to pay their instalments. Consequently, in 
1 9 8 1  the project was abandoned in spite of the marvellous plans 
it had drawn up, chief among which was the separation of cotton 
seeds from the lint before it was exported outside the c o u n t r y . 4 8 
The idea was to sell the two separately because in that way the 
Society could have made more money. And yet among some of the 
Society's long term plans was the localisation of the crop whereby 
some secondary industry could be built to process it into some 
textile commodities, as already pointed out above.
The SCCS's objectives had some socialist blend in themselves 
in that they had set a target time by which they would turn the 
local raw material into a manufactured commodity that would sell 
in the country at reduced prices compared to imports. At least 
that objective had some progressive developm ental concept in 
that the economic structure would not be one where the economy 
depended on exports only but would also include  some 
manufactured goods to earn foreign exchange. Even though these 
goods m ight not have enjoyed a flourishing m arket outside 
Sw aziland, at least its purpose would have been to provide 
alternative goods for the poor who could not afford to buy imports 
especially if their prices were higher than those of the locally 
produced  c o m m o d i t i e s . 49 j n that way the economy would have 
received some positive shot in the arm to compete effectively, 
with some of the weak economies in the region. But due to lack of 
support from among the farmers, and even among the Society's 
leaders, the plans could not be realised.
The execu tive  o fficers of SCCS exh ib ited  some 
unprecedentedly high degree of selfishness couched in the name 
of progress on behalf of the farmers. These were the claims given 
for being voted into office, yet they did so with the objective to
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fatten their purses and leave to go and invest the money in their 
own private businesses. On the other hand, one should also 
consider the reactions of the erstwhile cotton brokers, and these 
had their bases in South Africa where their investments were also 
b a se d .50 As interested parties, the brokers who had some shares 
in manufacturing industries in South Africa logically could have 
been threatened by the farm ers' stand to process their locally 
produced cotton into m anufactured goods in the territory. Not 
only was this move seen from the point of view of killing the 
goose that laid the eggs but was also thought capable of disrupting 
the tim e-honoured consum er m arket for the South A frican 
m anufactured goods that crossed the border into Swaziland. In 
short, the behaviour of the SCCS was not in keeping with the 
principles of the dependency theory whereby the latter should 
allow the established structure which moulds it into servicing the 
econom ic structure  of the already developed w orld to be 
p re d o m in a n t.51 South Africa, in the Southern part of the African 
continent, represented such a centre where most of the economies 
were controlled.52
It is, however, difficult to tell clearly how the SCCS failed to 
realise its objectives of establishing the textile factory for the 
manufacture of cotton goods. It could not have been due to the 
irresponsible conduct of the office bearers of both the Matsanjeni 
Union and that of the Big Bend SCCS only (see sketch map in 
Chapter Six). But in those cases where farmers refused to take up 
mem bership and turned down the terms of sale for cotton as 
stipulated by the cooperative, that might very well have been the 
influence of the brokers to dismantle the constructive plans of 
the Society. And this broker strategy worked well in the long run 
hence the failure of the Society to realise the objectives it was 
formed to fulfil. It was at the time of the growing fame of the 
M atsanjeni Union in the late 1970s, for instance, that some 
brokers began to provide transport services even to those farmers 
who had not been given any attention before. One such example is 
that of Clark who stopped to treat farmers differently as they had 
done before by giving more attention to large scale producers at 
the expense of sm all scale o n e s . 5 3 This was one of those
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subversive moves which brokers used to effectively weaken the 
strategy of the Union, and in the long run it worked because even 
though farmers bought their inputs from the Union's offices, and 
paid hard cash for them, the marketing of the crop continued to 
be handled on an individual basis; between the farm er and the 
b ro k e r .54  Even what was later experienced by the SCCS, was 
precisely the experience of the Matsanjeni Union both before SCCS 
and later. But the main cause of these unions' failure was broker 
bribes of fat offers to office bearers who later sold the crop to 
them at an average price any cotton buyer could have paid.55 jn 
the long run the system by which cotton was marketed did not 
serve the purpose for which the Union was formed, because it was 
the office bearers who enjoyed most of the benefits for which it 
had been formed.
The Ideals of SCCS Cotton and Textile Industry
Part of the grandiose programme for the SCCS was the 
provision of a locally established manufacturing plant with some 
forward and backward linkages with the cotton sector.56 These 
linkages would, from the producers point of view, represent some 
forward linkage, whereby the growers would be assured of some 
constant supply of inputs at affordable prices to stabilise the 
production of the crop. It was also hoped that the factory would 
take into consideration all the production costs of the growers 
when it sold to them the inputs and likewise when it bought the 
crop, but not to the point of jeopardising its profits. But the latter 
could always be made up for when the product was sold locally. 
An example of this is what is happening in socialist countries such 
as Tanzania where most of the basic commodities are produced 
locally from local raw m aterials.57 However, it is important to 
note that the difference in the case of Tanzania is that these 
projects are financed by the government while in Swaziland they 
were financed by the Society only which was form ed at the 
in itia tive  of some rich cotton cultivating entrepreneurs. Yet 
another difference was that the Society in Swaziland did not get 
even moral support from the governm ent apart from  drawing 
money from the Swazi Bank through CCU who acted as their
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guarantor. C lothes are relatively  expensive in Tanzania, but 
theoretically , the levels of the prices are determ ined by the 
production costs over and above other things considered. Had 
these comm odities been produced outside these countries, the 
retail prices could not have taken into account the production 
costs of the raw material in particular and producers could have 
been given a raw deal.
Yet another progressive aspect of the objective of the SCCS 
was to separate the lint from the seeds before it was exported. At 
least this was the plan of the Society, before it actually achieved 
the localisation of the crop. And after that stage there would be no 
need to export the raw part of the crop but only the manufactured 
items. But then lack of unity and of a clearly defined policy to 
back up the project robbed the farmers of the ideal world they 
had planned to create. In fact, this endeavour failed mainly due to 
lack of a clearly  defined governm ent policy to support the 
objectives of the Society. Government allowed the free trade 
policy to continue unhampered under the pretext that the country 
had not yet reached the stage where it could undertake projects 
such as those of the S C C S . 5  8 Government’s argument has always 
been that there was lack of finance for large scale projects like the 
establishment of factories and the localisation of locally produced 
raw materials. The main concern had always been what would 
happen to the poor farm ers’ cotton if the ideal projects of the 
cooperative did not take-off the ground, or even if it did but did 
not m ature to create strong and on-going forw ard-backw ard 
linkages with the farmers for various reasons.
Linkages of this nature, forward and backward have been 
tested in N igeria, for instance, and there they produced some 
positive reaction in that some constant flow of the raw material or 
farm ers ' p roduce betw een the producing  cen tre  and the 
m anufacturing industry was e s t a b l i s h e d . 59 W hether the farmers 
knew that the level of economic growth they had attained in 
Nigeria was a culmination of their struggle to stabilise agricultural 
economy was yet another issue. On the contrary, in Swaziland, the 
conduct of farmers, office bearers included, did not exhibit this
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degree of m aturity, and that was shown by the greed which 
blindfolded their vision and led them into embezzling funds of an 
organ isation  they had form ed them selves, and one which 
represented their own long term economic p lans.60 In the short 
term, however, farmers were the direct beneficiaries though their 
offspring would benefit more in the long run from the economic 
project they had instituted but failed to prosecute.
W hile it might be a plausible argument that investors who 
prom oted cotton and had their base and businesses in South 
Africa, might have deliberately caused the disintegration of these 
endeavours, in this case there is no clear evidence that this factor 
had a major contribution. Second, there is no evidence that the 
farmers were actually very serious about the promotion of their 
programme of economic growth. This stands out clearly when one 
examines the stages of growth of the Society and its economic 
activities. These were non-existent. Not only could it be said that 
the Society enjoyed some limited progress and success, there was 
just nothing worth that label as far as the economic activities of 
the Society were concerned. Soon after the program m e was 
designed and its im plem entation begun that was the point at 
which everything came to a standstill. In fact, since there were 
only two cotton cooperatives worth any note, one will keep 
comparing and contrasting the two, the SCCS and the Matsanjeni 
Union. Even the latter suffered the same fate, though when the 
SCCS closed down without any part of the loan repaid, farmers in 
south east Swaziland began in 1981, to consider seriously the idea 
of making their cooperative there take on some serious projects 
and their prosecution until 1985, when office bearers were kicked 
out of office on accusations of corruption.61
Cooperatives in general, and in particular those which form 
the focus of the discussion here, were without direction just like 
the Department of Cooperatives to which they were all affiliated 
and answerable. Having been constituted in 1963, with a purpose 
to foster the cooperative sp irit in farm ers throughout the 
territory, the department failed to make any head-way just as the 
SCCS and the Matsanjeni Union had d o n e . 62 While one takes into
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account that the department had a policy which guided it in as far 
as what its obligations were, the main problem was the practical 
aspect of its programme, that is, the implementation of the ideals 
was a completely different story from that of the policy. Personal 
interests loomed larger than those of the public for which the 
Cooperative Department had been established. The awareness of 
the D epartm ent of C ooperatives of its duties to national 
cooperative unions was dem onstrated by its advocacy of, and 
governm en t’s due support fo r, the estab lish m en t of the 
Cooperative Departm ent and Education Centre (CODEC) at the 
Ezulw ini Valley in 1979.63 CODEC was one of the support 
organisations which cooperatives had required very desparately 
because it provided the relevant skills cooperatives needed to 
function effectively where the office was staffed with less selfish 
individuals. A part from  providing the m anagerial skills, the 
college also went a long way towards providing skills in book­
keeping and accounts, and that was the area where the source of 
division lay. However, one major point to note is that keeping 
accounts books in proper order is one thing and keeping a faithful 
eye on the funds of the cooperative, was yet another.
It was in the early 1980s, a few years after the college had 
been in operation and had produced some candidates to serve in 
their respective cooperative centres that the problem  of the 
embezzlem ent of cooperative funds went on uncurbed. At that 
level the method of doing it was even more sophisticated because 
those who were responsible to keep the books already knew what 
auditors looked for and what were the symptoms of a sick book­
keeping accountant and how auditors detected the embezzlement 
of f u n d s . 64 However, the embezzlement of money by trained 
accountants, who were aware of their responsibilities and what 
shame the auditors' reports might bring upon their reputation and 
profession had some restraining effect on the extent to which they 
stole the money of their organisations. But in spite of that the 
degree of unity among the farmers in the M atsanjeni Union 
rem ained at its erstwhile lowest ebb. Even though one might 
sound as though the question of money mishandling was the cause 
of the failure of cooperatives to function according to their
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constitution and objectives, there were yet other factors which 
had a far more stronger influence in the opposite direction than 
the latter factor.
In conclusion, the discussion has focussed upon the 
weaknesses of the M atsanjeni Union, by looking at its sudden 
appearance and the problems which led to its failure to function. 
Along these lines the discussion also examined the appearance of 
yet another cooperative which aim ed to absorb all other 
cooperatives to avoid competition among the consumers for the 
lim ited cotton market, the SCCS. It is very hard to tell what 
prompted the leaders of these unions to propose such objectives 
because there was no concerted attempt to adhere to them for the 
sake of their fulfilment. However, whatever the objective for their 
formation, it seems that the leaders, most of whom were rich 
entrepreneurs, wanted to use these organisations to promote their 
interests. The m ultiplicity of investment opportunities created by 
trade led to the corruption of most the rich farmers who wanted 
to exploit cooperatives, and this in turn led to the failure of the 
cooperatives to hold together and realise their objectives.
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The initial collusion of the Colonial State in Swaziland with 
the settlers to ensure that cotton cultivation rem ained a settler 
preserve proved a failure. The two had hoped for a successful 
em ploym ent of the capitalist mode of production to produce 
cotton, the demand of which had been made elastic in Great 
Britain by the decision of the United States of America, in the late 
19th century, to process most of its cotton into textile commodities 
there, and export only an unusually smaller amount of raw cotton 
to Great Britain. In reaction to this the British Cotton Growing 
Association (B.C.G.A.), formed in 1902 in Manchester, took up the 
task of meeting the demand. For the BCG A the question of who 
produced it between the settlers and the indigenous growers of 
the empire, was immaterial. However, in Southern Africa, settlers 
had seen themselves as being more deserving than the indigenes 
to grow the crop. This was the main cause for the Colonial State 
and the settlers to attempt to turn the indigenous growers into a 
labour reserve in Swaziland. They met, however, with very little 
success.
Consequently, after 1910, some settler farmers employed the 
South African system of commercial agriculture of share-cropping 
or tenant farm ing. 1 The gist of this system lay in the fact that 
Swazi growers used a pre-cap italist mode of production to 
produce cotton cheaply and sell to the settler farmers at rock 
bottom prices. The latter listed the crop acquired from Swazi 
grow ers under their nam es, hence there are no archival 
indications that Swazi growers produced cotton already by the 
early 1910s. In some parts of the territory there were cases of 
Swazi growers who produced cotton on their own initiatives, but 
since the Colonial State and some settlers did not approve of it 
because they had viewed them as a labour force, chiefly authority 
was also used by the Colonial State and the settlers in an attempt 
to nip in the bud such a development. Some chiefs were opposed 
to cotton growing because it encouraged a measure of economic 
independence among their sub jects, som ething w hich was
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uncommon in a Swazi setting. Some chiefs also thought that cotton 
production would take the place of food production yet the latter 
deserved more attention because it was the backbone of the 
national economy. Some chiefs feared that cotton pests would 
spread and harm other crops such as foodcrops. Already the 
demand for food exceeded the supply hence chiefly insistence to 
concentrate more on food production. Being aware of this conflict, 
the Colonial State and the settlers reinforced it against the 
attem pts of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee, formed in 
England in 1917, to promote cotton production in the empire. 
However, in spite of the operational principles of the capitalist 
system of production and the revived m arket price of cotton,
some settlers continued to rely on the pre-capitalist mode of 
production to produce cotton through some Swazi growers.
In Swaziland, settlers displayed the South African features 
of settler economy, where earlier in the 1910s, as noted by Colin 
Bundy, political factors played a vital role in throttling African
endeavour in order to protect the settler econom y.2 One would 
not be running headway into generalisation to suggest that the 
role of the South African state in foiling African efforts in the 
early 1910s served as one of the factors which made settlers in 
Swaziland seek the support of the State after W orld War One to 
frustrate Swazi endeavour in cotton cultivation. However, due to 
the experience of the B.C.G.A. in the tropics, where African 
production of cash crops was prominent, settlers received very 
little open support from the latter to frustrate Swazi production of 
cotton. In Uganda in particular, European settlers were beaten 
hands down by African resistance to be turned into a labour 
re se rv o ir .3 However, African resistance had received some strong 
backing from  the Colonial State in Uganda, which made the
Ugandan experience different from those of other parts of the 
empire. Swaziland falls into the same category with Kenya as
noted by Anderson and Throup,^ where the capitalist mode of 
production triumphed, but in Swaziland it lasted for only a while 
due to the impact of the 1929 slump which helped to restrict the 
settlers' role in the cash crop business.
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Chiefly authority over the produce of their subjects and 
control over its distribution was being eroded by the influence of 
trade. The Chiefs' argument that cotton exhausted the soil faster 
than other crops, and spread insects which were harmful to other 
crops, only received the backing of the Colonial State in so far as it 
helped the latter to turn Swazi growers into a labour force for the 
settler economy. It was after the W orld Slump of 1 9 2 9 - 3 1  that 
the collusion between the Colonial State, settlers and chiefs against 
Swazi production of cotton disintegrated sharply. W hat emerges 
here is that economics determined the course of events, even 
political events because it was economics even in the First World 
War period that created the collusion between the state, settlers 
and chiefs to turn Swazi growers into a labour force. By the same 
token, in 1 9 3 2 ,  the Colonial State and the Empire Cotton Growing 
Corporation, formed in September 1 9 2 1 ,  colluded to subvert the 
traditional authority of the chiefs over the control of Swazi 
traditional economy. For the first time since its inception in 1 9 0 4 ,  
cotton was introduced for production by the Swazi in Swazi Areas 
in 1 9 3 2 .  Here the archaic lineage mode of production postulated 
that elders in some African communities determined the tempo of 
the political, economic and social lifestyle of their junior people, 
but already this system showed some contradictions because it
could no longer be argued that chiefly authority over the economy 
of their subjects was still intact and effective to m aintain the 
status quo.
The act of the Colonial State to undermine the political
power of chiefs over the control of the rural economy by forcing
upon the growers the cultivation of cotton agrees with the Marxist 
concept that economics is a determinant of all events be they 
political or otherwise. Similar findings were made in Kenya where 
Anderson, Throup and Lonsdale,5 revealed how the Colonial State 
supplanted a settler economy they had created them selves by 
supporting African endeavours at commodity production during 
times when the settler economy could not handle the problems 
which m ilitated against them. It was particularly  during the
depressions of 1 9 2 0 - 2 2 ,  and 1 9 2 9 ,  that A frican com m odity 
production, to meet the market demand, was prom oted because
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the se ttle r econom y was at its low est ebb due to the
unprofitability of the market price. But when the market price of 
the commodities was revived, the settler economy received state 
assistance yet again at the expense of the African sector. In fact, 
the impact of economics upon political factors was even made 
more elaborate by Claude M eillassoux in the case of the Ivory 
Coast when he studied the Guru and their participation in trade.6
Yet another theme which was im portant to take into 
consideration was the migration of labour power to industrial 
South Africa. Dualism theory which was utilised by Lewis^ to 
explain this type of labour migration proved only relevant here
when used to analyse those cases where heads of fam ilies
m igrated for short periods. Even then m igration was not pre­
determined; rather it was accidental upon the failure of the crops 
of the affected growers. The labour power was fully employed and 
involved in the production circle both in summer and winter. 
Lewis had postulated an export of surplus labour, whose wages 
from  m igration could be invested productively in the rural 
economy. But here most m igrants could hardly save enough 
money for investm ent in farming, in particular due to the low 
level of wages, a point well treated by H. W olpe,^ in the South 
African case where Swazi migrants were employed both on settler 
farms and mines. This theme runs through the study, particularly 
from the duration of World War One, when its magnitude worried 
settlers to the extent of lobbying government to discourage it for 
their benefit.
From  the duration of the Second W orld W ar, and 
particularly at the end of 1945 onwards, due to the changing 
m arket conditions and the expanding investm ent opportunities, 
Hogendorn's version of the vent-for-surplus model^ showed that
while the land mass allowed for more of the physical expansion of 
cotton cultivation, labour power was already precarious especially 
in the sparsely populated cotton growing area of south east 
Sw aziland. But the im pact of trade was reflected  by the 
demographic shift from some tem perate clim atic zones of the 
territory to the low-veld of south east Swaziland, especially in the
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early 1950s. Trade opportunities were not confined to cotton, but 
affected other crops hence various markets were opened up for 
the purchase of these crops. The vent-for-surplus theory helped 
to em phasise  the sign ificance  of these m ultip le  trading 
opportunities, and also of the opening up of dense forests in south 
east Swaziland for the production of crops which enjoyed a viable 
market both locally and externally. Due to the expansion of the 
volume of trade, the infrastructure was also affected positively to 
help facilitate  com m unication and the transportation of trade 
goods. But these trade opportunities failed to promote a sense of 
interdependence between areas which had a more tropical type of 
climate and those with a temperate one, which could have helped 
to reduce the amount of dependence upon commodities that were 
grown outside the country, such as the importation of maize and 
maize products from South Africa.
An investm ent in cotton cultivation also m eant some 
corresponding  im provem ent in ca ttle -rea ring  because some 
farm ers used cattle  as capital to finance cotton cultivation.
Im proving cattle-rearing involved cross-breeding the traditional 
Nguni stock with the modern and com m ercial breed of the
Afrikander and the Brahman. However, not every cotton grower 
could meet the expenses involved here no matter how willing he
m ight have been to maximise his profits by im proving his
trad itiona l breed of cattle . W hile trade opened up many 
opportunities for the cotton grower in south east Swaziland, 
responding to these opportunities was determ ined by one's 
financial ab ility . But w hile the ven t-for-surplus theory, as 
propounded by H ogendorn,10 which postulated a boom in the 
affected economies due to the improvement of the infrastructure 
and expansion of investment avenues, fitted well into the south 
east Sw aziland case, Gunner M yrdal's concept of econom ic 
developm ent as discussed by W alter Elkan was also useful in 
pointing to social d ifferentiation by suggesting that wherever 
economic growth occurred it did not benefit everybody to the 
same d e g re e .11 It was in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
cattle-keepers, particularly those of the hybrid of the Brahman, 
required farms to facilitate cattle-rearing and only a handful of
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them were successful. In the process these trade and investment 
opportunities perpetuated social differentiation that was already 
underway in rural south east Swaziland.
Social differentiation in cotton growing^south east Swaziland 
was facilitated by brokers' provision of credit facilities to the 
growers. This brokerage varied from one farmer to the next, with 
successful farmers receiving the lion's share of broker finance. 
This gross inequality in credit distribution was continued in the 
1960s by the Cotton Board, Swazi Bank, and CCU in their responses 
to the needs of the farmers for technical advice and credit 
facilities respectively. Farmers who knew how to approach these 
organisations for finance, and who could use their expanded 
cotton output to bargain, received more technical advice and 
finance. Financial assistance helped some growers to purchase 
private farms which led to some expansion in their cotton output. 
Tractors were purchased and used to boost the bargaining power 
of successful entrepreneurs in that brokers com peted for their 
expanded cotton and continued to pump more finance to them at 
the expense of less successful en trepreneurs hence social 
differentiation. Broker support of cash commodity production was 
also noted in Ghana by R. Southall and J. Miles and others which 
bears affinity to that of south east S w a z i l a n d .  12 in Tanganyika, J. 
Iliffe  noted that social d ifferentiation resu lted  from  Chagga 
successful exploitation of trade opportunities some of which were 
presented by contacts with Europeans and western education. 13 
Even there not every grower partaking of these opportunities 
benefited  to the same degree; the ability  to exp lo it the 
opportunities determined the level of success of each producer.
However, expansion in cotton cultivation per grower also
meant the expansion of the labour force at a time when labour 
was shrinking. The shortage of labour was yet another factor 
w hich exacerba ted  the financ ia l problem s of som e rich  
entrepreneurs. In order to resolve it, the use of technological
factors, such as herbicides, used to k ill weeds, became the
solution, aircraft for spraying and a harvestor to pick cotton were 
made labour substitutes. Yet other equipment was used to cut
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down the cotton plants at the end of the harvest period to avoid 
the ratooning of the crop which led to the multiplication of insects 
harm ful to the development of cotton cultivation. These were 
among the factors which pushed some of the entrepreneurs out of 
the cotton business by 1985, due to the huge debts they created 
with some of the financial institutions. However, some farmers 
partially solved their labour problem by the use of Mozambican 
refugees.
Most of the prosperous farmers perceived the need in the mid 
1960s to revive their cooperative which was already more than a 
decade old. In their justification they argued that they wanted to 
protect the interests of the small scale farm ers against broker 
exploitation, when in reality they wanted to use this organisation 
to entrench themselves in cotton cultivation. In 1977, yet another 
nation-w ide cooperative was form ed with sim ilar objectives, 
though it came with one which appeared more grandiose, most of 
these objectives were first and foremost meant to promote cotton 
cultivation in the low -lying parts of the country. However, 
divisive tendencies plagued the unions and made nonsense the 
aims for which they were formed. But there were suspicions that 
the divisive tendencies within all these unions were sown by 
outside forces, such as cotton consumers whose interests were 
being threatened by all these programmes.
It was not possible to explore all the areas of economic 
growth following the expansion of trade in cotton in south east 
Swaziland. One of the areas which this study overlooked was the 
role of women in the expansion of trade in cotton, particularly 
from the 1980s, when the United Nations sponsored vegetable 
producer cooperatives which were formed specifically for the 
benefit of women. Vegetables were and are still grown during the 
harvest time, and it would be interesting to investigate the impact 
of these projects on the harvest of the crop. One of the major 
questions to investigate would be the method used by the farmers 
who rely on family labour to substitute female labour at harvest 
time. This becomes crucial in view of the fact that women have 
other duties of their cooperatives to attend to while at the same
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time they must give a hand in the cotton harvest. It would be 
equally im portant also to establish the degree of econom ic 
independence such projects have afforded the womenfolk, and the 
social impact on the families that have been affected by these 
projects.
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Here will be listed names and places of the people who were 
interviewed with some brief notes on who they were and why 
they were chosen for interviews.
M.J. Clark; and Tom Jele of the Cotton Board, Manzini, 20, 25 
July, 1980; and 21 October, 1986. Clark was Chief Executive Officer 
for the Cotton Board before Jele localised the post late in 1980.
Aaron Dlamini, Nsalitje, 25 August, 1987. He lived in the area 
from the beginning of the cultivation of cotton. However, his own 
cotton fields were limited by both lack of money and the labour 
intensive nature of the crop. He was helpful though as far as 
answering the questions asked him.
Absalom Dlamini (Mbabane); W ilson Ginindza (M anzini), 29 
July, 1987. These were the officers of CCU and were interviewed 
on the organisation.
Bernard Dlamini, Sitilo, 23 October, 1980. Bernard grew cotton 
due to the absence of alternative crops that could withstand the 
drought conditions of the area. He could not move to go and settle 
e lsew here  because the area supported  ca ttle -rea rin g  w ell 
compared to other parts of the territory. He wanted to multiply 
his cattle.
David Dlamini, Ngwavuma, 23 July, 20 October, 1980; 27 March, 
12 July, 1982; 15 June, 10 August, 1983; 29 Septem ber, 13 
December, 1984; 15 May, 1 November, 1985. Being one of the 
pioneers of cotton cultivation in the area, he was very helpful in 
im parting some useful inform ation about the developm ent of 
cotton and its expansion to other growers and areas.
Elliot Dlamini, Manzini, 11 August, 1980. He worked for the 
Swazi Bank in Manzini as a loan manager and was in charge of 
farm er's loans.
Gali Dlamini, Ngololweni, 20 June, 1986 was born in the area. 
T hough he did not grow co tton , he had observed  the 
developm ents with in terest and recalled some of the crucial 
problems which hinged on production and marketing.
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Ida D lam ini, N kutjini, 23 July, 1980; Samson and Simon 
Dlamini, Sitilo, 20 October, 29 November, 1980; 12 May, 1983; 19 
September, 1987. They grew up in the area and possessed some 
valuable history of cotton cultivation though their direct physical 
involvement in its cultivation was limited by the fact that it was 
labour intensive.
Madami D lam ini, A lfred M abuza, M afutseni, 28 November, 
1980; 14 February, 1982. Apart from narrating their history of 
cotton cultivation, they also reported on H. Hutchinson, B. Manana 
and Bhongoza Masango who were forces behind the introduction 
of cotton into Swazi Areas.
M adolo D lam ini, M bulungwane, 16 August, 1980; Samuel 
Simelane Mgamudze, 20, 29 October, 29 November, 1980; Mandla 
Dlamini, Sandleni, 16 June, 1986; Majaha Mavuso, Mbulungwane, 
4 February, 1982. Their names were given by Ephraim Tsabedze 
because they were thought to have been fam iliar with the 
activities of Pastor Paul Thwala of Sandleni, and that conclusion 
was based on the fact that they were regular church attendants at 
Sandleni.
Msunduza Dlamini, Malta Mgabhi, Nsalitje, 19 December, 1985. 
These two were neighbours who were involved in cotton growing 
but only from the 1960s, when maize production could no longer
be relied upon due to adverse weather conditions.
Ntombazana Dlamini, Ngudzeni, 5, 25 March, 21 July 1979, 6 
August, 1980. She was wife of Ephraim Dlam ini. She related 
information both on her husband and her brother E.P. Dludlu of 
Ngololweni. When she was contacted in 1980 she was already
sickly and very little was gained from the discussion then. She 
died later in that year.
Samson Dlamini, Sitilo, 29 November, 1980; 29 August, 1984; 
Lomazala Dlamini, Hluthi, 11 February, 1986. These two possessed 
some very useful information on the history of cotton cultivation 
and narrated their own practical experiences with the business.
Simon Dlamini, David Sithebe, Nsalitje, 20 June, 12 July, 1982; 
20 October, 1983; 15 August, 1985. These were cousins who grew 
up together and in the 1950s they built their homes close to each 
other. They grew cotton and reared cattle because the latter
supported the former and vis versa.
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Venn Dlamini, N salitje, 29 November, 1985; 16 November, 
1986; 29 July, 1987. He grew cotton and kept a large herd of 
cattle which he sold from time to time to raise money to finance 
his cotton farming.
Zablon Dlamini, Matsanjeni, 25 August, 1987. He arrived in the 
area in the mid 1950s to rear cattle and grow cotton as sources of 
income. However, he grew very little cotton due to ill health and 
old age.
Petros Dludlu and Petros Dlamini, Majozi Zulu, Maphumzane 
Dludlu, Mlindazwe, 23 June, 11 August, 20 October, 24 November, 
1980; 17 May, 18, 29 July, 1987. These lived in Hlushwana at the 
beginning of cotton cultivation and grew the crop themselves. 
Later they moved to M lindazwe which possessed more grazing 
grounds and supported a strong cattle-rearing econom y upon 
which cotton cultivation depended.
Mafa Dludlu, Mtsambama, 9 June, 1982. He grew up in the area 
and knew about the early cotton experiments by both Swazi 
growers and European settlers because he worked on the farm of 
one of the settlers in the area. Later he grew it on a small field.
Elaine Dludlu, Ngololweni, 18 August, 1980; 11 August, 1982; 
20, 26 June, 1986; 12 October, 27 November, 1987. She is wife of 
E.P, Dludlu who grew cotton from the duration of W orld War One. 
She recalled most of the developments which surrounded cotton 
growing. One of her brothers partook of the M ahonti cotton 
venture. She related  how it was prosecuted. She has since 
remained in the area, and her home is at the top of the valley.
Philem on Fakudze, M acetsheni, 21 July, 20 O ctober, 11 
Decem ber, 1982; 26 M arch, 1983. As a nephew of Samuel 
Fakudze, Philemon was questioned on the activities of his uncle 
because he lived with him and partook of the cotton project 
himself. As a participant and relative who was directly involved 
with the project Philemon could answer most of the questions 
with confidence.
Josiah and Elijah Gamedze, Nsalitje, 23 October, 29 November, 
1980; 16 N ovem ber, 1986; 29 July, 1987. A lfred Gamedze,
Nsalitje, 27 M arch, 1982; 12 June, 1983; 12, 15 October, 29 
November, 1985; 16 November, 1986. John Gamedze, Nsalitje, 29 
November, 1985; Moses Gamedze, M polonjeni, 29 July, 1986;
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Aaron Shongwe, M polonjeni, 29 July, 1982; M atsapha Gwebu, 
Nsalitje, 13 December, 1984. These growers were indigenous to 
the area and had grown up in the area on a farm which later 
became their settlement. Their history as cotton growers began 
when they were squatters on the private farm. Later when the 
area became a Swazi settlement they grew cotton for themselves.
Simon Gamedze, Lukhula, 29 July, 1982. He grew cotton on a 
sm all scale because he was ham pered by the absence of 
marketing facilities.
Abel, Petros, Samson, Gumbi; Solomon Mahlobo; Almon Linda, 
Lubulini, 16 Novem ber, 1984; 28 July, 10 August, 1985; 29 
November, 1987. These were questioned on cotton production in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s in Lubulini. Some of them, like 
Abel, were doing well as cotton cultivators. He operated a 
butchery in addition to cotton cultivation. He also owned cattle 
which numbered in several hundreds.
Almon Hlophe, Lavumisa, 29 July, 1987; Luke Hlophe, Sitilo, 24 
August, 1987. In addition to growing cotton on their small 
holdings these growers also worked on Nkwanyana's farm for the 
maintenance of their tractors.
Simon Khumalo, Lozitha Tibiyo Offices, 19 July, 1980. He was 
questioned on the investment plans of his company towards the 
promotion of cotton cultivation.
Titus Kunene, Manager of Cotona, Matsapha, 21 July, 11, 23 
August, 1980. He was questioned on the progress made by his
company in promoting cotton, its problems and solutions.
A.E. Language, Nhlangano, 14 July, 1986; 21 February, 1987.
She is wife of A.E. Language who began to buy cotton in
Goedgegun in the late 1920s and carried on with that trade well 
into the 1950s when he was outclassed and forced out of the trade 
by Ralli Brothers and Company.
Alice and Lofana Mabuza, Nietgegund, 17 July, 1983. These two 
claim ed that they attem pted to grow cotton in the 1920s but
stopped after they had been discouraged by some settlers who
complained that Swazi growers stole their cotton to boost their 
meagre output.
Adam  M abuza, Jam es M am ba, (D w aleni), Ida M khonta 
(Thunzini), M elashwa Shongwe (N ietgegund), M adala Nhleko,
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(Ngwane), 7 September, 1982; 15 March, 1985. They had some
interesting inform ation on the conflicts which existed between
European farmers and Swazi growers on the allegations that the 
latter stole their counterparts' cotton to swell their meagre output.
Duma M abuza, M babane, 25 October, 1980. This one was 
employed as an accountant of the Swaziland Cotton Cooperative 
Union at Big Bend. He claimed knowledge of the problems which 
grounded the cooperative.
Majuba Mabuza, and Abel Shongwe, Nsalitje, 20 October, 1980. 
Though they lived in the area by the time cotton was introduced, 
the extent of their cotton cultivation was limited by lack of capital 
and by the fact that the crop was labour intensive.
Albion Mafu, Bulungu, 20 September, 1984. He was a member 
of Samuel’s church and was helpful in providing answers to some 
questions but his memory did not hold all the crucial facts which 
were needed to write his former pastor's history.
Sibhebhu M ahlalela, M akhava, 21 October, 1983; Alpheus
M ahlalela, N salitje, 12 May, 1983. They argued that clim atic 
conditions forced them to grow cotton, otherwise they reared 
cattle as a source of income, and grew their own food instead of 
buying it.
Nganga Mamba, Ngudzeni, 6, 18 August, 1980. He was asked 
about the history of cotton cultivation by Ephraim Dlamini of the 
same area.
Mzila Mamba, Lobhengula Shongwe, Sitilo, 27 December, 1985. 
These grew cotton from the late 1950s, but had no concrete 
knowledge of the problems of other farmers apart from theirs and 
those of relatives.
Albert Manana, Petros Sithebe, Sitilo, 20 October, 1980; 26 
September, 27 December, 1987. These three growers had their 
roots in the area, recalled the origins of cotton cultivation, the 
problems of its production and the solutions. They made some 
m ajor im provem ent in its cu ltivation  and accum ulation of 
property later.
Brian M. Manana and Dinah, Lwandle, 20 July, 11 August, 11 
September, 1980; 30 Dcember, 1982; 17 June, 30 December, 1986. 
M anana, along with his wife also possessed some valuable 
information about the introduction of cotton into Swazi areas in
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the 1930s. Selected by H. Hutchinson, he was employed to visit 
those parts of the country which were suited to cotton to discuss 
the im plem entation of the project with chiefs with a view to 
persuade them to cooperate.
Luke Mangwe, Tshedze, 28 November, 1980. His involvement 
in cotton and tobacco trade with European farmers at Goedgegun 
was helpful because he could provide some very rare information 
on the problems of marketing these crops.
Abel Maseko, Sitilo, 20 July, 1984; Samuel Motsa, Matsanjeni, 
11 February, 1986; Amos Jele, M atsanjeni, 11 February, 1986; 
Mahhusha Jele, Sikhalasebhodzwe, 11 February, 1986. They were 
lukewarm cotton growers who avoided its expansion due to lack
of capital. They also kept cattle on a large scale, in the region of 60
herds each.
Elliot and Josiah Masuku, Albion Nxumalo, Jotham Simelane, 
Mgamudze, 20, 29 October, 1980; 31 July, 1982; 26 August, 1984; 
15 May, 1985; 12 May, 21 June, 1986; 8 July, 1987. At a meeting
convened by Jotham to facilitate my interviews with these people
general questions were asked, and later specific ones probing into 
the growers' individual cultivation of cotton were asked. Most of 
these people could recalL only the recent past and that did not 
involve the history of the introduction of cotton in the area.
M avis M asuku, M ary Gwebu and M ahova Lugogo, Moses 
Lugogo, Aaron Nxumalo, Ngololweni, 18 October, 1980; 20, 26 
June, 1986; 12 October, 1987; 11 April, 1988. These were selected
due to their history of contact with deceased relatives who were
familiar with the events. The history of cotton had been narrated
to them by their parents.
David M azibuko, M polonjeni, 29 July, 1982; Lot Ndlovu, 
Mgamudze, 31 July, 1982. These combined cotton with maize and 
due to this division of the labour they did not do well in either of 
the two.
Alpheus M aziya, M afutseni, 20 Septem ber, 1980; M adliza 
Nkambule, Kwabhudla, 22 September, 1980; Bernard Shongwe, 
M afutseni, 20 Septem ber, 1980. They were asked about the 
introduction of cotton TL Hutchinson into the area and the 
problems which m ilitated against the project.
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M hlupheki M asuku, Luve; Lobamba M asuku, Lulakeni, 27 
December, 1982; 13 February 1983. He lived in the area and
worked on Wallis' farm to earn money to pay his taxes and meet 
other needs.
Amos Mathe, Madlangampisi, 17 January, 1983. He was one of 
the early Swazi labourers on settler cotton plantations in the area.
Aaron Matse, Mhubulwane Matse, Amos Matse, Albion Matse, 
Matsanjeni, 23 July, 20, 21, 27 October, 16 November, 1980; 20 
June, 1982; 9, 12 June, 1983; 21 March, 21, 29 August, 1984; 8
March, 25 May, 1985. These were brothers, and among them 
Amos was the first to grow the crop and even to purchase a 
tractor to enhance his cotton cultivation. He too operated other 
businesses such as a trading store and a butchery. They owned 
cattle from their cultivation of cotton.
M.J. Mcetshwa, Phongolo, 11 August, 21 October, 1985. He was 
Manager for J.L. Clark ginnery at Phongolo at the time he was 
interviewed. However, he could not answer questions which were 
based on the activities of the company in the 1950s because he 
was not there at that time.
P.W. Meyer, Mhlatuze, 20 October, 1980; 21 December, 1987. 
He was among the early growers to undertake cotton cultivation 
on a large scale. He was also instrumental in the establishment of 
the R alli B ro ther ginnery at M hlatuze. T hough he was 
uncooperative with the author during field studies, he gave some 
brief yet very useful information on the cotton cultivation in the 
lowveld of Swaziland.
Jerome M hlungu, Hlushwana, 7 August, 1983; 11 February, 
1984; 15, 17 August, 1985; 17 May, 1987. He arrived in the area 
in 1955 to grow cotton and rear cattle. He is also one of the rich 
farm ers today.
Mandla Mkhonta, Sitilo, 24 August, 1987. He was helpful as far 
as providing inform ation on the M atsanjeni Union and other 
cotton related issues.
Samson Mkhonta, Mgamudze 15 September, 1983; 15 May, 29 
November, 1985; 11 February, 19 June, 1986. He was helpful in
suggesting problems which he, as demonstrator, thought were an
obstacle to the expansion of cotton in the region by the 1980s. He
often agreed to come along with the writer to some farmers to
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conduct interviews. In his presence even the least willing to 
answer the questions were intimidated to do so.
Almon Mlotsa, Adam Gamedze, Moses Musa, Mahosha Mamba, 
Lavumisa, 23 July, 20 October, 1980; 4 April, 1982; 15 May, 1985. 
M ost of them  were fam iliar with the problem s of cotton 
cultivation expe|rfcnced by their employer Nkwanyana.
Maganga Mlotsa, Maloma, and Lobamba Masuku, Lulakeni, 17 
November and 27 December, 1982; Luke Shongwe, Lulakeni, 3 
March, 1983 respectively. These were familiar with the history of 
cotton growing in the area, particu larly  that of Ndawonye 
Sikhondze and others.
Almon Mthembu, Sitilo, 27 December, 1985. He was involved in 
cotton production from the mid 1950s and was still growing it but 
on a limited scale.
Esaw Ndlangamandla, Ka Liba, 15 December, 1984, 20 June,
1986. He claim ed that his age was more than 100 years, and 
nobody in the area could contradict him because all those who 
were asked about the validity of the things he said claimed that 
he was the most senior citizen in the area who knew most of the 
past more than anybody else. He also claimed that his herbalist 
skills were blessed by God through Rev Jackson of Mhlosheni 
Mission Station. The latter was also said to have inspired E.P. 
Dludlu to undertake cotton cultivation in Ngololweni after the First 
Wrold War. On that score he was very helpful in a number of 
ways.
Elma Ndlangamandla, Macala Mavuso, Muntu Nkosi, Mganwini, 
18 July, 11 August, 1987. Even though they arrived in the area in 
the 1950s they had since been involved with cotton cultivation 
and knew the problems involved in the business.
Almon Ngcamphalala, Phonjwane, 11 September, 1984. He was 
a m em ber of Samuel Fakudze's church and was helpful in 
providing some useful information on the pastor.
Joshua Ngozo, Logwaja Mamba, Pauline Mamba, Kuka Mamba, 
Lufu Nhleko, Ngudzeni, 5 March, 1979; 29 July, 6, August, 11 
September, 1980; 19 November, 1986; 27 November, 1987. These 
were interview ed about Ephraim  Dlamini. Some had assisted 
Ephraim by working on his cotton fields. Ngozo in particular was
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even more helpful because he had lived w ith Ephraim  and 
assisted him with cotton cultivation. Ngozo was Dlamini's nephew.
Almon and Petros Nkambule, Lavumisa, 29 July, 1982; 17 May, 
1987; Amos Matsebula, Sitilo, 17 May, 1987; Phesheya Mhlongo, 
Hlushwana, 8 July, 1987; Abel Masuku, Mgamudze, 8 July, 1987; 
Mampondvo Kunene, Nsalitje, 29 July, 1987. These were involved 
in cotton cultivation and cattle rearing though progress in the 
former was poor due to lack of adequate capital to finance it.
Johannes Nkwanyana, Lavumisa, 23 July, 20, 28 October, 25 
November, 1980; 15 June, 21 August, 1982; 5 March, 12 May, 15, 
21 August, 15 September, 29 November, 1983; 12, 26, 30 August, 
1984; 10, 15 May, 17, 27 August, 1985; 9, 19 May, 19 July, 26
August, 1986; 25, 26 August, 1987. He was born and brought up
in the area, but went to school in Manzini where he also worked 
with the Catholic Mission Station as a shopkeeper and developed 
the skills of an entrepreneur. This skill also contributed to his 
success in that business. Today he owns many shops at Lavumisa, 
a restaurant, garage, and many other businesses, and he is the 
most successful of all the famers in the region.
Simon Noge, Swazi Bank, Manzini, 20 August, 1980. He was in 
charge of the loans given to farmers to finance their farming and 
th e re fo re  was fam ilia r  w ith  the p rob lem s o f finance  
adm in istra tion .
Deacon Nsibande, Hlushwana, 23 July, 21 August, 20, 29 
October, 16, 29 November, 1980; 27 March, 31 July, 1982; 15 
June, 10 August, 1983; 20 July, 29 September, 1984; 11, 15
August, 1985; 11 February, 11 March, 16 November, 1986; 17
May, 1987. He began to grow cotton in the early 1950s, two years 
after A lbert V ilakati had started to cultivate  the crop. He 
possessed a mine of cotton history.
Samuel Nsibande, Hlushwana, 23 June, 20, 21, 29, 30 October, 
1980; 11 M arch, 12, 19 May, 11 June, 15 Septem ber, 29 
November, 11 December, 1983; 5 March, 19, 29 August, 27 
October, 1984; 17, 21 August, 26 September, 1, 16 November, 
1985; 19, 21 June, 1986. Samuel was also a successful cotton 
growing entrepreneur who began to grow the crop in the early 
1950s. He owned two farms on which he grew cotton and also 
keept cattle. He concentrated on these businesses and that made
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him more successful than his colleagues who m ultiplied their 
businesses to a point where they could not m anage them 
effectively.
Lucy Nxumalo and Ida Nxumalo were relatives, Mafutseni, 11 
August, 8 September, 1980. Lucy's husband, who was long dead at 
the tim e the research was conducted, had grown cotton in 
Mafutseni in the early 1940s in response to the cotton demand 
made on them by Messrs Kynocks and Company, J.L Clark and 
Company and Cotona. Her son Ephraim Nxumalo had advised them 
later on how to grow cotton especially after his training in South 
Africa.
Ephraim Nxumalo, Mafutseni, 15, 20 July, 4, 11 August, 8, 11 
September, 7 December, 1980. He devoted his time to the author’s 
work by taking him to various people he knew to have been 
involved with cotton growing. Having been an agricultural officer 
in the area from 1945 to the mid 1970s when he retired, Nxumalo 
was aware of m ost of the problem s which hindered cotton 
cultivation in those areas of Swaziland which he had visited as 
agricultural officer. His knowledge, which he suggested be checked 
against that of other people was helpful to identify the major 
themes upon which cotton cultivation hinged during W orld War 
Two and the subsequent years. He died tragically in 1981.
Mhlupheki Nxumalo, Mafutseni, 15, 19 July, 11, 21 August, 8 
September, 1980; 13 February, 1983. He was not involved in 
cotton cultivation because the crop was labour intensive and yet 
according to him the money it offered then did not warrant the 
inconvenience and costs its production entailed . He was a heavy 
d rinkard .
Philem on Nxum alo, Samson Nxumalo, and Abel Nxum alo, 
Matsanjeni, 23 July and 20, 23 October, 29 November, 1980; 11, 
16 September, 1984; 16 September, 1987. These were brothers. 
They all began to grow cotton in 1959 in the area. Initially they 
came from the temperate area of the territory specifically to grow 
cotton in 1959.
Simon Nxumalo, Matsanjeni, 23 October, 1980. He had a vague 
idea of the history of cotton cultivation in the area because he did 
not grow it himself on account of it being capital intensive.
257
A lpheus N tshangase, M atsanjeni, 20 O ctober, 1980. His 
settlement in the area dated back to the mid 1970s when cotton 
cultivation was more lucrative than before due to the risen price. 
He had originally come from Hluthi.
Elliot Ntshangase, Nsalitje, 29 November, 1985; 16 November, 
1986; M hlushwa Nkosi, N salitje, 16 November, 1986. Poverty 
ham pered progress in cotton cultivation  by these growers. 
Interest in the crop was however, very strong.
M bhavumane Ntshangase, M atsanjeni, 16 July, 5 September, 
1985. He joined cotton cultivation from the tem perate Hluthi in 
the mid 1970s and has since made good progress in it.
Mnukwa Nyatsikati, Mtsambama, 7 September, 1982. He did 
not grow cotton but was helpful in answering many questions on 
cotton production in the area.
Johannes Nzuza, Matsanjeni, 23 July, 20 October, 1980. He was 
involved in cotton cultivation from the early 1950s. Johannes died 
in the early 1980s still growing cotton.
John Douglas Scot, Luve, 10 August 1980 and 11 March, 1982. 
Scot was one of the early European settlers who arrived in the 
country in the 1890s along with Wallis and others and settled in 
Manzini. He was not involved in cotton cultivation but noted most 
of the im portant developments which occurred and had some 
bearing on cotton. He knew for instance, the reasons for the 
failure of some early cotton growers to attract enough Swazi 
labour to their cotton plantations.
Elliot Shiba, Matsanjeni, 23 June, 19 August, 20, 28 October, 25, 
29 Novem ber, 1980; 20, 31 July, 21 Septem ber, 1982; 12
February, 19 May, 15 September, 25 October, 1983; 12 May, 12, 
29 August, 24, 27 October, 1984; 11 February, 9, 15 May, 17, 25 
August, 1985; 19, 29 May, 16 July, 26 August, 1986; 21 August, 
16 September, 16, 24, 28, 29, November, 1987. He was one of the 
rich cotton cultivating entrepreneurs. He owned two farms, two 
trading stores, a repair garage, a butchery, a grocery, a petrol 
filling station, motor spare parts shop and some restaurant. His 
business was however, nearly brought to the knees in 1985 by 
the many investm ents he had made and yet failed to manage 
effectively. He owned hundreds of cattle which he slaughtered to
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sell at his butchery. He was a force to reckon with in these 
businesses.
Samuel Shongwe, Hlushwana, 16 May, 29 November, 1985; 11 
February, 27 September, 16 November, 1986; 17 March, 29 July, 
16 N ovem ber, 1987; M abhalane Shongw e, H lushw ana, 11 
February, 1986; M ajaha Sibisi, Sitilo, 20 July, 1984; Samson 
Shongwe, Sitilo, 28 July, 1982; Elizari Xaba, Sitilo, 31 July, 1982. 
W hile these growers were involved in cotton cultivation, they 
were also equally involved in the production of m aize and 
vegetables for sale and consumption
Shadrack Sibanyoni and Petros Thwala, M babane, 25 July, 
1980. Shadrack was in charge of Establishm ents and Training 
Department at the time of the field studies, but due to the fact 
that he had served in the 1960s as Director of Agriculture, he was 
approached for assistance and he suggested various places and 
people who could be of some help to the research. Thwala also 
played the same role because, though he was not fam iliar with 
most of the information sought, he suggested people who could 
assist.
Almon, Joseph, Simon Sihlongonyane, Mgamudze, 23 October, 
1980, 19 May, 29 December, 1982; 10 August, 1983. They grew 
up in the area but their interest in cotton was not very strong due 
to the capital intensity of the crop. They also complained about 
the poverty of the soil on which they cultivated the commodity. 
They needed to boost its fertility with chemical fertilizers every 
planting season.
Ndawonye Sikhondze, Lulakeni, 19 December, 1982; 12 August, 
1983; 9 May, 12 August, 1986; 29 July, 1987; 2 January, 1988. He 
began to grow cotton along with other crops such as sweet 
potatoes in the early 1950s. Potatoes were grown mainly for trade 
though some of it was sometimes consumed dom estically. As a 
polygamist, he worked hard to justify his social reasons to have 
more than one wife and he was very prosperous. He owned cattle 
which were invested in cotton cultivation and the promotion of 
farming in general.
Almon, Esaw, John, Samson, Simeome Sikhosana, Makhava, 20, 
29 Novem ber, 1980; 19 December, 1982; 12 May, 1983; 16 
N ovem ber, 1986; 29 May, 1987; Aaron Jele, M akhava, 19
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December, 1982. These were lukewarm cotton growers who were 
unaw are of a num ber of crucial issues involved in cotton 
cultivation.
Ephraim Tsabedze, Tshedze, 20 July, 16 August, 1980; 8 March, 
15 August, 1982; 16 June, 1986; 8 March, 1987. He was helpful 
both in relating the story of cotton cultivation and suggested 
names of the people he thought could be helpful.
A lbert V ilakati, M atsanjeni, 23 June, 20 October, 16, 29
Novem ber, 1980; 8, 27 M arch, 1982; 11 M arch, 1983; 29
September, 1984; 8 March, 1985; 11 February, 26 November, 28
December, 1986; 29 November, 1987; 8 January, 1988. He was the
resource person because he was the first Swazi to grow cotton in 
Matsanjeni early in the 1950s. He was a teacher by training but 
when he started to grow cotton he abandoned teaching because he 
thought that cotton growing was more lucrative than the other 
source of income.
John, Samson, Samuel, James, Joshua Vilakati, Makhava, 20 
October, 1980; 31 July, 1982; 16 August, 1983; 30 September, 
1984; 1 November, 1985; 9, 29 May, 16 November, 1986; 29 May,
1987. These brothers were interviewed on the question of cotton 
cultivation and the effectiveness of RDAS on cotton production
since their farming took place in such an area. They produced 
cotton on some jointly maintained farm where they claimed their 
output to be in the region of 5 bales per acre per grower which 
was the standard output then on a well maintained field.
Samson, and Samuel V ilane, M atsanjeni, 20 O ctober, 29
November, 1980; 20 July, 1982; 25 October, 1983; 11 February, 29 
August, 1984. These two were brothers who came to the area 
specifically  to grow cotton and rear cattle  as a secondary
engagement. Both of them owned a tractor each but they had not
yet diversified their rural economy to run other businesses. The 
cause of that was mainly capital limitation.
Captain G.L. Wallace, Mbuluzana-Luve, 10 August, 1980. Wallis 
was among the first few European farmers who began to grow 
cotton in 1904. According to his testimony, in 1904 the first cotton 
experiments in Swaziland were undertaken by him, M iller and 
Frank Buckham. His occupation was agricultural and pastoral
farm ing.
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Sydney B. Williams, Manzini, 25, 30 July and 11 August 1980. 
W illiams had served as Assistant Resident Commissioner for the 
Manzini (Bremersdorp) D istrict in Swaziland in the 1930s at a 
time when the ECGC attempted an introduction of cotton into 
Swazi Areas. H. Hutchinson had m obilised him to convene a 
meeting with the King (then paramount chief) and chiefs on a 
national level to hammer into chiefs' heads the noble ideals of 
introducing cotton into Swazi Areas. He only died in December 
1980.
David, Fendru Xaba, Sitilo, 20 July, 1982; 29 August, 1985; 29 
Novem ber, 2 Decem ber, 1987. They were among the most 
p rosperous grow ers who accum ulated  ca ttle  from  cotton 
cultivation. Though their homes were not very im pressive to 
reflect that as cotton farmers they had acquired most of the key 
farming inputs like tractors with all the other equipment which 
facilitated farming with a tractor.
L. Zini, Extension Officer, Nhlangano Agricultural Offices, 30 
July, 27 October, 1980. His story on M alangwane Dlamini was 
quite inform ative because he knew almost every detail of the 
circumstances which surrounded his attempt to grow cotton. He 
was the first informant to suggest that the writer would benefit 
from his investigation of the history of Samuel Fakudze and his 
cotton cultivation since even Malangwane had been inspired by 
Fakudze to grow cotton in his home area, Ngomane at that time. 
He has already retired  his services from  the M inistry  of 
A griculture.
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